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Foreword
TItis is the second volume in the International Series on Applied Systems Analysis
established by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in
order to promote the development and application of systems analysis across
national boundaries.
TItis volume by Dr. Rudolf Avenhaus has been selected for inclusion in the
Series because it comprises a thorough review of the analytical tools that have been
developed to deal with a problem of considerable international importance - keep-
ing track of rare or dangerous materials. Such problems have arisen with particular
urgency in the field of nuclear energy, where the materials of concern are plutonium
and uranium as they flow through the nuclear fuel cycle. Indeed, much of the
analytical apparatus that Dr. Avenhaus presents has been developed or refmed with
this application in mind. However, the value of this monograph arises from the fact
that these techniques can also be applied to the monitoring ofthe flow ofpollutants ,
such as sulfur dioxide; or potentially dangerous materials, such as carbon dioxide,
that may affect the global climate; or rare materials, such as the precious metals
in a mint. Furthermore, many centrally planned economies already employ material
balance accounting as a part of their planning procedures. And as awareness of the
finiteness of the earth's readily accessible resources and the need to utilize and re-
utilize them efficiently grows, the likelihood increases that other nations and insti-
tutions will adopt such techniques as well. The methodology described in this
monograph can form the basis for such applications.
Dr. Avenhaus is concerned with two cases: one in which the issue is how well
material can be accounted for, given the imprecision of measurement techniques;
the other in which the issue is how well this can be done in the presence of an
antagonist (the diverter of plutonium or the polluter) whose interest is to keep the
monitor from knowing that some material has been removed. His analysis of these
cases draws upon statistical methodology and, in the second case, the theory of
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games. In sum, he presents the basic tools needed to analyze a particular kind of
system, one in which the flow and storage of one or more materials is of central
importance. This volume is a significant contribution to the study of such
systems because it brings together in a unique synthesis results that have been ob-
tained in a wide range of fields of application, from nuclear energy to resource
economics, and in many countries.
We take added pride in including this volume in the International Series because
Dr. Avenhaus is an IIASA alumnus, having spent 2 years with the Institute from
1973 to 1975. Indeed, he was the first full-time scientist to begin work at the
Institute after its charter was signed in October 1972. Some of the work on this
volume was accomplished at IIASA, while the remainder was done at the Kernfor-
schungszentrum, Karlsruhe, to which Dr. Avenhaus has returned.
This volume, which brings together an internationally developed array of analy-
tical methods to treat a class of problems of international importance, is an ex-
cellent example of the kind of result that IIASA was established to produce.
ROGER LEVIEN
Director
Preface
The idea of writing on material accountability problems and methods for their
solution grew out of three major factors:
• In the Nuclear Research Center at Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of Germany,
a small group of scientists has been working since 1968 on the problem of inter-
national nuclear material safeguards. The basic idea of this work was to establish a
safeguards system based primarily on material accountability.
• In 1970, Resources for the Future, Inc., in Washington, D.C., published a
monograph dealing with environmental problems caused by modem technologies.
The authors demonstrated that material accountability could serve very well as a
tool for analyzing these problems, and they even proposed as a long-term goal the
establishment of an international environmental control authority.
• In 1971, more than 40 nations, under the auspices of the International
Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, agreed upon a safeguards system in partial ful-
fillment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this very
special area the material accountability principle could be accepted as the primary
safeguards tool because of its inherent "objectivity" and "formalization."
With the background of these three lines of development, and bearing in mind
the wide range of mass balance considerations in science and technology, it was
quite natural for me to try to describe the idea of material accountability and its
far-reaching applications, especially for international control problems as exempli·
fied by nuclear material safeguards, to a broad scientific, technical, managerial, and
perhaps political audience. In this sense, the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) seemed the ideal institution to assist in publishing the
present monograph.
ix
xThere is another, and equally important, reason that lIASA's participation in
the publication of this work in its International Series on Applied Systems Analysis
is appropriate: the problems and their solutions are presented primarily from a
methodological point of view - the first half of the monograph deals with theory
and methods, the second half with applications. Therefore, nASA seemed to be
the ideal sponsor, because its in-house research follows the same strategic lines of
combining methodology and applications.
While the outline of the monograph was first conceived in Karlsruhe in 1972, the
major part of the work was done in the stimulating atmosphere of lIASA during the
author's stay there. The monograph was completed in Karlsruhe, where the Re-
search Center's facilities provided excellent access to the newest literature in the
field. In fact, work on the book had to be stopped somewhat artificially: a literature
search service, using the key words "material accountability, material balance, mass
balances" reports an increasing number of references each month (at the moment
5 to 10); this may give an indication that the subject has attracted considerable
attraction and that - perhaps - time has come for a monograph. On the other hand,
it was not possible to work out some new and promising ideas; for example, the
mercury and cadmium balances in national economies, which would illustrate the
ideas presented here extremely well, could only be mentioned (in section 7.3.3) but
not fully analyzed. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the presentation of the basic
methods, as well as of the applications, is clear enough that the analysis of further
new (and always somewhat different) examples can be carried through by interested
readers themselves.
When I fint raised the idea of the present monograph, I was immediately and
strongly supported by Carl Bennett of Battelle Northwest in Seattle, Washington,
who, because of the dominant role he has played in this field, might be called the
"father of safeguards systems analysis." In the same sense, Wolf Hafele, formerly
director and project leader in the Nuclear Research Center in Karlsruhe and
now Deputy Director of IlASA, provided intellectual and practical support
throughout the work that produced this volume. Without the active role of these
two scientists, this monograph would have been realized only with great difficulty,
and I would like to thank them warmly for their support. In addition, thanks are
extended to the many friends, colleagues, and visitors in Karlsruhe and Laxenburg,
with whom the author worked on several aspects of this broad area and who read
first drafts or listened to presentations and gave their comments and advice.
RUDOLF AVENHAUS
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1 [nt roduct ion
The purpose of this monograph may be summarized very concisely: it is meant to
demonstrate that "the law of conservation of mass is not an Einsteinian abstrac-
tion,· but rather applies in real life."l In order to illustrate this statement in a
preliminary way, four problems will be formulated that may be viewed as rep-
resentative of the kinds of application to be considered:
• As the amount of fossil fuels burned increases continuously, the amount of
carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere also increases continuously. One
knows that, because of exchange processes between atmosphere, hydrosphere,
and biosphere, not all of the carbon dioxide remains in the atmosphere; however,
one wants to know quantitatively how the carbon dioxide content of the atmos-
phere will develop. This is important because, among other consequences, a major
change in the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere might have a significant
impact on the global climate (see, e.g., Matthews et al. 2 and Zimen and Altenhein3 ).
• The nuclear materials safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy
Agency in Vienna, set up in partial fulfillment of the nuclear weapon nonproli-
feration treaty, is aimed at the "timely detection of the diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture
of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown
and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.,,4 It has become
clear that the only possibility of fulfilling this requirement in an objective and
rational way is to devise and operate a system that allows complete accountability
of all the nuclear material in the nuclear fuel cycle.
* Perhaps one should better say "Lavoisier's abstraction" because Lavoisier was one of the
first scientists to clearly formulate the mass conservation law. On the other hand, Einstein
formulated it in the most general form by taking into account the equivalence of mass and
energy.
2• Because of the scarcity of some rare metal resources, the industries processing
these metals must seek ways and means of recycling those amounts of material
that up to now have been thrown away as waste for economic reasons. Several
proposals have already been made to offer better incentives for material recycling
- e.g., imposition of taxes on materials unaccounted for. It is clear that for the
enforcement of such taxes the establishment of a practicable material account-
ability system would again be a necessary prerequisite.
• The sulfur dioxide released into the atmosphere by the crude-oil-refining
industries imposes a severe environmental burden, at least in the immediate vicinity
of the refineries. Therefore, strict emission standards have been set up for the
individual plants. Clearly, the problem of how to enforce or to verify these emission
standards arises (see, e.g., Marzendorfer'), and, again, a careful accountability of
the sulfur processed in the refineries has been proposed as a basis for the verifi-
cation of compliance with the emission standards.
Common to all these problems is the consideration of materials with specific
properties - dangerous, or unpleasant, or rare - that are handled in the course of
man's industrial activities and whose flow must be observed carefully for several
reasons. These reasons, which have already been mentioned, may equally well be
fonnulated as questions to be answered by the monograph:
• Where does a specific material flow, and is our knowledge about the flow
complete? Where do we have to improve our knowledge?
• What is the probability that a diversion of a given amount of material is de-
tected in time?
• What can be done to ensure that some rare metals are used more efficiently
in industry? Where is the major part of these metals lost?
• How can we guarantee that substances that pose a hazard to the environment
are released only within the limits of some emission standards?
Special fonns of material accountability have been used for as long as one may
think back - where gold and silver are processed, in mints, or in alcohol processing,
for example. In addition, in the physical and chemical sciences the mass conserva-
tion principle was fonnulated long ago; the so-called continuity equation
dr + div (TV) 0
dt
(where r is the mass density, V the velocity vector, and "div" the divergence
operator) represents the final mathematical formulation of this principle and has
been used in innumerable cases. However, since the mid-1960s these principles
have attracted the interest of a broader technical, economic, and scientific audience
because of several general developments.
One development was the end of the "flat earth theory" of economics. It was
3realized that "free goods" like water, air, and other abundant resources could
no longer be considered free and that in this connection a much more careful treat-
ment of "residuals" and the possibility of recycling these residuals (Le., feeding
them back into the production process) was necessary. This had been the case for
centuries in the rural economy, and this was seen as an example for modem in-
dustrial activities. Among the exponents of this view are the members of the
Resources for the Future (RFF) ~esearch group, who have stressed the need for a
"material balance approach" to economic problems in a series of papers and mono-
graphs, both theoretical and applied.6 • 8•9 Their work may be briefly summarized
as follows: first, a careful accountability of all materials handled in the course of
man's activities must be developed on a worldwide basis because of our limited
resources. [The imaginative scenario that posits a "World Environment Control
Authority" (see Kneese et al.,6 Chapter 1) is worthy of mention here.]
Second, strict application of the accountability principle may become a major
tool for governments and administrative agencies and authorities in the develop-
ment and enforcement of regulations aimed at achieving more efficient use of some
rare materials or a better separation of some hazardous substances from the eco-
sphere. We will come back to these ideas in Chapters 6 and 7.
Another much more special and concrete development has occurred as a conse-
quence of the worldwide growth of peaceful nuclear industries. With the spread of
nuclear know-how, which was initiated with the first Geneva Conference in 1956
and accelerated by the fact that light-water reactors became economically com·
petitive power generation plants, the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons
grew. Therefore, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States
proposed a treaty for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; this treaty was
signed in 1968 and put into force in 1970 after having been ratified by more than
40 nations. (By 1977, more than 100 nations had signed the treaty.) The important
fact in our case is that this treaty foresees international controls on the nuclear
material of the peaceful nuclear industry and that the major tool of these controls
is strict accountability of the nuclear material.5 Even more important than the new
international political significance of material accountability principles is that more
than 40 sovereign states agreed on an international control system. This unique
feature of the control system suggests immediately that it could serve very well
as a pilot example for other urgently needed international control systems for the
atmosphere or the oceans - quite in the sense outlined by the scenario already
mentioned. Without going into greater detail here, it should be stressed that accep-
tance of this international control system was possible because of its "objective"
and "rational" nature; in other words, it was the material accountability principle
that helped make this system operational, and not, for example, surveillance mea-
sures that are built on the subjective impressions of inspectors, which have been
promoted strongly for some time by several groups. Therefore, it seems worthwhile
(and it was in fact, one of the basic ideas for this monograph, which has grown
out of long-term theoretical work in the nuclear material safeguards field) to inform
a broader audience of the power of material accountability principles in solving
4difficult technical and political problems and, furthermore, to demonstrate the
feasibility of such international control systems.
How can the material accountability principle actually be formulated in a
simple and applicable way? A trivial formulation may be that any material that
enters a well-defmed "box" or "area" cannot simply disappear; this means that
either it can be found within the box, or it has left it again. A more refined formu-
lation may be that the so,;al1ed book inventory of a box at a given time t1 , which
is defined as the starting physical inventory at time to before t 1 plus the inputs
into the box minus the outputs from the box between to and t 1 ,must be equal to
the physical inventory at time t1, and furthermore that the difference between
these two quantities must be the amount of material that has been lost, diverted,
badly accounted for, or not accounted for at all.
In this connection it should be mentioned that it is important to make a clear
distinction between those situations in which there exist only losses or bad ac-
countancy of material that need be considered (as is the case in the first and third
example given above) and those situations in which the possibility of purposeful
losses or even of diversion of material cannot be dismissed (as is the case in the
second example). It is clear that the latter situation is the more difficult one,
especially if detection of diversion of material is the major objective of material
accountability: as a material imbalance may be caused by one or more of the
possibilities mentioned, the problem arises of how to identify its true source.
In addition, one must take into account that if diversion of material is planned,
then it will be planned in such a way that the chance for detection is low, which
means that in this case various strategies have to be considered and evaluated.
Another important question that has been mentioned already is that of bad
accountancy. This may result from incomplete knowledge or incomplete measure-
ment of all material flows or inventories, or it may result from measurement errors
that cannot be avoided even if a very refined measurement technique is used or
that are made because the financial and personnel resources available for this pur-
pose are limited - which will always be the case in practical situations. This ques-
tion has not yet commanded the full attention of economists dealing with material
accountability problems9 because they are concerned primarily with the intro-
duction of the basic ideas; it is of paramount importance, however, in the nuclear
material case. In general, the role of this aspect will be larger, the "worse" the
relations between material throughputs or inventories, measurement accuracies,
and importance of the material are. If an industrial plant processing zinc has a
throughput of several hundred tons per year, if the measurement accuracies are in
the order of percent, and if taxes on wasted zinc become significant only if some
tens of tons are wasted, then measurement accuracies are not the central problem.
If, on the other hand, a plutonium-processing plant processes only one ton per year,
and the measurement accuracy is also in the order of percent, then it is crucial
for the useful applicability of material balance principles to remember how toxic
plutonium is and also to remember that only a few kilograms are needed for
manufacturing a nuclear bomb.
5A third aspect is the verification of the source data necessary for the establish-
ment of a material balance. It is clear that this aspect plays a role only in those
cases where material accountability is a means of detecting losses or diversion,
where the source data are generated by one group (e.g., representatives of the
industry), and where these data are verified by another group (e.g., representa-
tives of a control authority). Since the possibility of data falsification cannot be
excluded in such cases - otherwise verification measures would be meaningless -
the problem of evaluation of the various existing falsification strategies arises again.
Furthermore, as in the problem of appropriate relations between throughputs,
measurement accuracies, and importance of the material, the problem of the
appropriate verification effort in relation to the objectives must be considered.
If one studies applications of the material accountability principle, existing as
well as theoretical ones, one realizes that only in a few cases is the principle in the
narrow sense - establishment of a material balance by comparison of book and
physical inventories - used. This is the case in all situations in science and tech-
nique where continuity equations are established or where mass balances like that
of the earth's carbon dioxide or oxygen and nitrogen10 are established; it is also the
case for the nuclear material example. In many other cases material accountability
means simply a measurement of all material flows as input, product, and waste; in
other words, it means only the establishment of book inventories. This is even the
case when the diversion possibility cannot be excluded, e.g., in the noble-metal-
processing industries; here, in fact, the additional containment measures replace the
taking of inventory and thus playa key role in the whole security system. Another
case is material balances where the interest is centered on some waste streams that
contain materials that cannot be balanced in a natural way, because they are gener-
ated in the plant. An example of this is the waste water chemical oxygen demand
in the bottle industry, which has been discussed extensively by Ayres et al. 11 In the
discussion of concrete applications in Chapters 6 and 7 of this volume, an attempt
is made to clarify when and why material balances in the narrow sense are estab-
lished and when and why only a more general material accountability is performed.
In accordance with the ideas on material accountability outlined so far - prin-
ciple, verification, and applications - this monograph is structured as follows:
In Chapter 2 the material balance principle will be described for one inventory
period, and the problem of the statistical significance of the difference between
book and closing real inventories will be discussed. Next, consideration will be
generalized to a sequence of inventory periods. This is the first time that the
difference between the two situations (where diversion of material need not be
considered and where it cannot be excluded) becomes important: in the latter
case, diversion strategies are taken into account. Analysis of the data verifica-
tion problem is the subject of Chapter 3. This problem was intensively investigated
in the course of the analysis of the nuclear material safeguards problem because of
its importance in that field. In this monograph, a survey is given of the techniques
that have been proposed for the comparison of measurement data and that may
become important in various fields. In Chapter 4 a two-part analysis of the systems
6aspects of a control system is presented: data verification and establishment of a
material balance. A conflict situation representation of the control system is given,
and the question of the "global parameters" of the problem is raised, a problem
that is intimately connected with the question of the unavoidable degree of sub-
jectivity in the system.
In Chapter 5 the ideas developed in previous chapters are applied to the nuclear
materials safeguards system, and the specific case of an irradiated-fuel-reprocessing
plant is analyzed. Special emphasis is given to practical formulas and to limitations
of application. The sixth chapter gives an idea of the extent of applications of the
material accountability principle in the technological and economic fields; these
applications range from very old and special ones, like mint material accountability,
to the very broad use in the planning of socialist economies. Environmental account-
ability is the subject of Chapter 7; here the applications that have been mentioned
in the preceding chapters are treated at some length. Finally, in the eighth chapter
some possible applications in the arms control area are presented; they seem worthy
of discussion here because of the vital importance of the subject and, furthermore,
because this area offers an opportunity for particularly useful application of the
ideas developed throughout this book.
(During the fmal stages of work on this monograph, a paper was published by
Marsden et a/. 12 who attempt to conceive a kind of "unified theory of mass bal-
ances." Three different examples (analysis of the mass flow in a chemical reactor,
a river pollution analysis with the help of the Streeter-Phelps equations, and the
analysis of the Solow economic growth model) demonstrate the close similarities
between completely different problem areas in the form of a one-to-one correspon-
dence of the basic quantities used in the three models. Furthermore, they offer
some ideas on how to generalize the mass balance concept to a tool for any kind
of interdisciplinary modeling. In this monograph, I have not gone so far, as the em-
phasis was more on the demonstration of the applicability of the material account-
ability principle to practical problems; however, the ideas of Marsden et at. seem
quite appealing and could be considered as a straightforward theoretical extension
of the ideas presented here.)
What is the intended audience for the material to be presented in the follow-
ing chapters? The monograph speaks primarily to practitioners in the technical
and economic area who have to establish material accountability systems for any
material and who want information about the ways and means, the problems
involved, and the benefits that may be realized by such systems. In addition, the
monograph applies to physicists, chemists, biologists and environmental scientists
who are investigating material balances in the course of their research and who may
acquire some idea of the power of the material balance tool. Finally, it is intended
for theoreticians in the economic and political area; in this regard, this mono-
graph may be viewed as a further elaboration of some ideas expressed by Kneese
et a/.6 and Goran.9
One final remark should be made about the mathematical methods used. Some
may feel that a much more sophisticated formalism has been used than is necessary
7for the treatment of the practical examples presented here, and it could be argued
that the presentation of some good computer programs would be of more help
to the practitioners than the sometimes complicated formulae given here. The argu-
ment for the use of analytical solutions is that they provide a unique way of ex-
plaining the structure of the models and their achievements as well as their limit-
ations. This is also the reason special attention has been given to the discussion of
special cases and approximations: they provide an illustration of and an intuitive
insight into the problems and their solutions. Furthermore, the intent was to
present the material in such a form that it could be understood by a reader with a
knowledge of mathematics and statistics that can be acquired through elementary
textbooks like those of Brownlee13 and of Bennett and Franklin. 14 Two sections
perhaps require somewhat more knowledge (sections 3.3.1 and 4.4); however, a
complete understanding of these sections is not necessary to the understanding of
the rest of the book.
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2 The Material Balance Concept
In this chapter, the basic idea of the establishment of a material balance is pre-
sented. For this purpose a material balance area, through which material passes in a
given interval of time, is defined. After the definition of the book inventory -
initial physical inventory plus throughput (receipts minus shipments) - the material
principle is formulated; this principle holds that if no material has been lost or
diverted, then the book and physical inventories at any given time should be
equal. This is simply a consequence of the law of conservation of matter.
This principle does not hold precisely on actual data because of random measure-
ment errors and other uncertainties. Therefore, a decision problem arises, a problem
that is complicated, if one considers a sequence of material balances, by the com-
mon occurrence of correlations between different elements of the sequence.
Two situations are considered in this chapter. The first is one in which the aspect
of diversion of material is irrelevant - for instance, in the case of balances in nature
(the carbon dioxide cycle of the earth will be considered in Chapter 7), as well as
in the case of balances established for process control or for management purposes
in various areas of technology and economics (some examples will be discussed in
Chapter 6). In the second situation, the possibility of diversion of material will
be taken into account; in fact, we will consider examples where the material bal·
ance principle is a tool for detecting the diversion of material. Here, "strategies"
enter the scene.
Before going into quantitative considerations, we will demonstrate the usefulness
of the material balance concept even in qualitative terms with the help of a little
quiz:
Consider two bottles each containing the same amount of wine; red wine in one
and white wine in the other. Now one spoonful ofred wine is put into the white wine
bottle and after some mixing a spoonful is taken from the white and red wine
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FIG URE 2.1 Mixing of wine (see text).
mixture and put back into the red wine bottle. The question is whether there is
more red wine in the white wine or vice versa.
One can calculate with some effort that both bottles must contain the same
amounts of foreign wines, but one can also show this directly with a material
balance argument: if the red wine bottle contained more white wine than the white
wine bottle contained red wine, or inversely, then the total amounts of white and
red wine could not add up to the amounts originally given! The problem and its
solution are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
2.1 THE MATERIAL BALANCE PRINCIPLE FOR ONE INVENTORY PERIOD
Let us consider a well-defined closed box that contains at a given time to some
material into which material enters and from which material leaves during a given
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interval of time (to, t.). This box, which in the following discussion is called the
material balance area, may represent, for example, an industrial material processing
plant or the air above a given land area that contains some pollutants.
The material contained in the material balance area at time to is called the
physical inventory 10 • The algebraic sum of the amounts of material that enter
and leave the material balance area in the interval of time (to, t.) - which in the
case of an industrial plant are called receipts and shipments - is called the through-
put D. The physical inventory at to plus the throughput in (to, t.) gives the book
inventory B at t 1 , Le., the amount of material that should be contained in the
material balance area at time tl:
B:=Io+D. (2.1 )
The amount of material actually contained in the material balance area at time
tl is called the physical inventory II" If all material contained in, and passing
through, the material balance area in the interval of time (to, t.) is carefully ac-
counted for, and if no material has disappeared or has been diverted, then the
difference between the book inventory B at t 1 and the physical inventory II
should be zero. This is simply a consequence of the law of conservation of matter.
However, as not all of these conditions must be satisfied, the difference between
these two quantities at the end of one inventory period, which for historical reasons
has been called material unaccounted for (MUF)t
MUF: = B-11 = 10 +D - II , (2.2)
is not always zero. Thus arises the problem of finding out the various causes of this
difference being nonzero and, furthermore, of trying to separate them.
This decision theoretical problem will be outlined for the simplest case in the
next section. The definitions given in this section are summarized in Figure 2.2;
other figures that represent applications of the material accountability principle
appear in later chapters (see, e.g., Figures 5.2, 5.3,6.1,6.3, 7.1, and 7.3).
• A nice illustration of the difference between book and physical inventory was given by the
Bavarian humorist Carl Valentin (1882-1948) in the form of a little sketch: a delivery man
comes to a landlady and gives her a birdcage saying: "Here I deliver to you the birdcage with
the canary inside that you bought some days ago." The landlady takes the cage,looks at it, and
says: "But there is no canary inside!" Now an endless dispute arises in which the man explains
in great detail that he himself had put the canary into the cage, that he carefully closed the
door, that he continuously watched it until now, that there was no hole in the cage, and so on,
and that therefore the canary must be in the cage (book inventory!) whereas the landlady
continuously repeats and tries to convince the man that there is no canary in the cage (physical
inventory!).
t It would be better to call this quantity "book-physical inventory difference," as in most cases
the material is accounted for. but with measurement errors. In fact, this term has been used for
some time (see, e.g., Stewart'), but MUF had already been used in so many papers and even in
agreements and treaties that there was no chance of changing this somewhat misleading ter-
minology.
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FIGURE 2.2 The material balance concept. Time to: beginning physical inven-
tory 10 , Time interval (to, t 1 ): throughput D = receipts R - shipments S. Time tl:
book inventory B =10 + D; ending physical inventory 11 ; MUF =B -11 .
2.2 MEASUREMENT ERRORS, RANDOM LOSSES, AND DIVERSION:
FORMULATION OF THE TEST PROBLEM
(2.3)
Let us assume that the measurement of the physical inventories I as well as that
of the material throughput cannot be done without committing measurement
errors and, furthermore, that there will always be some unmeasured losses - material
flows into or out of the area that for any reason are not measured at all. Then,
as already mentioned, the problem arises of deciding whether the difference be-
tween the book and the physical inventories at the end of the inventory period can
be explained by these two sources of uncertainty or if there is another reason,
for example, the diversion of material in cases where this is possible.
The solution of this decision theoretical problem requires some statistical
formalism. More precisely, it requires the use of test theory methods. As the kinds
of formulae and arguments that are used below will recur throughout this mono-
graph, they are described here in some detail.
In order to outline the procedure, we will assume that the probability distribu-
tions of the measurement errors and of the random losses are known. We write the
results of the measurements of the physical inventories 10 and II and of the book
inventory D, which we now treat as random variables, in the following form
10 = E{Io) + eo
11 = E(/I) + e1
D = E(D)+eD
where E{Io), E(/d, and E(D) are the expected values of the random variables
10 ./1 , and D - that is, the true values of the inventories 10 , II, and D in those
cases in which there are no persistent systematic e"ors - and where eo, el, and eD
are the random errors of the measurements of 10 , II , and D. The expected values
and the variances (i.e., the first two moments of the probability distributions of
eo, el , and eD) are given by the following expressions:
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£(eo) = 0, var(eo) al~
£(el) = 0, var (el) al~ (2.4)
£(eD) = 0, var (eD) = aD'
Furthermore, we assume that during the inventory period a random loss I occurs.
This loss we also conceive of as a random variable whose probability distribution
is known and whose expected value and variance are given by
£(/) = o,t var (I) = 0[. (2.5)
The measurement errors and the random losses may cause a nonzero book-
physical inventory difference, as already explained. In order to understand this, we
write Eq. (2.2) with the help of the expressions (2.3) in the following fonn:
MUF = £(/0 ) + eo + £(D) + eD - £(/1 ) - el -I. (2.6)
Because of the conservation of matter we have
£(/0 ) + £(D) - £(/d -I = 0.
Therefore, from Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5) we obtain
£(MUF) = 0.
(2.7)
(2.8)
We call this relation, which is a consequence of the assumption that there are only
measurement errors and random losses with the properties (2.4) and (2.5) the null
hypothesis Ho.
We can now formulate our problem, which is to find out whether the non-
vanishing book-physical inventory difference is caused only by measurement
errors and random losses. In statistical tenns: we have to test the null hypothesis
Ho. We achieve this by choosing a significance threshold s for the sample value
(realized value) of the book-physical inventory difference MfrF and deciding
Ho correct if MUF"" s. (2.9)
The value of the significance threshold s is fIxed with the help of the probability
ofe"or of the first kind a, which is defined by
a: = prob {MUF >s IHo}. (2.10)
In words, a is the probability that "Ho not correct" will be stated if, in fact, Ho
is true. The problem of the appropriate choice of the value of a is discussed in
Chapter 4.
If the result of the measurement is
MUF>s, (2.11 )
t We consider here internal plant losses under stable process conditions. For new plants or if
one has to consider external losses, the expected value of I will be greater than zero.
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we conclude that "the null hypothesis Ho is not correct" or "the alternative hypo-
thesis HI is correct." The nature of the physical problem determines whether we
want to formulate the alternative hypothesis HI explicitly. Let us assume that it
is reasonable to formulate HI in the following way:
HI: E(MUF) = M, (2.12)
where M is a quantity greater than zero. (The choice of an appropriate value for M
will also be discussed in Chapter 4.) In this case, we can characterize the test by the
probability ofe"orofthe second kind {3, which is defined by
{3: = prob {MUF ~s IHd· (2.13)
In words, {3 is the probability that "HI not correct" will be stated if, in fact, HI
is true (or, in line with standard statistical terminology, it is the probability that
the statement "Ho not correct" will not be made).
The probabilities of errors of the first and second kind for normally and inde-
pendently distributed measurement errors and random losses are given by
l-a=~(~) (2.14)
and
1 - {3 = ~ (~ - Ul -a), (2.15)
where
1 IX (t
2
) (2.16)~(x) = v'2,; _ exp -"2 dt
is the normal (Gaussian) distribution function, U is inverse, and
a2 = 2a; + a'b + at (2.17)
is the variance of the material unaccounted for.
Generally, in this monograph we will not present formal proofs of mathematical
statements or theorems. As in this case, however, we will occasionally give informal
proofs in order to convey an idea of the mathematics involved.
The relations (2.14) to (2.17) can be derived as follows: from the definition of
Q (Eq. 2.1 0), we get
1 -Q = prob {MUF ~s IHo},
or, with Eqs. (2.4) and (2.7),
{
eo+eD-el-1 s }
1 - Q = prob a ~ ~ lHo ,
where a is given by (2.17). As we assumed eo, eD, el' and 1 to be normally and
independently distributed, the random variable (eo + eD - el -l)/a is normally
distributed with expected value zero and variance I, and so Eq. (2.14) holds.
or
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From the defmition of the alternative hypothesis HI (Eq. 2.12), we take the
random variable (eo + eD - e I -1-M)/a to be normally distributed with expec-
ted value zero and variance a; therefore we get from the defmition of (3
{
MUF-M s -M}(3 = prob <;;;-- ,
a a
~=~(~-~).
Elimination ofs with Eq. (2.14) gives Eq. (2.15).
Since the purpose of the test procedure described so far is to detect unusual
losses (Le., losses that cannot be explained by experience) or diversion, for obvious
reasons we call the probability of the error of the first kind, Ct, the false alarm
probability, and we call one minus the probability of the error of the second kind,
I - (3, the probability ofdetection. Because of the central importance throughout this
monograph ofEq. (2.15), which establishes a relation between false alarm probability
Ct, variance ofmeasurements and random losses a2 , amount M assumed to be missing
(or diverted), and probability of detection, we will discuss it here in some detail:
I. The probability of detection increases with increasing amount M assumed to
be missing (or diverted). This property is a natural requirement in any detection
system.
2. The probability of detection increases with decreasing standard deviation a.
This is reasonable, too. If one remembers that the standard deviation ordinarily
decreases with increasing effort (money or man-hours), this property means that
the probability of detection increases with increasing effort.
3. The probability of detection' increases with increasing false alarm probability.
This is a well-known property of any detection system (e.g., fire alarm system): the
more sensitive the system is, the higher is its false alarm rate.
Up to now, Eq. (2.15) has been used in order to determine the value of the
probability of detection I -~. We can use it, however, to determine the value
of any of the four quantities involved. For this reason, it is sometimes written in
a symmetric form:
A numerical example that can easily be obtained with the help of any table for
the normal (Gaussian) distribution function may be formulated as follows: if an
amount of material is missing (or diverted) that is 3.3 times as large as the standard
deviation a, and if the false alarm probability Ct is 0.05, then the probability of
detection is 0.95.
Figure 2.3 is a graphic representation of Eq. (2.15) in the form of a nomograph.
Since Eq. (2.15) will be used to determine the value of any of the four quantities,
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we can, with the help of this nomograph, give the values of three of the four
parameters and determine the value of the fourth as shown by the example. It
should be noted once more that we have assumed that the variances of measure-
ment errors and random losses are known. The estimation of measurement error
variances may require considerable experimental effort,2 and the estimation of
variances of random losses can be achieved only with the help of long-term histor-
ical MUF data.3- 5 Although these problems will not be treated in further detail,
a remark about the importance of systematic measurement errors in this specific
connection is in order. For simplicity we consider one part of the throughput mea-
surement D:
Let us assume that the receipts in the interval (to, t l ) consist of n different
batches and that each single batch i is measured with a random error ej, i = 1,
... , n, and a systematic error d that is common to all errors of the sequence of
n batches.
As an illustration of this we can imagine that the measurements are performed
with the help of a calibration curve and that in the establishment of this calibra-
tion curve random errors are committed. As long as one uses the same calibration
curve, the error of this curve remains the same - Le., it is systematic in the usual
sense of the word. However, it should become clear from this example that this
systematic error is of random origin and varies randomly from calibration to cali-
bration. In other words, random and systematic errors are not logical alternatives
but have to be defined in connection with the specific experiment under considera-
tion. The important difference between these two types of errors is their mode of
propagation, as will be shown.
The resulting variance of the sum of all receipts can then be determined as
follows: let R j be the measurement result of one batch:
R j = E(R) + ej + d, i = 1, ... , n, (2.18)
with
E(ea = 0, var (ej) a2 E 2 (R) • 0;r (2.19)
E(d) = 0, var (d) a2 E 2 (R)·0;s
Then the relative standard deviation 0Sum of the sum
is given by
n
Sum: = L R j
j=1
(2.20)
(2.21)
This formula can be derived in the following way: from Eqs. (2.18), (2.19), and
(2.20) we have
var (Sum) = var (n. E(R) + t ej + n· d) = n· a; + n2 • a;.
1=1
we obtain
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Therefore, with
var (Sum) = £2(Sum)·0§um
n·02 n2• 0202 = r + 8
Sum n2.£2(R) n2.£2(R) '
which, with Eqs. (2.19), is equivalent to Eq. (2.21). This result shows that for
very large batch numbers the dominating part of the variance is the variance of the
systematic error even if for the single measurement this is small compared with
that of the random error.
We have already mentioned the problem of estimating error variances. It is
clear that in all cases where the total measurement error is composed of random
and systematic errors according to Eq. (2.18), this problem is even more compli·
cated; here, analysis-of-variance types of experiments have to be performed. 6
2.3 SEQUENCE OF INVENTORY PERIODS
In this section, we consider a reference time interval (O,n, say 1 year, and assume
that during this time n + 1 physical inventories will be taken (the value of n will be
discussed in section 2.5). A number of new problems now arise. The first one to
be discussed is the problem of the starting inventory for each of the inventory
periods.
Let us assume that at the end of one inventory period the result of the test is
"the null hypothesis is correct," in other words, that no material has disappeared.
Then, in principle, one would assume that the ending physical inventory of the
preceding inventory period should be taken as the starting inventory for the next
inventory period, as it represents the amount of material actually found in the
material balance area. However, the uncertainty of this value could be very high
compared with that of the book inventory. In such a case it would be better to
take the ending book inventory.
Stewart 7 has proposed estimating the starting inventory for the period (ti-! , t i )
with the help of a linear combination of the ending book and physical inventories
of the preceding period (ti-2, ti-\) in such a way that the estimate is unbiased
and has a minimum variance. This unbiased minimum variance estimate Si-! for
the starting inventory of the ith inventory period is given by the following for-
mula:
where
var(Ii-! )
var(Bi-!) + var(Ii-!) .
The variance of this estimate is given by
(2.22a)
(2.22b)
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var(Sj-I )
1 1
---+---
var(Bj-I ) var{Ij_I)' (2.23)
How can we understand these formulae? An unbiased estimate for the starting
inventory is given by
Sj-l = iij - 1 " Bj- 1 + (1 - iij-d " Ij- 1 ; o:s:;; iij - 1 :s:;; l.
The variance of this estimate is
var(Sj_d = iil-1 "var(Bi_d + (1 -iij_d2 "var{Ij_d.
The value of iij- 1 that minimizes var (Sj-l ) is determined by the following equation:
(2.24)
Clearly, the variance of this estimate is smaller than each of the variances var(Bj-I )
and var(Ij_1 ). Thus, even when one of the two ending inventories is much more
precise than the other, it is useful to take the less precise inventory into account
as well.
The estimate as given above has another property that is important for the
following reason: if for every inventory period the starting inventory is chosen as
described by formula (2.22), then the book-physical inventory differences of
different inventory periods are uncorrelated. The proof of this statement can be
understood immediately. The book-physical inventory difference for the jth
involves only constants. Then the covarience between MUFj and MUFj is
MUFj = aj_l"Bj-I +(I-aj-I)"Ij_1 +Dj-~'
Let j > i. Then Sj-I can be written as
Sj_l = Cj-l + bj - 1 "Sj,
where the Cj-l term involves I's and B's with subscripts larger than i, and bj- 1
involves only constants. Then the covariance between MUFj and MUFj is
cov(MUFj,MUFj) = cov(Sj-I +Dj-Ij,Sj_l +Dj-Ij)
= bj-I "cov(Sj,Sj_l +Dj-Ij)
= bj-1 " cov(aj" (Si-l +Dj)+{1 -aj) "Ij,Sj-I tDj-Ij).
As cOV(Sj_l + Dj, I j) = 0, and as cov(X. X) = var(X), we get
cov(MUFj,MUFj ) = - bj-I " [(I - aj)" var(Ij) - aj "var(Bj)]
0,
if we use Eq. (2.24) by putting i instead of i - 1.
The fact that the book-physical inventory differences are uncorrelated if the
starting inventories are chosen according to Eq. (2.22) has a further consequence
whose importance will become evident. As it has been assumed initially that all
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measurement errors are normally distributed, it follows that the book-physical
inventory differences of different inventory periods are independent. This is im-
portant in the following considerations.
The second problem in the treatment of a sequence of inventory periods is the
appropriate extension of the test procedure outlined in section 2.2 to a sequence
of inventory periods. The null hypothesis in this case is, clearly,
Ho: E(MUFI) = ... = E(MUFn) = O. (2.25)
The direct translation of the method described in section 2.2 would be to perform
n tests, one after each single inventory period. However, there are reasons to con-
trol the test as a whole - in other words, to control the resulting probability of
error of the first kind a, which is given by
I-a = prob{MUFI<'sIAMUF2<'s2A, ... ,AMUFn<'snIHo},
where s, is the significance threshold of the ith test, and which gives with the
zero-<:orrelation property
I-a = prob{MUFI<,sIIHo} ... prob{MUFn<,snIHo},
or, with Eq. (2.10)
n
1 -a = n (I-a,),
'=1
(2.26)
(2.27)
where a, is the false-alarm probability for the ith inventory period. Another poss-
ibility would be to test the null hypothesis as a whole, e.g., on the basis of a multi-
variate statistic like that described by Anderson.8 The disadvantage of this is that
one gets no information at all about the single inventory periods.
In the following section we will proceed by performing n tests in the sense of
section 2.2, where we choose the values of the single significance thresholds
in such a way that the boundary condition (Eq. 2.27) is met for a given value of the
overall probability of an error of the first kind.
2.4 MATERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AS A TOOL FOR DETECTING THE
DIVERSION OF MATERIAL
In cases where we know that diversion of material is not possible, the alternative
hypothesis HI need not be formulated explicitly, as mentioned in section 2.3.
According to the test procedure described above, there is a certain degree of free-
dom in the choice of the n significance thresholds for the single-inventory periods
of the reference interval of time; this is so because we have only one boundary
condition (Eq. 2.27). This freedom can be used, for example, to simplify the pro-
cedure by choosing the same values for the probability of an error of the first
kind ai for all periods:
(2.28)
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On the other hand, in all cases where one has to take into account the possibility
of the diversion of material, the alternative hypothesis HI plays a major role. This
was indicated in section 2.2, where we introduced a probability of detection 1 - (3,
which was a function of the amount M assumed to be diverted. In the following,
we assume that material accountability is performed primarily in order to detect
any diversion of material - we will discuss this point once more at the end of this
section. Therefore, we formulate the alternative hypothesis HI in such a way that
we assume that in the ith inventory period the amount M j of material is diverted:
i = 1, ... , n. (2.29)
According to the choice of the starting inventory, the expected value of the book-
physical inventory difference at the end of an inventory period is not given simply
by the amounts of material disappearing in these inventory periods.
Under the assumption that in the jth inventory period (j = 1, ... , n) the a-
mount Mj disappears (alternative hypothesis HI) the expected value of the book-
physical inventory difference of the ith inventory period is determined by the re-
cursive relation
These relations can be proven as follows: if one defines
j = 0,1, ... ,n
one has, according to this assumption,
Therefore,
E(MUF, IHI ) = E(Sj_1 ) +E(Dj) - Ej
= OJ_1 [E(Sj_2)+E(Dj_.)] +(l-0i-l)oEH +E(Di)-Ej
=OJ_I O [E(MUFi_IIH.)-E(DH)+£i-l +MH -£j-2 +£i-d
+ (l - 0i-.) 0 £j_1 + £(Di) - Ej
= 0i-I 0 £(MUFi_IIH1) +M,.
Let us return to the question of the appropriate determination of the significance
thresholds Sj for the n inventory periods during the reference interval of time
(0, 1) in a case in which a diversion of material cannot be excluded. We assume that
a "critical amount M of material" exists in such a way that a diversion of this
amount should be detected with a guaranteed probability, where
n
M= L Mij=1 (2.31)
and where M j is the amount of material disappearing in the ith inventory period.
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The optimal choice of the significance thresholds SI (or the probabilities of errors of
the first kind <Xj) for the ith inventory period may then be formulated as that
choice that minimizes the probability of error of the second kind for any alterna-
tive hypothesis HI given by Eq. (2.29) subject to the boundary conditions (2.27)
and (2.31).
Because of the relations (2.30) the expected value Yj of the ith book-physical
inventory difference is given by
(2.32)
and thus the probability of error of the second kind for the ith inventory period,
according to Eq. (2.15), is given by
(Yj ){3j = I - cf> OJ - UI-QI ' (2.33)
where
at: = var(Sj_l) + var(D) + var(Ij )
is the variance of the ith material unaccounted for.
On this basis, we can formulate the problem of the determination of the optimal
set of probabilities of errors of the first kind (a;, ... , a;) in the following way:
The optimal set (ar, ... , a~) of the probabilities of errors of the first kind is that
set that determines the total optimal guaranteed probability of an error of the
second kind,
{3** = n ¢ (U;-Qj -~). (2.34)
1=1 OJ
The total optimal guaranteed probability of an error of the second kind is defined
by
{3** = min max ncf>(uI-Q.-Yj). (2.35)
0<, "'O<n: M, ...M n : 1=1 I OJ
I-Q=n (l-ap M= l:M·j j I
Intuitively, a person or a group who wants to divert material would do the in-
verse, Le., choose its strategy xeX, where
x = {(MI , .. . ,Mn ): L M j = M>O}, (2.36)
j
in such a way that the probability of an error of the second kind is maximized for
any strategy Y eY, where
n
Y= {(al, ... ,an ): n(I-aj)= I-a}. (2.37)j=1
Thus we may formulate the optimization problem as a two-person zero-sum game
(X, Y, {3) where the sets of pure strategies are given by the sets (2.36) and (2.37)
and where the payoff to the first player is given by the probability of error of the
second kind.
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i = 2, ... , n -I,0,
It can be shown that the optimal strategies (M; , ... ,M;) and (ar, ... , a~) of
the optimization problem (2.34) exist and are unique. We will not give the deriva-
tion of the rather complicated analytical expressions for the optimal strategies,
which are obtained with the help of Lagrange multiplier technique; instead, the
reader is referred to theorem 3.10 in the original work of Avenhaus and Frick.9 We
will, however, present the analytical expressions for the optimal strategies: they are
given as solutions of the following two systems of equations:
-(x-+ U'(e Xi » -(xo + .u'(eXi-, »~ I 2 ,-, 2
e e
-------
( U'(exn» ( U'(e xn -. »
-\Xn + --2- - Xn-. + 2
e e
------- 0,
nL Xj = In(l-a); Xj = In(l-aj);
j=1
:'. "'(') • Q (U{?'l _::) _:1-> •"'(~"-')
oQ (U(eXi-.)_Yi-l) = 0, i = I, ... ,n,
Ui-1
n-1
Yn + L (l- aj) ° Yj = M,
j=1
(2.38)
(2.39)
Yj and aj are given by Eqs. (2.22b) and (2.32).
For the purpose of illustration, we give the optimal strategies for two inven-
tory periods, (M;, M;) and (a;, a;). According to Eqs. (2.38) and (2.39), they are
solutions of the following equations:
(l-adou1 "(l-a)"exp(!UI-a)-(l-a2)"U2 "exp(!UI_a) = 0
(l-ad-(l-a2) = I-a
_J.. ° 4>' (U1-a• - M1) 04> (Ul- a, _ M +(I-a) OM1)U1 U1 U2 U2
+1-a o4>(U _M1)o4>'(U _M+(I-a)M1) =0l-a, 1~U2 U1 U2 U2
M1 +M2 = M,
where 4>'(x) is the first derivative of the Gaussian distribution function 4>(x)
and where a is given by Eq. (2.22b).
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Two important properties of these solutions must be mentioned here; they
can be deduced from the general solution, but it is easier to do so from the special
solution given above:
• For at = 0 - that is, for the case where the physical inventories are measured
precisely and therefore are taken as the starting inventories for the next inventory
periods - one can show with the help of some algebra10 that the smaller the var-
iances al of the book-physical inventory differences (with appropriate starting
inventory) are, the smaller and corresponding optimal significance thresholds
are and the smaller the amounts of material M;* to be diverted in the ith inventory
period are. This can be interpreted in such a way that in inventory periods during
which the technical possibility (expressed by the variance of the measurement
errors) of detecting a diversion is good, the operator will divert only small amounts
of material, if any, and the inspection team will check the material balance only
in a rather loose way. We will come back to this point in Chapter 3, where we will
find the same situation again.
• One can conclude immediately from the set of equations (2.38) that the
optimal strategy (ai, ... ,a:) of the inspection team does not depend on the value
of the total amount M to be diverted in the reference time. This is very important
because in both cases, Le., for accidental losses as well as for intentional diversion
of material, the plant operator who wants to detect losses and the control authority
that wants to detect diversion of material can at best have an idea of the order of
magnitude of the amount of missing material, but not of its precise value. The fact
that the optimal inspection strategy does not depend on the value ofM tells us that
it is, in fact, not necessary to know the precise value of M in order to establish an
optimal control scheme.
We have stated before that the optimization problem would be intuitively for-
mulated as a two-person zero-sum game with the error of the second kind as the
payoff. We will discuss this assumption in greater detail in the fourth chapter.
Here, we will mention only that from the point of view of optimizing the prob-
ability of error of the second kind the way proposed in section 2.2 is not neces-
sarily the best way to estimate the starting inventory. In fact, other estimates can
be given. 11 However, as these estimates lead to very difficult correlation problems,
they are not very useful from the practical point of view, and therefore we will
use only the estimate given by Eq. (2.22).
Let us conclude this section with a remark about the purpose of the optimiza-
tion procedure just described. The idea was to maximize the probability of detec-
tion of any diversion strategy for a given total amount M to be diverted. Therefore,
we had to detennine the best diversion strategy from the diverter's point of view.
As a result, we obtained the optimal guaranteed probability of detection. This
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procedure is also reasonable in cases where intended diversion of material need
not be considered, but only accidental losses: it gives the optimal control strategy
for the detection of losses of total size M (which need not be known) that occur
in any mode, including the worst mode from the detection point of view. In other
words, for this case, too, we have determined the optimal control scheme and the
optimal guaranteed probability of detection. Such a procedure is commonly used
in the game theoretical treatment of statistical problems, where one talks about
"games against malevolent nature."
2.5 FREQUENCY OF TAKlNG INVENTORY
In the two foregoing sections we have assumed that there are n inventory periods
per reference time interval (0, 1). The question of the existence of an "optimum
number n" of inventory periods now arises.
In order to tackle this problem we have to formulate the appropriate optimiza-
tion criterion. We will proceed in two steps. First, we assume that the crtiterion is
again the overall probability of detection. This is in line with the formulation of
the optimization problem as given by Eq. (2.35). Second, and this is a new aspect,
we take the detection time into consideration.
The analysis of the first problem, Le., the optimization of the overall probability
of detection with respect to the number n of inventory periods leads to the follow-
ing somewhat surprising result, which will be reported here without the rather
lengthy prooflO,12: the total optimal guaranteed probability of error of the second
kind (3•• as given by Eq. (2.34) is smaller for one inventory period per reference
time than for n inventory periods per reference time for any n > 1.
This result is surprising, as one would expect that additional physical inven-
tories would increase the quality of the statement. It is to be noted that it was
not proven that n inventory periods are better than m inventory periods for m > n
- Le., strict monotony was not proven. However, numerical calculations indicate
that, in fact, (3•• is a strictly increasing function of the number n of inventory
periods; an example is given in Figure 2.4.
From these results one could conclude that in any case it is best to have only
one inventory period for the reference interval of time. However, when one has to
take into account diversion of material, the detection time also must be considered.
It is clear that this detection time is determined by the number ofinventory periods,
as a statement about detection can be made only after the book-physical inventory
comparison.
From what has been said up to now, one could make two assumptions about
the detection time. First, one would assume that the shorter an inventory period
is, the shorter the detection time is. Second, according to the result stated above,
with an increasing number of inventory periods per reference time, the probability
of detection decreases. Therefore, detection may depend on the values of the
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parameters of the stronger of the two effects. From these considerations one con-
cludes that the expected detection time T is the appropriate optimization criterion
for the detection time point of view, because it takes into account both aspects,
the actual time at which detection may occur and the probability for the detection
at that time.
The expected detection time, say T2 , which shall be measured in units of in-
ventory periods, is the sum of the products of detection times i(i = 1, ... ,n)
and probabilities for first detection at time i; these probabilities are given by
I-I
P,· n (I -PI)'
/=1
i=I, ... ,n (2.40a)
(this has to be understood as PI for i = I), where P, is given by
P,: = prob {!I1UF, >sIIHI }. (2.40b)
We note in passing that (2.40a) can be written in such a simple form only because
the different MUF,'s are independent.
One is now faced with the difficulty of taking into account the possibility that
no detection at all occurs during the reference time; the probability of this is given
by n
n (I -Pi),
1=1
where P, is again given by Eq. (2 .40b). If we call a the detection time for the case
in which detection occurs only after the end of the reference time, then the expec-
ted detection time is given by the following formula:
n I-I n
T2 : = L i-P·· n (I-P.)+a· n (I-P,), (2.41)
1=1 I /=1 J 1=1
where P, again is given by Eq. (2.40b). The difficulty with this formula is, as al-
ready stated, that there exists no natural numerical value for a; for optimization
purposes we may arbitrarily put a = n + 1.
A more satisfying optimization criterion is the expected detection time T1
under the condition that detection will take place during the reference time. This
criterion again takes into account both aspects of detection time - actual time and
probability of detection at that time. It is given by the following formula:
n I-I
~ i-P·· n (I -P)
1=1 I 1=1 /
n
1- n (I -p.)
1=1 I
(2.42)
where P, is once again given by (2.40b). Comparison with formula (2.41) shows
that a kind of normalization has been performed based on the following formula:
n I-I nL P,· n (I - Pi) + n (I - P,) = l.
/=1 /"1 /=1
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Formula (2.42) can be derived as follows: let U and T be random variables with a
finite number of realizations U1 , ••• ,Un and t I , •.. , tm' Then the probability
for the realization uJ> j = 1, ... , n, under the condition that t" i = 1, ... , m holds,
is given by
prob {U= Uj A T= tIl
prob {U= ujl T= t,}: = b {T-} .pro - t i
Therefore, the expected value of U under the condition that t i holds is given by
~ ,--pr_o_b-->..{U_=_uLiA_T_=_t~i}Et (U) = i.. ui' - -
, j"'l prob{T=ti}
Now we define n -+ n + 1, m = 2; u, = i for 1 :,.;; i:";; n, U n +1 >n; and t l = 1, t 2 = O.
This means that we define t l as "detection happens during the reference time" and
to as "detection does not happen during the reference time" and, furthermore, that
we define U = i as "detection happens first at the ith inventory taking." Therefore
we have, with (2.40b),
'-1
prob {U = i} = Pi' n (1 - Pj) for 1 :,.;; i:";; n
i=1
n
prob {U=Un+l} = 1- n(1 -Pi)
'=1
n
prob {T = I} = 1 - n (1 - Pi)
i=1
n
prob {T= O} = n (1 -Pi)'
i=1
Now we have
{T = I} A {U = i} = {U = i} for 1 :,.;; i:";; n,
{T=I}A{U=un+1} = o (empty set).
From this we get
. _ _ ~ • prob {U = Uj}
T I • - Et,(U) - i.. Uj b {T- t }'j=1 pro - 1
which leads immediately to the formula to be proven.
For the purpose of illustration we will give some special cases of the formulae
(2.41) and (2.42). For PI = ... =Pn = :P we get (for a = n + 1)
n i' P • (1 _ p)i-I
T I = L (2.43)
i=1 1 -(1 -Pt
n
T2 = L i'P'(l _p)i-I +(n + 1) '(I-Pt,
i=1
(2.44)
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which gives, with the help of some algebra,
T1 = .!.. + n • ( I - I)P I -(I -P)"
T2 = -j; + (2n - 1 ; P ) • (I _ P)" .
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FIGURE 2.5 Expected detection times T1 (Eq. 2.42) and T2 (Eq. 2.41) as a
function of the number of inventory periods per year with Q and M as parameters.
Data from Avenhaus and Frick. 12
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For I -P~ I and I --P~ 2nPwe get
I
T l = P+ n . (1- P)"
IT2 = -+ 2n' (1 -P)".P
Both forms look quite similar in this case.
The first derivative of Tl with respect to n is
oTl = (1 - P)" • (I + n • in(1 - p») (2.45)
on I - (1 - P)" I -(1 -- P)"
which is for n = I greater (or smaller) than zero if P< (or » -In(1 - P), Le.,
the existence of a minimum of Tl with respect to n depends on the value of P.
It should be noted, however, that formula (2.45) is of only limited use for the
determination of the optimum number n of inventory periods even in cases where
the single probabilities of detection are approximately the same: As the number n
of inventories has to be varied for [IXed reference times, Le., for fixed throughput,
the single probabilities of detection depend themselves on n (except for cases
where the variances of the book-physical inventory differences are determined
primarily by the variances of the physical inventories).
Figure 2.5 presents the results of the calculations, based on the data used in
Figure 2.4, for both the detection times (measured in fractions of the reference
time, a = n + I in the case of T;J. In both cases one sees that there exists a mini-
mum that may be explained with the arguments given above.
The question of how to choose between or combine the conflicting optimization
criteria - total probability of error of the second kind {j and expected detection
time T - together with the question of the appropriate values of critical amount
M of material and overall probability of error of the first kind a, will be discussed
in Chapter 4.
2.6 SUBDNISION OF MATERIAL BALANCE AREAS
Let us assume that we have a very large material balance area, and let us further
assume that the errors of inventory and throughput measurements are so large that
the resulting uncertainty of the established material balance is intolerable. Under
these circumstances, one could subdivide the material balance area into n subareas
as illustrated in Figure 2.6. For simplicity we assume that the material flows from
the left to the right; in other words, we exclude the possibility of recycling material.
According to Eq. (2.2) the book-physical inventory difference for the ith sub-
area, i = I, ... ,n, is given by
MUF/ = /0/ + R/- Si - /1/, i=I, ... ,n, (2.46)
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FIGURE 2.6 Subdivision of the original material balance area into n subareas.
where R I = R are the receipts and Sn = S the shipments of the original area, and
where the shipments of the ith subarea are the receipts of the i + I st subarea. We
assume that these transfers between the subareas are measured independently as
receipts and shipments and that these measurements are unbiased, i.e.,
E(S,) = E(R,+ I ),
Addition of all n equations (2.46) gives
i = I, ... ,n-l. (2.47)
n n n
L MUFj = L 101 +R - S - I III
1=1 1=1 1=1
= :MUFtot - (2.48)
In other words, addition of alI n equations (2.46) gives the material balance equation
for the original material balance area.
Let us assume now that for each of the n material balance subareas significance
tests are performed as described in section 2.1. Then, when the amount M, of
material is diverted in the ith subarea, with
n
L M j =M,
;=1
(2.49)
(2.50a)
(2.50b)a~ = var (l01 +R j - S, - II,)
the following expression for the total probability of detection
n ( M.)I-a = 1-0<1> U- _-2.~n I-~
1=1 a,
is obtained where
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is the variance of the ith book-physical inventory difference MUFI , i = I, ... ,n.
This is true because of the independence of the different material balances. There-
fore, the question is whether this probability of detection is larger or smaller than
the probability of detection for the original area, which is given by the following
well-known expression:
(2.51 a)
where M is given by Eq. (2.49) and
rr = var(/o+R-S-/1) (2.5lb)
is the variance of the book-physical inventory difference of the original material
balance area, and where, for the purpose of comparison,
n
a = I - n (I - al)
1=1
(2.52)
is the overall false alarm probability, which will be the same for the one large and
for the n small material balance areas.
With the same kinds of argument as in the sequence of inventories case, one
now can show that for any subdivision the probability of detection I - {3 as given
by Eq. (2.50a) is smaller than that given by Eq. (2.51a) when both "players" use
optimal strategies in the sense of section 2.2. In other words, from the point of
view of probability of detection it is better not to subdivide the original area.
There is, however, still another argument: as in the foregoing section, where
frequent inventories were performed in order to have a short detection time, one
might want to subdivide the original area in order to better localize the loss or the
diversion. In fact, there could be reasons that would make it desirable to know
where a loss or a diversion had happened if it had happened. The analogy between
the sequence of inventories case and this case can be carried even further. If we
want to detennine the expected detection location (measured in numbers of sub-
areas), we get the same expressions as earlier: the expected detection location,
under the condition that detection takes place, is given by the same expression as
(2.42):
(2.53)
Here the analogy ends. Whereas in the foregoing section we could use this expres-
sion in order to detennine the optimal number of inventory periods (Le., that
number that minimizes the expected detection time), such an approach does not
have any meaning here.
Generally, one may conclude that from the point of view of probability of
detection it is best to have one large material balance area and only one inventory
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period in the reference time under consideration. There might, however, be good
reasons to better localize the detection in time or place that would justify the
introduction of additional physical inventories or the subdivision of the large
material balance area into a number of small ones.
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3 Data Verification
In Chapter 2 it was assumed that the data necessary for the establishment of a
material balance are correct except for measurement errors - in other words, that
these data are not falsified intentionally. There are cases where there is no reason
to take into account the possibility of falsification, e.g., all cases of balances of
mass flows existing in nature. However, there are also cases where such data falsi-
fication cannot be excluded; these are all cases where the material balance principle
is used as a control or safeguards tool.
In this chapter, we will describe data verification procedures. This means that in
this chapter we always have the control function of the establishment of the
material balance in mind. In addition, it should be mentioned that the verification
techniques described in this chapter are useful not only for verifying data that are
necessary for the establishment of a material balance; they also may be used for
more general data verification purposes as well.
In the following sections we will first treat the verification of physical inventory
data, and then the verification of material flow data. The reason for this procedure
is that in the second case, in contrast to the fITst, we have to take into account the
sequential aspects of the problem, which makes the treatment more complicated.
The techniques and procedures discussed have been developed only in the last
few years. At the end of the chapter, a short remark will be made about the relation
between the material presented here and the material contained in the literature on
business accountancy.
3.1 INVENTORY VERIFICATION: ONE CLASS OF MATERIAL
In order to be specific, let us assume that there is an industrial plant that processes
important or rare or dangerous material that has to be safeguarded and, furthermore,
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that the safeguards are performed by accounting for the material in the way de-
scribed in Chapter 2. As we have seen, this procedure requires regular physical
inventories. We assume that the physical inventory is taken in such a way that the
production of the plant is stopped· and that all the material in the plant is available
in the form of a unique class of measurement units that we will call "batches."
In this specific case the safeguards procedures are as follows: the operator of the
plant measures the material contents of these batches and reports the data to the
inspection authority. An inspection team verifies the reported data with the help of
independent measurements on a random sampling basis. If there are no significant
differences, the inspection team will take all the operator's data as correct. If there
are significant differences, a "second action level" of the inspection authority will
be the consequence.
This second action level is necessary because there is always the possibility of a
false alarm, Le., the possibility that significant differences appear even though the
data are correct. We expect that in a second action level it will become clear whether
or not the alarm was justified. We will not go into the problems of second action
levels here; these questions are treated in a general framework in the next chapter.
Let Xj, j = 1, ... ,N, ,be the measurement result obtained by the operator for
the material content of the jth batch. Furthermore, let Tj be the true value of the
material content of the jth batch, and let eOj be the random and do the system-
atic measurement error common to all measurements, Le.,
j = 1, ... ,N. (3.1)
The variances of the errors are assumed to be known:
var(do) = : abB' var(eOj) = : abr, j = 1, ... ,N. (3.2)
If we assume that both the random and systematic errors are independent and
normally distributed, we have
(3.3)
On the basis of a random sampling plan the inspection team chooses n batches
and measures their material contents. Let Yi> j = 1, ... , n, be the result of the
inspection team's measurement of the material content of the jth batch, and let
e]j and d] be the random and systematic errors. The variances of these errors are
var(d]) = : alB' var(e]j) = :aIr, j = 1, ... , n. (3.4)
They need not be the same as those of the operator's measurement errors
because, for example, the inspection team may use different instruments.
* It should be mentioned here that it is an oversimplification to assume that a plant is shut
down in order to take a physical inventory only for safeguards purposes because neither the
plant management nor the safeguards authority would pay the costs connected with such a
measure. In reality, a plant will be shut down only if there are also some internal plant reasons
for doing so; otherwise, "partial inventories" or "running inventories" or simply crude estimates
without any process interference will be performed.
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(a) Detection possible (if measurement errors are "small")
r- ....,
I i
• I
..._.~
(b) Detection not possible
FIGURE 3.1 The random sampling problem. -- Batches available (N =7),
data of which are reported to the inspector. - - - Batches, data of which are
verified by the inspector (n = 4). -. _. - Batches, data of which are falsified by
the operator (r == 2).
If the operator does not divert any material from batch j after he has reported
the data, we have, by analogy to (3.3)
Yj - Tj == d l + elj - N(O, al. + aIr), j == I, ... , n. (3.5)
If the operator diverts the amount p. from r batches after he has reported the data
but before the inspection team's measurements, we have
j == I, ... , r. (3.6)
For the purposes of illustration, a numerical example for the sample sizes nand r
is given in Figure 3.1. It should be noted that the expected value of the difference
Yj -1) represents the amount of material p. that has been diverted only in those
cases where the material content of the jth batch is represented by one datum Yj'
If the material content of one batch is given by several data (e.g., total weight
and concentration) and if, furthermore, these data are verified separately, p. has a
different meaning. An example of this is given in Chapter 5.
We assume here that the amount diverted by the operator is the same for all
batches from which he diverts material. This assumption as well as the value of this
amount will be discussed later. Clearly, it could be assumed, too, that the operator
diverts the material only after the verification procedure of the inspection team has
been finished. This would mean that there would be a chance that such a diversion
would be detected through the establishment of the material balance. The data
falsification discussed here is assumed to be performed in such a way that the
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material balance does not show a significant difference. The interplay of the two
diversion strategies, data falsification and use of the uncertainty of the material
balance, will also be discussed in the next chapter.
There are several statistical procedures available for the comparison of the
operator's data with those of the inspection team. Here, we will concentrate on the
so-called D-statistic, introduced into this field by K. B. Stewart, I but we will men-
tion another statistic at the end of this section.
The idea of the D-statistic is to fonn, with the help of the inspectors' data, an
unbiased estimate I of the whole material content of all batches of the class
N n
I: = - LYj
n j=1
(3.7)
and to compare this value with the corresponding estimate B formed with the help
of the operator's data
(3.8)
N n
B: = - L Xj.
n J=I
It is to be noted that only those operator's data for which corresponding inspection
data exist are used in the fonn (3.8), the reason being that in forming the difference
D,
D: = B-1, (3.9)
(3.1 0)E(D/Ho) = O.
the variations of the true values are eliminated.
If the operator does not falsify any data - in accordance with Chapter 2 we call
this assumption the null hypothesis Ho - the expected value of the difference is
zero:
If the operator falsifies r batches in such a way that he takes from every falsi-
fied batch the amount 11 - we call this assumption the alternative hypothesis HI
- the expected value of the difference is
E(D/HI } = 11' r = : M, (3.11 )
which can be derived easily by using the properties of the hypergeometric distri-
bution. Therefore, just as in the case of the material balance test described in
Chapter 2, a test will be perfonned with null and alternative hypotheses given by
Eqs. (3.10) and (3.11).
Let us again define probabilities of errors of the first and second kind by
(1(:
{3:
prob {D > s/Ho}
prob {D ~ s/HI }
(3.12)
where s is the significance threshold of the test. In the following discussion we will
call 1 - {3 the probability of detection. Instead of the more general case considered
in Chapter 2, we deal here with situations where the objective of the verification
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measures is the detection of missing material. In the same sense we call Q the false
alarm probability.
The probability of detection I - (3 as a function of the false alarm probability
Q is given by the following formula:
min(n,r) ( IJ 01 )(3 = L <I> UI - 0
l=mu(O,n+r-N) -Q Vn'a;+n2'a~ (3.13)
where <I> is the normal (Gaussian) distribution function, U its inverse, and
a;: abr + a1-
a~: = ab. + aj,.
(3.14)
One recognizes the characteristic mixture of the measurement uncertainty aspect,
expressed by the <I>·function, and the random sampling aspect, expressed by the
hypergeometric coefficients. The derivation of this formula, which has been given
by Avenhaus,2 is as follows:
The distribution function of the random variable D under the alternative hypothesis
HI is given by
which can be written in the following form:
FV/H (x): = prob {Ii. L dJ +Ii. p.- Z <x},
I n J n
where dJ is the sum of the measurement errors of the operator's and inspection
team's measurements of the jth batch and Z is the number of falsified batch data in
the inspection team's sample. The random variable Z can take every integer value
1between max (0, n + r - N) and min (n, r). Therefore, with
and because of the independence of the random variables ~ dJ and Z, we getJ
FV/H,(x) = L prob{li. LdJ<X-liop.-I}'Prob{Z<I}.
I n J n
According to the foregoing consideration the random variables dJ are normally
distributed with expected values and variances
where a; and a~ are given by (3.14). In addition, the random variable Z is
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hypergeometrically distributed, so we get
(
x-Wi ) C)o(:=;)
FDIH.(x) = ~ cI> v'n o a;+n2o a; ° (:).
Because of the definitions (3.12), the probability of no detection ~ and the false
alarm probability 0: are given by
~ = FDIH,(S), 1 -0: = FDlHo(s) ,
where FDlHo(x) is given by
( X)FDIH (x) = cI> •o v'n° a; +n2 ° a;
Elimination of the significance threshold S with the help of the false alarm prob-
ability 0: finally gives formula (3.13).
Formula (3.13) can be used, for example, for the determination of the sample
size n, if all other parameters are fixed. Because of its complicated structure, how-
ever, it is difficult to use it in practice. Therefore, approximations will be discussed
in the next section. For illustrative purposes, five limiting cases are given:
1. For exact measurements, Le., for a2 = 0, we get
~
or, after some reordering,
r-l ( n)~ = n 1 - -----=-=- .
i=O N I
For r~ N we get from this formula the following simple formula
(3.15)
(3.16)~=(l-~r,
which can be understood immediately.
2. For the sample size n = 1 we get
~ = (1 - 0:) • (1 _!..) + cI> (Ul-CI. _ IJ ) • !..,
N v'a2 + a2 Nr 8
It should be noted that for exact measurements and "drawing with replacement"
instead of "drawing without replacement," as has been assumed until now, we get
instead of (3.15)
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which can be understood easily: if there are r falsifications and the sample size is
I, then the probability of choosing a falsified batch is rlN, and the probability of
choosing a correct one is I - riN. If one chooses a correct batch, the probability
of not detecting a falsification is I - <k. If one chooses a falsified batch, the prob-
ability of not detecting the falsification is
«P (UI-Ot - ~),a~+ a:
in accordance with formula (2.15).
3. For one falsified batch, r = I, and N >n + I we get
13 = (1 - <k) 0 (I _!:) + If> (UI- Ot _ IJ. ) 0 !:,N Vna2+n2oa2 N
r 8
which can be explained in the same way as above.
4. If all batch data are verified, Le., n =N, we get
13=«P(UI- Ot -v. IJ.oN ).Noa~+N2oa:
This case corresponds exactly to the test described in the second chapter: we com-
pare two quantities that have the same expected value under the null hypothesis
but whose expected values under the alternative hypothesis differ by the amount
M =IJ. 0 N. Therefore, we obtain the same formula as given by (2.15).
5. If all batch data are falsified, Le., for r = N, we get
(
IJ. on )13= «P U1- Ot - ;
v'n 0 a~ + n2 0 a:
this expression is again of the same structure as (2.15).
If the inspection team wants to use formula (3.13) - or an appropriate approxi-
mation - for the determination of the necessary sample size, the question of the
value of the parameter IJ. arises, since, unlike the other parameters, it is not known
to the inspection team. A reasonable procedure would be to determine that value
that maximizes the probability of error of the second kind 13, because one would
then have a guaranteed probability of detection. Because of the complicated struc-
ture of (3.13), this optimization cannot be carried through analytically; one has
to resort to numerical calculations. Some examples are given in Figure 3.2. From
these calculations, one may draw the following conclusions.
Let us assume that the operator wants to divert the amount
M = IJ.°r. (3.17)
For an amountM that is far larger than the total measurement variance, it is optimal
for the operator to falsify as few batch data as possible, consistent with the
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boundary condition (3.17). In the opposite case, Le., for an amount M smaller
than the measurement variance, the operator should falsify all batch data, again
consistent with the boundary condition (3.17).
The meaning of "to falsify as few data as possible" depends on the technical
situation. An upper limit for the amount IJ. to be falsified per batch is the material
content. In some cases the inspection team may use, in addition, a rough and cheap
measurement device with whose help all batches are checked before the precise
measurement instrument is used for a limited number ofbatches. In these cases a falsi-
fication is possible only within the limits of the accuracy of the rough instrument.
In the derivation of formula (3.13) we assumed that the operator would falsify
the batch data in such a way that the difference between reported and real value
is the same for all falsified batches. One can give examples where it would be better
for the operator to use a different strategy, Le., to vary the differences. However,
as this would require a large computational and organizational effort, we do not
consider it to be a practical strategy.
As already mentioned, there are further possibilities for comparing the operator's
and the inspection team's measurement data: the so-<:alled P-statistic. Here, the
operator's data on a single batch are compared with the inspection team's data
on the same batch such that the total false alarm probability is not greater than a
given value. Before going into the mathematical details it should be mentioned that,
unlike the D-statistic, this statistic is not capable of handling systematic errors -
this is the main reason that the D-statistic is generally preferred. If systematic errors
can be neglected, then the values of the parameters of the problem determine which
of the two statistics gives the lower probability of detection for a fixed false alarm
probability. In addition, the P-statistic has an important property in view of the
sequential problems that are discussed in the last section of this chapter.
The resulting probability of no detection as a function of the false alarm prob·
ability for the comparison of data for one class of material is given by the follow-
ing formula: (')(N - ')
min(n.r) ( )' I IIJ. n-{3 = L I/> Un _-- ·(I-a)I-IIn.
l=max(O.n+r-N) r::.!1-a a (N)
~re n
(3.19)
where a is the resulting false alarm probability, which is related to the single test
false alarm probability a' by the relation 1 - Q' = (I - a')n , and where all the other
parameters are defined as before.
The derivation of this formula is as follows? The inspection team compares each
of its measurement results Yj with the corresponding result Xj reported by the
operator. This comparison consists of a test of significance on the basis of the dif-
ference d{ = Xj - Yj; the null and the alternative hypotheses H o and HI are given by
E(dj/Ho) = 0; E(dj/HI ) = -IJ.
for all verified batches.
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According to our assumptions the differences dl are normally distributed ran·
dom variables, the distributions of which are given by (3.3), (3.5), and (3.6).
Therefore, if s is the significance threshold of the single test, the single probabilities
of detection and the false alarm probabilities a' are given by
a': = prob {dl >s/Ho} = eII(~)
Pj: = prob {dl > s/H1} = ell (; - ~).
Pj = eII(;-Ul-cr).
Now the probability of not detecting a falsified batch is composed of all prob·
abilities of fmding among the n verified batches [ falsified ones without recognizing
them as such, and n -[ unfalsified ones that are recognized as such. As the prob·
ability of finding among n batches [ falsified batches, if a total of r batches are
falsified, is determined by the hypergeometric distribution, the probability of not
finding any falsified batch is given by
min (n,r) [( J.L)]I (~). (:=;)
(j = L ell U1- O/ - - • (l - a't-1 • •
l=max(O.n+r-N) 0 (:)
Elimination of the significance threshold s with the help of the false alarm prob·
ability a gives
a = 1-(l-a't.
The resulting false alarm probability a for the whole class is obtained if one puts
r = J.L = 0; this gives
Elimination of the single false alarm probability a' with the help of the resulting
false alarm probability a fmally gives formula (3.18).
As in the case of the probability of detection based on the D-statistic procedure,
we will discuss for illustrative purposes several limiting cases:
r-l ( )(j = n 1-~.
j"O N-I
Qearly, in both cases the probability of detection is reduced to the probability of
selecting at least one falsified batch among the n batches selected for verification
purposes.
2. For sample size n = 1 and r <N - 1 we get
(j = (l - a)' (1 - ~) + ell (Ul-Q -;) .~.
1. For exact measurements, Le., for 0 2 =0, we get, as in the case of the D·
statistic,
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That this is exactly the same expression we got for the D·statistic can be under-
stood easily: as there exists only one pair of data to be compared, both verification
procedures are the same.
3. For one falsified batch, r = 1, and n <N - 1, we get
( ( n) ( Il) I-lin n(3 = I-a)o 1-- +cfl Un~-- o(I-a) o-N yl-et a N
= (l - a't 0 (1 -~)+ ¢> (UI-et' - ~) 0 (l - a't -1 0 Ji,
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for given M = Il o r as a function of r;N = 200, a = 0.327, a = 0.05, n = 21. (From
Avenhaus.2)
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which can be understood in the same way as in the corresponding case of the D·
statistic.
4. If all batch data are verified, i.e., for sample size n =N, we get
(3 = ct>(U1- a ' -~r '(1-a')N-r,
which means that the probability of no detection is the product of r probabilities
of no detection and ofN - r probabilities of committing no false alarms.
S. If all batch data are falsified, i.e., for r = N, we get
(3 = ct>(U1- a ' -~r,
which means that the probability of no detection is the product of n probabilities
of no detection.
For n> 1, Figure 3.3 gives an indication of the relation between P- and D·
statistics. The maxima of the probability of detection as a function of number r
of falsified batches for a given total amount M to be falsified are more pronounced
in case of the P·statistic. However, as they are not interesting for the operator
because he wants to minimize the probability of detection, and as the inspection
team cannot influence the choice of r, these maxima are without any importance
in the framework of the safeguards problem.
3.2 INVENTORY VERIFICATION: SEVERAL CLASSES OF MATERIAL
In this section we assume that the inventory of the plant consists of R different
classes of batches, with completely different values of such parameters as total
batch numbers, material contents, and measurement variances. One can get an
idea of such a situation if one imagines a chemical plant where the material to be
safeguarded enters the plant in a given physical and chemical form (e.g., liquid or
solid, pure or as a compound) and leaves the plant in a different form. Therefore,
if production is stopped so that a physical inventory can be taken, the material
will be available in classes of batches with different characteristics.
According to the terminology of the foregoing section, let Xij, j = 1, ... ,N
"i = 1, ... ,R, be the measurement result obtained by the operator for the material
content of the jth batch of the ith class. Furthermore, let T,j be the corresponding
true values of the material contents and let eO/j be the random and dOl be the
systematic measurement errors common to all measurements of the operator in
the ith class, i.e.,
j=l, ... ,N
"
i=I, ... ,R. (3.20)
The class-specific variances are again assumed to be known:
var(dOl) = : ab." var(eO/j) = : abrl, j = I, ... ,N
"
i = 1, ... , R.
(3.21)
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If we assume, in addition, that both the random and systematic errors are indepen-
dent and nonnally distributed, we have
X'j - Tij = dOl + eOij - N(O, oba + Db,,), j = 1, ... ,N" i = 1, ... ,R.
(3.22)
We assume again that the operator reports all his data to the safeguards authority
and that on the basis of a sampling plan the inspection team chooses ni, i =1, ... ,R,
batches from the ith class in order to detennine their material contents with the
help of independent measurements. Let Y'j, j = 1, ... ,ni, i = 1, ... ,R, be the
measurement result of the inspection team for the material content of the jth
batch of the ith class, and let em and dIi be the random and systematic errors of
these measurements, respectively. The variances of these errors are
var(eIlj) = :olr"j = 1, ... ,ni, i = 1, ... ,R. (3.23)
As already mentioned in section 3.1, these variances need not be the same as the
corresponding operator's variances given by Eqs. (3.21), as the inspection team
may use different instruments.
For the safeguards authority the key problem now arises of how to choose the
sample sizes ni' i = 1, ... ,R, for the different classes of material. We tackle this
problem in the following way: let us assume that there is only a finite amount C
of inspection effort available for the verification of the operator's reported inventory
data and, furthennore, that the effort required for the verification of one batch
datum of the ith class is f, (given in tenns of money or man-hours). Then, the
sample sizes n, have to be selected in such a way that the boundary condition
R
C> L fi °ni (3.24)
1=1
is met and the overall probability of detection is maximized.
On the other hand, one has to assume that the operator who wants to divert
the amount M of material by means of data falsification will do this in the way
that is most efficient from his point of view. This means that one has to assume
that he chooses his sample sizes 7" i = 1, ... ,R, in such a way that the boundary
condition
(3.25)
is met where Ili is the amount of material diverted by means of falsification of
one batch of the ith class such that the overall probability of detection is minimized.
3.2.1 EXACT SOLUTION FOR A SPECIAL CASE
In this section, we first consider a special case that offers us the advantage of
giving analytical solutions. We then treat the general problem with the help of some
approximations. Finally, we give a general discussion that will show how the solu-
tions of the special case can be applied to practical situations.
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We assume in this section that both "players," Le., the plant operator and
the inspection team, decide independently and without knowing about the inten-
tions of the other that they will limit their actions to only one class of material,
not necessarily the same one. One may imagine that the selection of the class
will be done with the help of a random number generator. This means that the
selection of the batches whose data have to be verified will be performed in two
steps:
I. Selection of the class (say, class i)
2. Selection of the nj batches of the class selected such that nj is the largest
integer smaller than C/Ej according to (3.24), Le.,
nj = [£] (3.26)
The same procedure will be used by the operator in case he wants to divert
the amount M of material by means of data falsification: he will first select the
class and then the rj batches within the class such that rj is the smallest integer
larger than Mlllj according to (3.25), i.e.,
(3.27)
It should be noted that there may be a difference in the ways the parties deter-
mine their sample sizes: the values of Ej, i = I, ... ,R, are fixed if the measurement
instruments are given. The operator, however, may choose any value of Ilj within
the limits discussed earlier; he may choose rj and Ilj such that the class probability
of detection is minimized. For the following considerations it is important only
that the values of rj and IlJ be determined for all classes i = I, ... ,R before a
specific class is selected.
One important point has to be made here: in the forthcoming considerations
we do not include the possibility of the operator's behaving legally; that is, we
assume that in any case the operator will divert the amount M of material. In brief,
the reason for this is that the whole analysis serves the purpose of optimizing the
safeguards effort, which has as its aim the detection of the diversion of the amount
M of material. A more detailed discussion of this assumption is given in Chapter 4.
The problem outlined so far may be formulated as a two-person zero-sum game
where the payoff to the operator as player I is one minus the probability of detec-
tion and the payoff to the inspection team as player 2 is the negative payoff to the
operator. The probability of detection is I - (jj if both players choose the ith
class for their action, where (jj is given either by Eq. (3.13) or by Eq. (3.18); and
the probability of detection is the false alarm probability aj if the inspection team
chooses the ith class and the operator chooses a different class.
Therefore, we have an R x R matrix game where the payoff to the operator is
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(3/ if both parties choose the same class and the payoff to the operator is I - a/ if
the inspection team chooses the ith class and the operator chooses a different class.
Operator: 2
diversion 3
Inspection team: verification in class:
2 3 R
(31 I - a2 1 - a3 . I -aR
1 - al (32 1 - a3 I -aR
1 - al I - a2 (33 1 -aR (3.28)
from
class
R
(3.29)
All elements of the ith colwnn have the value I - a/ with the exception of the
element on the main diagonal, which has the value (3/.
It should be noted that a special case of this R x R matrix game [(3/ = P " (1 -a/)
for i = 1, ... ,R] has been described by Karlin3 where it has been used for the
analysis of the distribution of election funds in R different election areas. Generally,
this game may be used for the analysis of conflict or competition problems in R
different areas where, because of limited resources, both players are forced to con-
centrate their actions on only one of the R areas.
In the following, we consider only the case
R m~ aj-CXj
m~ CXj < m~n (1 - (31), L J < I
I I 1=1 I - (3/ - a/
because only for cases of this type can analytical formulae be given that are of
interest in practical situations. The first assumption is reasonable in any case; the
second assumption is fulfilled for al = a2 = ... = aR and also for R = 2 and
al =1= a2, but it may not be fulfilled if the class false alarm probabilities vary strongly
and if, furthermore, the number of classes is large.
Let qj, i = 1, ... ,R, be the probability that the inspection team will select the
ith class, and let PI, i = 1, ... ,R, be the probability that the operator will select
the ith class. Then the optimal strategies q.: = (qr, ... ,q~) and p.: =(pr ,
... , P~) of the inspection team and of the operator; the resulting "false alarm"
probability a· , which is defined as
R
L al"q1;
1=1
(3.30)
I
I
I
I)
Ii
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and the value of the game ~* , Le., one minus the guaranteed probability of detec-
tion, are given by the following relations:
1-~* -a* *_q; = 1 ~ , PI -
- I-al
R a* -a.L I = a
1=1 1 - ~I -al
1 R 1
=L---1 - ~* - a* 1=1 1 - ~I - al
l-~* -al
1 -~I-al' i= 1, ... ,R.
(3.3la)
(3.31b)
(3.3lc)
For the value ~* of the game, we have the following limits:
m!uwI ~ 1 - ~* ~ m~n (l - ~I)'
I I
(3.32)
As can be checked easily, the optimal strategies q* and p* fulfill the necessary
conditions
R R
Lqi = 1, L P; = 1.
1=1 1= 1
The proof of the relations (3.29) can be performed by using the saddle-point
criterion,2 which in our case reads as follows:
~p, q*) ~ ~(p*,q*) ~ ~p*, q), (3.33)
a* = a,
where ~* =~(p* , q*). This criterion can be understood easily: the strategy q* of
the inspection team is the best against any of the operator's strategies - in other
words, against the best of the operator's strategies. The same holds for the strategy
p* of the operator. That the solutions (3.31) fulftll the relations (3.33) can easily
be checked; in our case, in fact, equality holds among the three quantities in
(3.33).
It must be noted that the relations (3.31), which represent the solution of the
matrix game (3.28) (Le., the second stage of the two stages of the batch selection
procedure mentioned on page 46), also represent a solution of the complete two-
stage game.
Before clarifying the meaning of the false alann probability a* • we will discuss
some features of the solution (3.31) of the matrix game given by the matrix (3.28):
1. If all class false alann probabilities are chosen to be the same, i.e., if al = ...
= aR = : a, we get
and, furthennore,
* _ 1 -~* -a _ *
ql - 1 R - PI,-~I-a
i=l, ... ,R,
which means that both players' probabilities q; and p;, with which they decide on
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action in the ith class, are the same. In addition we see that the probability with
which the operator chooses a class for action is larger, the smaller the class's prob-
ability of detection is. TIlls is perfectly reasonable, and it is also reasonable that
the strategy of the inspection team accordingly is the same, i.e., to choose that
class with high probability that is chosen with high probability by the operator.
This result corresponds exactly to the result we obtained for the sequence of
inventory periods, where both the inspection team and the operator concentrated
their actions on periods in which the detection probability was low.
2. In the limiting case al = ... = aR = 0, we get
1 R 1
--= I->R
1 - {3* i=l I - {3i '
or
* 1l-{3 <-R'
which is clear because only one class is selected; this, however, leads to low prob-
abilities of detection if R is large.
Let us come back once more to the resulting "false alann" probability a*,
which was defined by
R
a* = L ai· q;.
i=l
We used quotation marks because this probability a* has a somewhat different
meaning from the false alann probability we had defined earlier. In fact, as we
made the assumption at the beginning of the treatment of this special problem
that the operator will divert the amount M> 0 of material, any alann is justified
in the sense that material has been diverted. On the other hand, a* is the expected
probability of getting an alarm in one class while the diversion takes place in
another class. Therefore, it is indeed a false alarm in the literal sense of the term.
Whether the term false alarm is appropriate in this connection depends upon
the entire inspection procedure, including "second action levels" (see section 4.2).
If, in case of an alann, only measurements of batches of the same class are repeated,
then this alarm will be recognized as false. If, on the other hand, measurements of
batches of all classes are repeated in case of an alarm, then one probably will detect
the falsification of data, and the alann really leads to the detection of an illegal
action, which means that in such a scheme there is no such thing as a false alann.
In the following discussion we will assume for simplicity that the first alternative
is in effect.
In the inspection procedure that has been described so far, the class false alann
probabilities ai were free parameters and, consequently, the resulting false alann
probability depended on the set of false alarm probabilities chosen by the inspec-
tion team. One could now take a different position and postulate that the resulting
false alann probability (in other words, the rate of false accusations) is such an
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important quantity that the value of it has to be fixed a priori. This would mean
that the inspection team can then choose the set (at. ... ,aR) of class false alarm
probabilities within the limits posed by the boundary condition
a = L a,· q"
,
where a has a given value. It is clear that the inspection team will choose the set
(at. ... ,aR) such that the guaranteed probability of detection I - (3* is maxi-
mized.
Unfortunately, this optimization procedure cannot be carried through analy.
tically because of the complicated dependence of the class detection probabilities
1-(3, on the class false alarm probabilities a, (Eq. 3.13 or Eq. 3.18). However,
one can give an approximate solution if one assumes that the class detection prob·
abilities 1 - (3, do not depend on the class false alarm probabilities a,. Since this
still leads to complicated analytical formulae, and since we will not make further
use of these results, the interested reader is referred to the original work.2
3.2.2 APPROXIMATE SOLUTION FOR THE GENERAL CASE
(3.35)
(3.34)
E(D/Ho) = O.
In this section we consider the case in which both "parties," Le. plant operator
and inspection team, do not limit their activities to one class but rather spread
them over all R classes of material. In the special case treated before, the question
of the appropriate distribution of inspection effort on the different classes did not
appear explicitly (one class was selected and the whole effort was spent on this
class); in the situation considered now, the effort distribution question is the
central problem to be considered. Here, we will base our treatment on the D·
statistic; however, we will comment on the use of the P·statistic at the end of the
section.
We begin our considerations by generalizing the D-statistic introduced in section
3.1 to the case ofR classes. We obtain the following expression:
R N. n,
D: = L .......!. L (Xli -Y'j)'
'''I n, j=1
The expected value of this random variable under the null hypothesis (no data
falsification at all) is zero:
The expected value under the alternative hypothesis (falsification of r, batch data
by the amounts Il, i = 1, ... ,R) is given by
E(D/Ht ) = L Il, •r, = : M., (3.36)
The variances of D under the two hypotheses are given by the following ex-
pressions:
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where
i= 1, ... ,R.
(3.37)
These variances are the sums of the measurement error variances (ab/H) and of
the random sampling variances, which are derived from the hypergeometric
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(3.40)
distribution. For N j ~ I, formula (3.38) simplifies to
2 =" N~ [a;j + 2. + ~.!l.. N j- '1 (~_l...)]
aD/H 1 L... I' n all Il, N N N'
j 1 i 1 n, j
We now assume that the random variable D is approximately normally distri-
buted, with expected values and variances given by Eqs. (3.35) to (3.39):
D/Ho~ N(O, ab/H)
D/H1 ~ N(M, ab/H,).
Figures 3.4 to 3.6 offer some graphic representations of numerical calculations
to suggest the parameter combinations for which this approximation is valid.
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(3.41)
Now, if a test is perfonned in the same way as in the case of only one class of
material, the relation between probability of detection, false alann probability,
and critical mass is given by the following relation:
1-{3 = <I>(~-U .aD /H o )I-a ,
aD/H, aD/H,
which differs from relation (2.15) only because the variances under the different
hypotheses are different.
In order to find the optimal distribution of a given inspection effort C, we again
consider a two-person zero-sum game where the set of pure strategies of the inspec-
tion team is given by all possibilities of choosing the sample sizes ni' i = 1, .. ,R, of
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the different classes consistent with the boundary condition (3.24), where the set
of pure strategies of the operator is given by all possibilities of choosing the sample
sizes rio i = 1, ... ,R, of the different classes consistent with the boundary con-
dition (3.25), and where the payoff to the operator is given by one minus the prob-
ability of detection (j, as given by Eq. (3.41). It is asswned, furthermore, that the
values of the parameters M, C, J.lj, fj, i = 1, ... ,R, are given. At the end of this
section we will see that, within the framework of our assumptions, it is best for the
operator to choose the largest values of the parameters J.lt that are consistent with
the technical boundary conditions.
As the normal distribution function <I>(x) is a monotone function of its argu-
ment x, we may take the negative argwnent of the function in Eq. (3.41) as the
payoff to the operator. In the following, we will consider only the case M ~ U1- a •
aD/H
o
' In this case, the dependence of aD/H
o
on the variables nj will have no in-
fluence on the result, so we may take the variance ab/H I as the payoff to the
operator.
The optimization of the variance ah/H I was proposed first by Stewart,l who,
however, optimized the variance only with respect to the inspector's variables
n, for given sets (rl, ... ,rR) and (J.ll' ... ,J.lR) by using the method of lagran-
gian multipliers (Le., he considered the sample sizes "j to be continuous variables).
Bouchey et al. 4 treated the same problem by using the method of dynamical pro-
gramming (Le., they were able to keep the variables n, discrete).
An approximate solution of the two-person zero-swn game described above can
be given as follows. Under the assumptions
N, ~ 1, rj ~N" ni and rj are continuous variables for i = 1, ...• R
a~/"j ~ a~ for i = I, ... , R
the optimal strategies (nY, ... , n'k) and (rY , ... , r'k) and the value of the game are
given by the following formulae:
rCJI
C
----·NjJ.lj,
J:-N· f· 'J.l'j J J 1
M
----·N,f·J:-Nj'f .• J.l. I'j J 1
i = I, ... ,R
i=I, ... ,R
(3.42a)
(3.42b)
02 ~ (22 M )aD/H, = f-- N, • aBi + C • N i • fj • J.lj .
1=1 ,
(3.42c)
In order to give an idea of the structure of these solutions, we sketch their deriva-
tion. From the assumptions, it follows that the variance ah/H, can be written in
the following form:
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Oh/H. = L (Nt .o~ + N, • III •!l) . (3.43)
I n,
As. the first term is independent of the strategies, the saddle-point criterion may be
written in the following form:
o 0
" 2'1" 2'1" 2'1
'- N, • III • Ii";; L. N, • III • 0: ,.;; '- N, • III • - .
I n, I n, I n, (3.44)
The validity of the left-hand side can be seen immediately if one uses the boundary
condition (3.24). The right-hand side is equivalent to the inequality
.,2 2 ( )2IVI ·Il, .€,L €,. n, .L ~ L N, • III • €I ,
I i n, I
which represents a special form of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
It should be noted that the solutions (3.42) may not satisfy the boundary con-
ditions n" '1";; N
"
i = 1, ... ,R, as these boundary conditions are not taken into
account in the formalism. If this is the case, analytical solutions cannot be given,
and one has to look for numerical solutions.
From the solutions (3.42) we can conclude that it is best for the operator to
choose the Il,. i = 1, ... ,R, as large as possible (Le., as large as is compatible with
the technical possibilities; see page 41). This is in accordance with the results de-
scribed in section 3.2 and with our assumption that the critical amount M has to be
large compared to the measurement uncertainties (M~ Ul - a • OD/Ho)'
The quantity N, • €I describes the effort necessary for the verification of all
batches in the ith class. The quantity N, • III describes the amount of material that
can be diverted by the operator if he diverts from all batches of the ith class the
amount Il" Therefore, the solutions (3.42) can be interpreted in the following
way:
• The ratios of the inspection team's optimal sample sizes for the different
classes must be equal to the ratios of the maximal amounts of material that can be
diverted by the operator from the different classes. The ratios of the operator's
optimal sample sizes for the different classes must be equal to the ratios of the
efforts necessary to verify all batches of the different classes.
An approximate solution similar to the one given by Eqs. (3.42) can be derived
if the P-statistic is used as the basis for the data comparison. Under the assumptions
'1 <ar; N,. n, <ar; N,• n, and '1 are continuous variables for i = 1, ... , R
III <ar; 0,· Un,,__ for i = 1, ... , R
v I-at
an approximate solution of the two-person zero-sum game described above is given
by the following formulae:
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n? = (3.45a)
(3.45c)
(3.45b)
TTl
i = 1, ... ,R
__M__ • fl • N,r~I
where
1: filliNi/TTI
I
TTl = <I> (E- - u )a, ~1-Qj'
is the probability of detecting a falsification if the data of one falsified batch of the
ith class are verified.
The derivation of this solution starts with the following approximation of the
class probability of detection for the P-statistic, Eq. (3.18).
r, .n,
1 - {3, = -- . TT·N j I>
i = 1, ... ,R. (3.46)
The overall probability of detection is therefore given by the following relation:
R ( rj • n· )1 - {3 = 1 - n 1 - __I • TTl
1=1 N,
and can be approximated by R
" r·· n·1 -(3 = L- _I_I. TT"
1=1 N j
Therefore, the saddle-point criterion reads as follows:
" r,· n, .,... " r,o •n? " rio. n?
L- --. TTl .... L -- • TTl ~ L---• TTj'
I N , I N j j N j
It can be proven immediately that the fonnulae (3.45) fulfill these relations if one
takes into account the boundary conditions (3.24) and (3.25).
On the basis of this approximation an interesting relation can be established be-
tween the results described in this section and those described in section 3.2.1. In
section 3.2.1 the activities of the two players were limited to one class; however,
that class was selected with the help of a random experiment. Therefore, the sample
sizes are random variables, and one can detennine the expected values of the sample
sizes, both of the inspection team and of the operator. If one now takes the approxi-
mation used above and detennines the ratios of the expected sample sizes, the re-
sults are the same as those given by Eqs. (3.45). This result may be interpreted in
the following way:
• The exact solution of the approximate problem and the approximate solu-
tion of the exact problem give the same result for the approximate probability of
detection. In other words, we may state that we have not committed Kimball's
error of the third kind.s
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This result may be used for another approximation of the optimal distribution
of the verification effort in case the assumptions made in this section are not
justified: we calculate the expected sample sizes for the general case (action in only
one class) on the basis of the solutions (3.31) - Le., we calculate
i = 1, ... ,R,
where qi is the optimized probability of selecting the ith class for the purpose of
data verification (optimal inspection strategy), and take these expected sample
sizes as real sample sizes for the general case (action in all classes). We do the same
with the operator's sample sizes r" Then, with the help ofEqs. (3.35) to (3.41), we
can calculate the guaranteed probability of detection.
Let us make a final remark about the usefulness of the solutions given above.
There is an interesting generalization of the formulae (3.42) that is based on the
exact measurement approximation and "drawing with replacement" formula
(3.16), for R classes:
{3 = Ii (l_~)nl. (3.47)
1=1 N,
Without giving the proof, we just report that for
L J.l.I" N,»M
I
(Le., for an assumed diversion that is smaller than the total amount that can be
diverted), the only saddle-point of the function (3.47) in the domain
f nl, ••• ,nR, rl, ... ,rR : f €I" n, = C, f J.l.1 "r, = M)
\ 1=1 1=1
is determined by the following relations:
C
nf! = "J.l.' "N,. " exp (- K" €O) (3.48a)
I ~J.l.' " €. "N,. " exp (- K" €J) I I IJ 1 J J
r? = N,"p-exp(-K"€,)], i = 1, ... ,R, (3.48b)
where the parameter Kis uniquely determined by the following equation:
R R
~ J.l.,"N, " exp(-K "€,) = LJ.l.,"N,-M. (3.48c)
'=1 1=1
(3.48d)1 - If = 1 - exp (- K"C).
The value {30 = (3(n~, ... ,n~, r~, . .. , r~) at the saddle-point - in other words,
the optimal guaranteed probability of detection 1- If - is given by the following
simple relation
This solution has the following interesting properties:
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I. As K is greater than zero, one sees immediately that
O<r? <Nj
O<n?, i = I, ... ,R,
R
L €j 'Nj > c.
j=1
in contrast to the situation for the solutions (3.42), where these properties were not
necessarily given. A necessary but not sufficient condition for rj < Nj , i = I, ... ,R,
is
It is intuitive that there is no sufficient condition because the drawing-with-replace-
ment model permits the spending ofany effort.
2. For K • €/ <II; I for i = I, ... ,R, Le., when
R
C<II;L€j'Nj
i= 1
I, ... ,R,
n'!
•
we obtain the old solutions (3.42).
3. For €1 = ... = €R = :€ we obtain exp (-K . €) = 1-Ml'£Jlj' Nj, and there·
/fore,
C
----·Jl··N
'£Jl . • €. N. I •
i 1 M J
r'! = ·€·N
• '£Jl . • €. N,. .'i 1 J
which resembles the solution (3.42) quite strongly.
4. As K does not depend on the value of C, the optimal sample sizes rf do not
depend on the value of C. Unfortunately, the optimal sample sizes nf do depend
on the value of M in general; they do not depend on the value ofM only for small
values of M and for small variations of the single batch inspection efforts €j, as we
have seen above. Furthermore, as K is a monotonically increasing function ofM, as
can be seen by implicit differentiation of Eq. (3.48c), we get from (3.48d) that the
optimal guaranteed probability of detection (f is a monotonically increasing func-
tion of M and a monotonically increasing function of C, which is quite reasonable.
These properties illustrate the usefulness and the stability of the solutions (3.48) as
well as of the solutions (3.42) and (3.45). Therefore, and in view of the complexity
of the general problem and the effort necessary for obtaining better solutions, we
consider these solutions to be sufficient for practical problems.
3.3 FLOW MEASUREMENT VERIFICATION
So far, it has been assumed that the batches whose data must be verified are all
available at the same time and, therefore, that the inspection team can take random
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samples and proceed in the way described. The verification of the physical inventory
of a plant at a given time was taken as a representative situation for the application
of this scheme. In this section we shall see the conditions under which we can apply
the scheme to the verification of flow measurements as well.
Let us consider the material entering an industrial plant during a given interval
of time. We asswne that the material arrives in the form of batches that are avail-
able for some time and that then go into the production process. There they lose
their identity and thus are no longer available for measurement and data verification
purposes. This means that the verification can be done only before the batches go
into the production process and that the methods described in the preceding section
are not generally applicable. However, there are other situations.
In order to illustrate these other possibilities, we consider batches where a com-
plete determination of the material content includes a net weight determination
and a chemical concentration analysis. We assume that the chemical concentration
determination will be performed in such a way that a sample is drawn and analyzed:
these samples are assumed to be stored until the end of the inventory period, when
a verification procedure can be applied as described in section 3.2. The different
classes of batches may be given by the classes of input, product, waste, and physical
inventory batches. In the case of the net weight determinations these procedures
cannot be applied: once the batches have entered the process stream, the weight
data can no longer be verified.
In the follOWing, we will consider this situation. Two different cases will be
treated:
• The operator measures the parameter in question (e.g., the net weight of the
batch), reports it to the inspection authority, and the batch is still available for
some time after this so that the inspection team can decide whether the data of this
batch shall be verified. We shall call this procedure independent sequential verifi-
cation.
• The operator measures the parameter in question and reports it to the inspec-
tion authority. However, there is no time for a later verification of these data be-
cause the batch immediately enters the production process. In this case the inspec-
tion team can perform its own measurements only at the same time as the plant
operator; in a real situation the inspection team will simply observe the operator
when he takes his measurements. We will call this procedure dependent sequential
verification.
3.3.1 INDEPENDENT SEQUENTIAL VERIFICATION·
If one analyzes this case, a fundamental difference from the cases treated so far can
be observed: at the beginning of the sequence of batches the inspection team does
• This section was written in collaboration with Jean-Pierre Ponssard, Ecole Polytechnique,
Paris.
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not know whether the operator intends to divert any material by means of data
falsification. It might happen that the operator decides only from batch to batch if
he will falsify the data of the batch, with the result that at the end of the sequence
he has not falsified any data. This situation was analyzed by Dresher6 and later by
Hopfinger;7,8 these investigations, however, dealt with only one class of material
and did not take measurement errors into account. Because this situation is less
important than the case in which the operator decides at a given point in time
either to divert some material within a certain time or not to divert any material
we will pursue it no further. We consider once again the case in which there is only
one class of material. There are a total of N batches, n batch data will be verified
(this is known to the operator), and r batch data will not be falsified. The compari.
son will be made pairwise; the probability that a correct batch datum will be re-
cognized as correct is ex' and the probability that a falsified batch datum will be
recognized as correct is (l The overall probability of detection can be determined
with the help of a formalism developed by Dresher6 : let one minus the overall
probability of detection P(n, r, N) again be the payoff to the operator. The optimal
probability of detection P(n, r. N) can then be determined easily by solving the
following 2 x 2 matrix game:
AInspectionteam Falsification No falsification
Verification -(l-{J)+{J·P(n-I, - Ct' + (l - Ct ') • P(n - 1,
r-I,N-I) r,N -1)
No
verification - P(n,r - I, N - 1) -P(n,r,N-1)
(3.49)
The meaning of the different matrix elements can be understood easily. Consider
the upper left element: if in the first stage the operator falsifies his data and the
inspection team verifies these data, then this falsification is either detected (with
probability I - (j) or not detected (with probability (j). If it is not detected, then
the "game" goes on to the next stage, Le., a game has to be considered with N - 1
stages and sample sizes n - 1 and r - 1. The meaning of the other matrix elements
can be understood in a similar way.
The boundaries for the solution are as follows:
1. For r =Nand n ~ 1, we have
P(n, N, N) (3.50a)
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2. For n = N and r ~ I, we have
P(N, r, N) = I -l3r • (l - o:')N-r, (3.50b)
3. For n = 0 we have
P(O, r, N) = O. (3.50c)
It should be noted that the game in which the operator has not decided a priori
whether to divert any material leads to the same payoff matrix as given by (3.49).
The only difference consists in the boundary conditions (3.50).
As can be shown easily, the guaranteed overall probability of detection is given
by the following fonnula:
(3.5 1)
where
I - 0: = (I - a ')".
The optimal strategy of the inspection team is to verify the ith batch with prob-
ability
i = I, ... , N, (3.52)j = 0, ... ,n;n-jPij = N-(i-I)'
if j of the foregoing batches have been verified. The optimal strategy of the
operator is to falsify the data of the ith batch with probability
i = I, ... , N, (3.53)k = 0, ... , r;r-kqjj=N-(i-I)'
if k of the foregoing batches have been verified.
The result (3.51) is especially interesting because it corresponds exactly to the
nonsequential case if one uses the P-statistic, fonnula (3.18). This means that
under the assumption that the operator has decided before the beginning of the
sequence to falsify r batches, the situation is the same as in the nonsequential case.
This may be explained by the fact that the operator has no chance to learn from
the past (Le., how many batches had already been verified by the inspection team).
There are great difficulties in extending this consideration to the case of several
classes. One way of doing so might be to approach the problem in the same way as
in the special case described in section 3.2.2; that is, to assume that both parties
limit their actions to one class and that they decide before the start of the sequence
with the help of a random experiment which of the classes they will select. In this
case, fonnulae (3.31) can be applied again, and the class probabilities of detection are
given by Eq. (3.51). However, there is no indication that it is possible to use the
expected sample sizes calculated with these fonnulae for the general case, as had
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been proposed at the end of the section; nwnerical calculations for simple cases
show that these cases are much more complicated than the corresponding non-
sequential cases. Thus, the expected sample sizes calculated from the special case
may give an indication of the distribution of effort among different sequences of
batches in the form of a lower limit for the probability of detection. However, the
problem must be considered unsolved, at least from the analytical point of view;
simulation studies for special numerical cases seem to provide the only means of
obtaining solutions.
3.3.2 DEPENDENT SEQUENTIAL VERIFICATION
In the case where the inspection team generates its data together with the
operator, it is clear that those data of the operator that are verified will not be
falsified, since the operator knows before he reports his data which data will be
verified by the inspection team. If any data are falsified, it will be those that are not
verified. However, even in these cases, it is possible for the inspection authority to
make a statement about the correctness of all data; this possibility is outlined in the
following paragraphs. As we have done up to now, we will again consider first the
case of only one class of material with N batches, n of which are verified by the
inspection team.
Let T be the long-term average true value of the material content (or more gen-
erally, of the batch parameter considered) of the batches of the sequence. It is
supposed that this long-term average is well known because of long experience with
production practices. For a sequence of N batches let Ii be the difference between
the true value of the jth batch and T. Furthermore, let do and d l be the system-
atic errors of the operator and the inspection team, respectively, and let eOj and e1j
be their random errors.
If no data are falsified (null hypothesis Ho), we have for the data Xj reported by
the operator
(3.54)j = 1, ... ,NXj = T + Ii + do + eOi>
and for the inspection team's dataYj
Yj = T + Ii + d l + e1j, j = 1, ... , n. (3.55)
Ifr batch data are falsified by the amount p. of material (alternative hypothesis HI),
we have for the r falsified data reported by the operator
Xj = T-p.+Ii+do+eoj, j = 1, ... ,r. (3.56)
The variances a;, abr> air> ab., a;' of the variation of the true values ("batch-to-
batch variation") and of the measurement errors of operator and inspection team
are assumed to be known:
varfj :a~, j = 1, ... ,N
vardO,I :ab,/B' vareO,I,j 'a2 J" =• O,Ir, 1, ... ,N. (3.57)
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The test procedure now is the following: the inspection team compares the
estimate of the material content of all batches of the sequence that has been
fonned on the basis of the inspection team's independent measurements with the
estimate fonned on the basis of the operator's measurements; in other words, the
inspection team evaluates the difference D.
N" N
D: = - LYj- LXj. (3.58)
n j=l j=l
It should be noted that in contrast to the D-statistic, described in section 3.1, all
operator's data are used; this is the reason the variation of the true values has to be
taken into account.
If we assume that all measurement errors, as well as the deviations /j, are nor-
mally distributed, then the random variable D is normally distributed under the null
as well as under the alternative hypotheses. It has the following expected values and
variances:
(3.59)
where
E(D/Ho) = 0 E(D/Hd = IJ.. r = :M
var(D/Ho) = var(D/Hd = :a2
a2 = N2 (..!. . a20 +!. a2 + a2 + a2 + (! - !).a2)N r n Ir 0. I. n N v
According to earlier considerations, the probability of detection 1 - (j is given by
l-{j = 4>(~-UI_Q)' (3.60)
where Q is the false alann probability.
If we want to extend the treatment to the case of R classes of material, it is not
always correct to detennine the difference D between the inspection team's data
and the operator's data, summed over all classes. In order to understand this, we
consider the two classes of input and output batches. In case of a falsification, the
operator will report too small input data and too large output data, which means
that the difference may cancel partly or completely if they are added. In this case
it would be reasonable to consider the difference of the differences. However, there
are also cases where the operator could report too small values for both classes
(e.g., if he intends to cover up a falsification in a second plant for which the out-
put of the first plant is the input). Therefore, it would be reasonable to consider all
possible sums and differences of the class differences between the inspection team's
data and the operator's data. The variance of the D-statistic is the same in all these
cases.
According to earlier considerations, the problem again consists in minimizing the
variance
var(D/H1 ) f (Ni(ab.i - a~) +Nl (abBi + al.i) +Nl (alrl + a~») (3.61)
j=l ni
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with respect to the boundary condition
RL€j' n/";;; C.
j=1
If one considers the sample sizes nj to be approximately continuous variables, then
the problem can be solved with the help of the method of Lagrangian parameters.
The resulting optimized sample sizes n? are given by
i=l, ... ,R. (3.62)
Formulae of this type have been given by Cochran.9
It should be noted that the strategy of the operator (i.e., the way he determines
the sample sizes Tj under the boundary condition ~j • Tj =M for a given value of
I
M) does not have any influence on the probability of detection. This is true as long
as we assume that the batch-to·batch variation is known to the inspection team and
that this information will not be improved on the basis of the measurement results.
If, on the contrary, this were the case, then the operator's strategy (e.g., taking
large amounts from a few batches of one class) would defmitely have an influence
on the inspection team's strategy and, therefore, on the resulting probability of
detection.
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARK
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, we have considered only situations
in which the data verification procedures are meant to detect falsified data and in
which data are falsified for the purpose of diverting material in such a way that the
procedure for establishment of material balance cannot detect such a diversion.
This is the reason we could not use the techniques and procedures developed for
business accountancy, as described, for example, by W.E. Deming!O In Deming's
book, various sampling schemes for the evaluation of inventories of materials are
described and the practical problems connected with the implementation of these
schemes are discussed, but always under the implicit assumption that nobody will
falsify data on purpose. Nevertheless, as these methods are based on long practical
experience, one should try to extend their use to the situations considered here.
On the other hand, it is useful to repeat here what was said at the end of the
fourth section of Chapter 2. Ifone develops stratified sampling schemes in order to
detect accidental losses or in order to minimize errors, one should try to find the
best scheme - that scheme that is the best against all loss or error "strategies." In
this sense, the methods presented here are also useful when data falsification need
not be taken into account.
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4 Systems Aspects
The subject of this chapter is, once again, a system for the control of material flows
that is based on the principles of material accountability and data verification de-
scribed in the two preceding chapters. In both subsystems a game theoretical
treatment was used for the determination of the optimal strategies of the control
authority, with the probability of nondetection as the payoff to the operator. How-
ever, neither the zero-sum assumption, Le., the assumption that the gain of one
party is the loss of the other, nor the choice of the payoff function was justified by
first-principle arguments. In addition, the terms "false alarm probability," which
includes the idea that there exists a mechanism that can recognize an alarm as false,
and "probability of detection" were introduced heuristically and without any con-
trol scheme that justified these terms.
In this chapter, we will analyze the conflict situation between the two parties -
control authority and plant operator - and show that the zero-sum game with
the probability of detection as the payoff to the control authority does in fact
describe the situation appropriately. In addition, we will discuss the necessity of
different action levels for the control authority in order to clarify whether or not
an alarm was justified. Furthermore, we will discuss what parameters of the total
system can be determined, and how many "global" parameters have to be fiXed
a priori. For this purpose, we have to consider the control problem as a whole,
which is complicated because the two subsystems are not independent. In the last
section of this chapter an alternative control scheme will be discussed that combines
the two aspects of the problem from the very beginning in the sense that the in-
spection team uses only its own data to establish the material balance.
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4.1 THE CONTROL PROBLEM AS CONFLICT SITUATION
Here, we consider a well-defined control problem for one material balance area
during an interval of time (to, tl)' We choose as an example the control of the
material flow of a single industrial plant. We assume that an inspection effort C
(man-hours or money or both) is available for this control task and that the operator
of the plant decides at the beginning of the interval of time whether he will divert
any material.
If one tries to estimate the value of the amount M of material that the operator
will divert in case he plans to do so, one has to ask for the motivation of the oper-
ator. Probably he is not interested in diverting amounts below a certain threshold
amount Mo. Furthermore, he will not divert more than a certain amount, say M1 ,
of material because if he did, the probability of detection would be high. On the
other hand, the control authority is not interested in searching for micrograms of
material, first because there would be no chance of detection and second because,
with few (but important) exceptions, the diversion of such amounts would do no
hann to anybody. Thus, the control authority will assume that the plant operator
will either not divert any material at all during the interval of time (to, td or that
he will divert the amount M of material, with Mo <M <MI'
If the plant operator diverts the amount M> 0, then the interests of the control
authority and those of the plant operator are opposed to each other: the control
authority wants to detect the diversion, whereas the plant operator wants to
camouflage it. If the plant operator does not intend to divert any material, then the
interests of both parties are parallel; both parties consider it to be a gain if the legal
behavior is recognized as legal behavior, and they consider it to be a loss if an
alarm is raised even if the operator behaves legally.
This partial conflict situation may be described by a noncooperative two-person
game, in which the sets of strategies XM and Yc of both players are limited by the
fmite available effort C and by the total amount M of material assumed to be
diverted, and in which the payoffs to the plant operator (as player 1) and to the
control authority (as player 2) are defined as follows:
(- a, b) for diversion and detection
(c, - d) for diversion and no detection
(- e, - f) for no diversion and detection (Le., for a false alarm)
(0,0) for no diversion and no detection
(4.1)
In making these definitions, we assume that the inspection effort C is small com·
pared to the ideal or real loss for the control authority in the various possible sit-
uations and that it can be neglected in the payoff to the control authority. The
inspection effort C is treated as a parameter of the set of strategies of the control
authority whose value is determined either a priori (as will be assumed here) or by
means of a special criterion (we will come back to this point on page 68). This
separation of payoff parameters and inspection effort, which was first proposed
(4.3)
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by Bierlein,I, 2 allows us to nonnalize the payoff parameters such that the payoff to
both players is zero for no diversion and no detection. We assume, further, that the
values of the parameters a, b, c, d, and fare greater than zero. About the value of e
we do not make any assumptions: in case of a false alann (which is assumed to be
clarified in a second action level - see the next section) there might remain a net
loss for the plant operator because of unavoidable process disturbances; there
might, however, also be a net gain because the control authority had to pay a
penalty for unjustified accusation.
In the following discussion we first consider the case in which false alanns cannot
happen (Le., Q =0), and then the more realistic and more complicated case in which
false alanns have to be taken into account.
4.1.1 FALSE ALARMS ARE NOT POSSIBLE
According to the definitions (4.1), the expected gains (or losses) of the plant
operator and of the control authority
(-a· [1- f3(x, y)] + c· f3(x, y), b· [1 - f3(x, y)]
-d-f3(x,y» = :(B(x,y),1(x,y» for diversion (4.2)
= (0,0) for no diversion
where I - f3(x, y) is the probability of detection if the plant operator plays a strat-
egy x E XM and the control authority playsy EYe.
Let us consider for the moment only the "illegal" game, Le., the game in which
the plant operator will divert material. To solve this game means to fmd the equi-
librium points (x*y*) of the game that are defined by
-a· [1 - f3(x*, y*)] + c· f3(x*, y*) ~ -a· [1 - f3(x, y*)]
+c· f3(x, y*) for all x EXM ,
+ b • [1 - f3(x*, y*)] - d • f3(x*, y*) ~ b • [1 - f3(x*, y)]
-d· f3(x*, y) for ally EYe.
As we have assumed that the values of the parameters a, b, c, and d are greater than
zero, these two inequalities are equivalent to the following inequalities:
f3(x*, y) ~ f3(x*, y*) ~ 13(x, y*) for all x EXM,y EYe. (4.4)
These inequalities, however, can be interpreted as the saddle-point criterion of a
two-person zero-sum game with "no probability of detection" as the payoff to
player 1. In other words, the equilibrium points (x *, y *) in the noncooperative
non-zero-sum game (XM • Ye , B, J) are the same as the saddle points in the zero-sum
game (XM • Ye , 13).
Up to now we have assumed that the value of the inspection effort Cwas given
a priori. But how can we detennine this value if we are asked to do so? For this pur-
pose, we need a criterion for sufficient inspection effort. The criterion first given by
Bierlein l is defined as follows:
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• The inspection effort has to be determined such that the plant operator is
induced to behave legally. This will be achieved if his expected gain in case of legal
behavior is larger than his expected gain in case of illegal behavior.
(4.5)
-a· [1-~(x·,y.)] + c· ~(x·,y·)~ 0,
From (4.2) we therefore get the following sufficient condition for the inspection
effort:
or, equivalently,
•• 1l-~(x ,y )~--.
a1+-
c
Ifwe defme
l+~
c
we can fonnulate the criterion as follows:
• The inspection effort has to be determined such that in case of the diversion
of the amount M ofmaterial the probability 1 - ~o of detection is guaranteed.
This criterion may be helpful when it is not possible to agree on numerical values of
the payoff parameters b and d, but when one instead prefers to think in tenns of
detection probabilities.
Let us summarize and discuss the results obtained so far. The optimal inspection
strategy y. E Yc for a given inspection effort C can be detennined as the saddle-
point of an "illegal" two-person zero-sum game with the probability of no detection
as the payoff to the control authority. This means that the optimal inspection
strategy does not depend upon the values of the payoff parameters of the players.
This result is of eminent practical importance because it is impossible in many cases
to give numerical values to the payoff parameters; this is, by the way, one reason
the practical usefulness of game theoretical considerations has frequently been
doubted.
One could argue that the exclusive consideration of the "illegal" game has to be
interpreted in such a way that it is assumed a priori that the plant operator will be-
have illegally and that, therefore, control is no longer necessary. Here, the answer
is that an illegal action must still be detected and that the consideration of the
illegal game serves the purpose of detennining the optimal detection scheme.
The detennination of the optimal inspection strategy for a given effort is the
systems analyst's most important task because the question of the appropriate
inspection effort is usually handled by administrators or by politicians, at least in
cases of major importance. Nevertheless, we have fonnulated a mathematical tech-
nical criterion for the "appropriate" effort, which, however, requires knowledge of
the values of the payoff parameters or, equivalently, of the appropriate probability
of detection.
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In the following, it is always assumed that the value of the inspection effort is
fIxed a priori.
4.1.2 FALSE ALARMS ARE POSSIBLE
When false alanns cannot be ruled out, the scheme for the determination of optimal
inspection strategies that we have developed on the preceding pages does not work.
First, it does not seem possible to reduce the general noncooperative game to a
zero-sum game because the equivalence of the inequalities (4.3) and the saddle-point
criterion (4.4) fails. Second, the false alann probability a enters the scene as a new
quantity whose value must be specifIed. We will see, nevertheless, that we can
handle the new situation with a procedure that is quite similar to the one developed
before.
We start with an auxiliary consideration. Let us assume that there exists an in·
spection problem for which the gains and losses in the different situations are given
by (4.1). Let us assume furthennore that the set of strategies XM of the plant oper-
ator is the set of possible probabilities p of diverting the amount M of material, and
that the set of strategies Y of the control authority is the set of possibilities of
choosing the value of the false alann probability a:
Y = {a: 0 ~ a ~ 1}. (4.6)
Then, with the help of (4.2), we can derive the expected gains of the two players:
We get for the plant operator
B(a,p) = (-a'(I-jj(a))+c'jj(a))'p-e'a'(I-p)
and for the control authority
I(a,p) = (b'[1-jj(a)]-d'jj(a))'p-f'a'(1-p),
(4.7a)
(4.7b)
where 1 - jj(a) is the probability of detection as a function of the false alarm prob-
ability a. Thus, we have a noncooperative two-person game (XM , Y, ii, 1) whose
solution is again given by equilibrium points (p*, a*), which are defined by analogy
to the inequalities (4.3).
The details of the analysis of this game can be found in Frick and Avenhaus,3
but the more important results are as follows:
1. For a~ e there exists one equilibrium point, which is given by (p*, a*) = (I,
1). This result can be understood as follows: If the plant operator's loss is greater
in case of detected diversion than in case of a false alann (such a situation is, of
course, most unlikely), the control authority will always state a diversion, Le.,
choose a* = 1. Inversely, in such a case the plant operator will divert material with
certainty, as this causes a smaller loss for him.
2. For a > e one can show that
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If there exists an equilibrium point (p*, a*), it has the properties O<p* < 1,
O<a*<l.
If (3 is convex, there exists an equilibrium point.
If (3 is convex and differentiable, there exists exactly one equilibrium point,
which is given by the following equations
- a + e 0 a + (a + c) 0 (3(a) = 0
[f - (b + d) 0 (3'(a)] 0 p - f = 0
(4.8a)
(4.8b)
where (3'(a) is the first derivative of (3. (Note that the optimal value of a depends
only upon the payoff parameter values of the plant operator.)
7(O,a) = -foa
The fact that in the reasonable case a > e the plant operator will divert material
with a probability greater than zero leads to the question of how the control author·
ity should choose the value of a so that the plant operator will behave legally -
that is, so that he will choose p = O. In the spirit of the criterion (4.5), the set of
strategies y' of the control authority that induces the plant operator to legal
behavior is given by
y' = {a: O:S;;;a:S;;; I,B(p. a) <B(O, a)}.
Now one can show that the game (XM • y'. B. 7) has no equilibrium point.
Therefore one has to argue as follows: the optimal counterstrategy of the plant
operator against any inspection strategy y E y' is p =0, which, according to (4.7a),
gives an expected payoff
to the control authority. This means that the control authority will choose the
smallest possible value of a E y'. Let us denote Q: = inf {a E Y'}. Then we can
show that for differentiable (3 we have Q = a* where a* is the solution of (4.8a).
This means that the control authority has to choose an "e-good" strategy Q + e,
where e is a small positive number.
Let us come back to our original problem, which we illustrate with the help of
the material accountability example. Our task is to determine the optimal inspection
strategy; in our example, this means determining the optimal set (at, ... ,a~) of
false alarm probabilities (Le., significance thresholds) for the n inventory periods. It
can be shown4 that the noncooperative game (XM, Y, B, 7), where
XM = XMI UX2 UXM :1'
XMI {(Ml , ••. ,Mn ): 1:.Mj = M> O},
X2 = {(O, ... , O)}(legal behavior)
XM3 {p: O:S;;; p:S;;; 1}
Y = {(al"" ,an):O:S;;;a,:S;;; 1 fori = 1, ... ,n}
and where lJ and 7are given by (4.7), has a uniquely determined equilibrium point
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[(Mr, ... ,~), p.; (ar. ... ,a~)] that can also be calculated by the following
two-step procedure:
1. Determine the saddle-point [(M:, . .. ,M:), (a:, ... ,0::)] of the zero-sum
game (XM , Y, (3) where XM and Yc are given by the sets (2.36) and (2.37) and
where (3 is the n-fold product of (2.33). In other words, solve the problem out-
lined in section 2.4.
2. Determine the equilibrium point (p., a·) of the noncooperative game (XM ,
Y, ii, I) where XM and Yare given by the sets (4.6) and where (3(a) is the value of
the game (XM , Yo<' (3).
This important result, which also holds for other control schemes (e.g., the com-
bined material balance and data verification schemes discussed in Chapter 5), allows
us to handle the complex problem of optimizing inspection strategies in control
systems where false alarms cannot be excluded. The following procedure may be
used in dealing with this complex problem.
If it is possible to estimate the values of the payoff parameters (4.1), then one
can solve the problem either as a whole or with the help of the two-step pro-
cedure outlined above. If, on the contrary, such estimates cannot be given, then one
has to fix the value of the resulting false alarm probability a priori and solve the
"illegal" two-person zero-sum game, with the probability of no detection as the
plant operator's payoff.
Thus, the analysis of this problem is similar to that of the less complicated case
in which false alarms need not be taken into account. The only substantial differ-
ence is that the resulting false alarm probability represents a new parameter whose
value must be determined a priori if the payoff parameter values cannot be esti-
mated. We will come back to this point in section 4.3.
4.2 ACTION LEVELS
In the foregoing section we introduced the terms "false alarm probability" and
"probability of detection," and we remarked that in a simple inspection scheme
that has only one action level this nomenclature has no meaning. When data are veri-
fied with the help of the D-statistic, then, if the difference D is significant, an alarm
will be raised. However, nothing has been said about whether any further action is
taken to find out if the alarm was justified.
In this section we will discuss possible control procedures with more than one
action level (as well as those with only one) and see what the meaning of 0: and (3
is in this framework. Since no such procedures have actually been worked out,
these considerations are hypothetical; they are important, however, in clarifying the
relationship of the schemes described in the foregoing chapters.
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4.2.1 ONE ACfION LEVEL ONLY
Let us assume that the control procedure consists of only one action level: the
inspection team generates its own data and compares these data with those reported
by the plant operator. If these two sets of data show no significant differences, then
the material balance is closed with the data of the operator. If the material balance
establishment shows no significant difference between book and physical inventory,
it is stated that the operator behaved legally. If either one of the two tests - data
verification or material balance - shows significant differences, it is stated that
material has been lost or diverted.
The subsystems of this control system have been described at length in Chapters
2 and 3. The effort C introduced in section 3.2 is in fact the total inspection effort,
as no other activities are foreseen. The disadvantage of this system is that it offers
no possibility of correcting an erroneous accusation. The control authority knows
that, according to the chosen significance levels and the measurement variances,
there is a probability Q that an erroneous accusation will be made, but in practice
they cannot decide whether the accusation is justified. This means that in this model
there exists no "false alarm" but only an "alarm." One can still call Q the false
alarm probability as it is an important quantity for the design of a control system,
but in this situation it is irrelevant.
It is clear that in realistic control systems - especially in international systems
like the nuclear materials safeguards system to be described in the next chapter -
more action levels are required, since one cannot afford too many false alarms.
4.2.2 SEVERAL ACfION LEVELS
We now assume that at the end of the first action level it is decided either that the
difference between the inspection team's data and the operator's data is not sig-
nificant and therefore that the operator behaved legally, or that the difference is
significant. In the latter case, a second action level follows.
At this second action level, all measuring instruments, those of the operator and
those of the inspection team, are recalibrated in order to eliminate systematic
measurement errors; furthermore, all data are checked for transcription errors. On
this basis, it is determined whether a false alarm was raised. If the reexamination
leads to the same conclusions, it is stated that in fact material was lost or diverted,
and the inspection ends with a report to the control authority.
This cannot be considered a true two-action-Ievel procedure because at the second
action level no new measurements are performed. We assume that the additional
effort C2 for the second action level as well as the false alarm probability Q (in
other words, the expected effort Q • C2 for the second action level) is given. This
means that the optimal procedure for the control of material as described in the
two preceding chapters is not changed by the introduction of a second action level
of this kind.
At the second action level, additional measurements could be performed. One
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could, for example, repeat the old measurements with higher accuracy, or one
could measure all batches of all classes. However, there are objections to such
procedures. One objection is that such additional measures still do not make it
absolutely clear whether material was lost or diverted, as the random measurement
errors cannot be eliminated; a repetition of the operator's measurements would be
useless, as he could explain the falsification of his fIrst data as transcription or
measurement errors. Another objection is that the total inspection effort must be
limited somehow, as inspections disturb the operation of the plant (at least one
plant representative must be available to accompany the inspectors). In other
words, the plant operator must be protected against overambitious inspection
teams.
If one wants to analyze an inspection procedure that truly consists of two action
levels, one must be aware that the inspection mode at the second action level may
influence the strategy of the operator - and thus of the inspection team - at the
first level. If the same batches that had been verified at the first level were verified
at the second level, the operator would limit his falsification at the first level to
only a few batches. If, however, on the second action level all batches were veri-
fied, the operator would falsify as many batch data as possible by as small an
amount as possible. Therefore, a mathematical treatment of a procedure with more
than one action level would have to include the second action level from the outset.
In order to do this, one would have to know the details of the second action level
procedures. As already mentioned, there is no known case where such procedures
are formally established, so further detail is irrelevant.
4.3 PARAMETERS OF THE TOTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
In the discussion of the two subsystems of a material flow control system in
Chapters 2 and 3, some parameters had to be fixed without further justification.
In the material balance establishment subsystem these parameters were length of
the inventory period (to, tl); probability of detection 1-~; false alarm probability
0:; and critical mass M. In the data verification subsystem we had these same para-
meters, as well as inspection effort C. The values of these parameters could not be
chosen independently because for each subsystem there is one relation between
these parameters (see, e.g., Eq. (2.1 5) and Eq. (3.41)). This means that in total the
values of 3 + 3 = 6 parameters have to be fixed a priori, if we choose for both sub-
systems the same reference time.
It is necessary that each inspection system be as formalized as possible; it was
already mentioned that the plant operator must be protected against the inspection
authority. The next question to be dealt with is the possibility of reducing the num-
ber of parameters whose values must be subjectively ftxed a priori. In order to
tackle this question, let us consider the simplifted case in which the veriftcation of
the data of the plant operator can be performed with the help of the D-statistic de-
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scribed in Chapter 3 (a realistic example of such a case will be given in the next
chapter). The whole inspection procedure at the end of one inventory period con-
sists of the performance of two tests of significance: the D-test (for the data
verification) and the MUF-test (for the material balance establishment).
The whole inspection problem at the end of an inventory period may be viewed
as a composite test-of-significance problem in the sense of multivariate statistical
analysis (see, e.g., Miller4 ), where the null hypothesis Ho is given by
E(D/Ho) = 0, E(MUF/Ho) = 0, (4.9)
and where the alternative hypothesis is given by
E(D/Hd = M1 > 0, E(MUF/H1 ) = M2 > 0, (4.10)
where the values ofM1 and M2 are still to be discussed (see Eq. 4.26).
Because the inspection problem, which consists of the two subsystems, is treated
as a whole, one does not fIX the significance thresholds SI and S2 of the two tests
by fIXing the two false alarm probabilities 0:1 and 0:2 independently. Instead, one
fIXes a single false alarm probability 0:, which is defined by
1 - 0:: = prob {D EO; SI /\MUF EO; S2/HO}. (4.11)
As this equation is of crucial importance for further considerations, we will discuss
it in greater detail.
According to the results described in Chapter 2, the random variable MUF under
the null hypothesis Ho is normally distributed, with expected value°and variance
ulwF (given by Eq. 2.17). According to Chapter 3, the random variable D under
the null hypothesis Ho is at least approximately normally distributed with the
expected value°and variance u'blH (given by Eq. 3.35):
o
D ..... N(O, u'blH ), MUF"'" N(O, ulwF)' (4.12)
o
The two random variables, however, are not independent because the data of the
plant operator occur in both D and MUF; we call PH
o
,defmed by
cov(D, MUF) E(D 'MUF/Ho)
PH = =
o UD/Ho 'UMUF
(4.13)
(4.14)
the correlation between these two random variables under the null hypothesis.
Therefore, the two random variables D/UDlH
o
and MUF/UMUF are distributed
according to a bivariate normal distribution whose density is defmed by
1 ( x2-2xYP + y2)
f(x,y) = 21Tv'I_p2exp - 2(l-p2 ) •
The false alarm equation (4.11) is given by the following expression:
76
016
-~-_ ---l
0.14
012
i
-~_. -- O.IO---~------
I «.02
-1.0
P I
-----. :
-0.8 -0.6
0.08
0.06
0.04
002 (j.·005!
i
0.1 1.0
FIGURE 4.1 Single test false alarm probabilities at and a2 for at =a2 as a
function of correlation p with total false alarm probability a as parameter. (From
Avenhaus and Nakicenovic.6 )
I-a = I J(J~~HodXf(J~2UF dy exp CX2~2xYP2+y2). (4.15)
21Ty'1 - p2 _~ _~ \ 2 I - p )
If we remember the relations between the significance thresholds SI and S2 and
the single false alarm probabilities a I and a2 (Eqs. 3.39 and 2.14)
l- a l = <I> (~), 1 -a2 = <I> (----L), (4.16)
OD/Ho °MUF
then we can eliminate the significance thresholds in Eq. (4.15) and get a relation
between the total false alarm probability 1 - a and the single false alarm prob·
abilities al and a2 :
I -a = I fU,-Q\ dx f u'_Q, dy exp (_ x2 - 2xYP2+ y 2). (4.17)
21T~ _~ _~ 2(l-p)
Some limiting cases of this equation can be established very easily if one uses the
properties of the bivariate normal distributions:
• For p = 0 we get
(4.18)
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FIGURE 4.2 Mutual dependence of the single test false alarm probabilities 01
and 02 with correlation p as parameter for total false alarm probability 0=0.05.
(From Avenhaus and Nakicenovic.6 )
which is a well-known relation in multivariate statistical analysis.
• For p = 1 we get
for (4.19)
• For p = - 1 we get
(4.20)
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• For - 1~ P ~ 1 we get
a = {a l
a2
for
o
o
(4.21)
In addition, we can deduce from Bonferroni's inequaIity4 that for - 1~ P ~ 1 we
have (4.22)
(3: = prob {D ~Sl AMUF~S2IHd. (4.23)
Using Eqs. (4.10) and taking into consideration that for the D-statistic the variance
under the null hypothesis is different from the variance under the alternative
hypothesis, we get for the total probability of detection
aD/H' U,-a -M,1 0 1
(3 = 21r~ L~ aD/HI
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate equation (4.17). Figure 4.1 shows for al = a2 the
dependence of al on PI with a as parameter; Figure 4.2 shows the dependence of
al on a2' with P as parameter and for fIxed a = 0.05. The main result is that for
P < 0 (which is the case in the example given in Chapter 5) Eq. (4.17) can be
approximated very well by Eq. (4.18).
The composite test of significance (D, MUF) is not yet fully characterized by a
given value of the total false alann probability a, because the two significance
thresholds are not yet determined completely by Eq. (4.15). In order to find these
thresholds we determine the total probability of an error of the second kind (3 of
the test, or, in other words, the total probability of detection 1- (3. This is de-
fmed by
(4.24)
For the vanishing correlation (p = 0) this fonnula reduces to
(3 = 4> (aD/H. oUI-a,-MI) '4>(UI_a, -~) =(31 '(32' (4.25)
aD/H. aMUF
Now we can solve the problem of choosing appropriate values for the single
false alann probabilities al and a2 as well as for the single critical masses M I and
M2 in Eqs. (4.10). We suppose that the control authority wants to detennine the
values of al and a2 such that the guaranteed probability of detection is op-
timized if the operator diverts the amount M of material. This means that the maxi-
mum (with respect to the inspection strategies (ai, a2 : (l - al)(1 - (2) = 1 - a))
of the minimum (with respect to the diversion strategies (MI, M2 :M1 + M2 = M))
of the probability of detection has to be detennined. The optimal values of the
single false alann probabilities al and a2 are therefore determined with the help of
the following optimization problem:
max min 1-{3(CXI,CX2;MI,M2)
Q'1 ,Q'1; : M 1 ,M:1 :
(1-"',)(1-"',)=1-'" M, +M, = M
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(4.26)
where {3(CXI, CX2; M I , M2) is given by Eq. (4.24). For practical purposes it would
be of advantage to put CXI = CX2 ; in fact, it will be shown in the next chapter that
this choice does not cause any significant deviation from the optimal probability of
detection.
Before we go on, it should be noted that there is another conceivable way of per-
forming the composite test of significance for D and MUF. One could take linear
combinations of D and MUF as test statistics so that the new statistics are inde-
pendent and are thus much simpler to treat. In fact, such a scheme has been dis-
cussed recently by Hough et al. 7 The more complicated scheme outlined here seems
preferable, however, because it is important for a control authority to test the
"physical" statistics D and MUF and to be able to see immediately where the sig-
nificant difference, if any, arises.
Let us now come back to our original question of how many inspection system
parameter values have to be fixed a priori and how many can be determined later
on. We may imagine the following procedure.
First, the inspection budget (man-hours or money) for a given plant during a
given reference time (e.g., I year) has to be fixed. As was discussed in the first
section of this chapter, one could also imagine that the value of the budget is de-
termined according to a criterion of the kind given on page 69; however, we assume
here that such an important parameter is discussed in the political arena, especially
because such long-term considerations as number of available inspectors must be
taken into account. Second, the length of an inventory period is determined. This
question was discussed at the end of the second chapter: if the probability of de-
tection were the only criterion, one would have as few inventories as possible (e.g.,
once a year). On the other hand, the detection time, which is another criterion,
would call for as short an inventory period as possible. A third aspect is that phy-
sical inventory taking usually means a disturbance of the plant operations -
which should be as small as possible. Therefore, a compromise should be made
among these different points of view; the actual length of an inventory period will in
most cases be determined on a pragmatic basis.
The next parameter to be discussed is the total false alarm rate. While a high
false alarm rate increases the sensitivity of the inspection system, the inspection
authority cannot afford too many false alarms, for obvious reasons. The actual
value of the total false alarm rate will depend strongly on the second action level
procedure. If there are efficient methods for checking the validity of an "alarm"
at the first action level, one will not be so sensitive, while an alarm on the second
level would immediately throw some doubt on the legality of the plant operator's
behavior.
The two remaining parameters, critical mass and total probability of detection
I - {3, should be considered together: if the value of M is fIXed, that of 1 - {3 is
determined by Eq. (4.26) and vice versa. Whether the probability of detection
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I - (3 in case of a diversion of an amount M will be considered sufficient depends
on the nature of the inspection problem. Eventually, the value of one of the other
parameters, e.g., the budget, must be changed. Oearly, the efficiency that can be
reached also depends on the accuracy of the measurements.
We have now reduced the number of parameters whose values have to be fIxed
a priori from the six mentioned at the beginning of this section to the four out·
lined above. Is a further reduction possible?
In principle, further reduction can be achieved in the following way: we consider
several plants and fIx the values of the parameters - length of inventory period,
budget, false alarm probability, and critical mass - for all the plants together.
Then the values of the plant parameters are determined with the help of an optimiz·
ation procedure as discussed above. This corresponds to our procedure for deciding
on a verification effort and determining the critical masses for the single classes
given in the third chapter, where only the values of the parameters C and M were
given for all classes and where the single-{;lass parameter values were determined by
an optimization procedure. If several plants are considered at once, there would be
more diffIculties, technical as well as fundamental: there would be new correlations
(e.g., shipper-receiver correlations) that could not be treated as conveniently as
in the case analyzed above, and it is doubtful if such a "lumping" of different
plants would be acceptable to the plant operators. It remains to be seen, therefore,
how far such a formalization can go in a real case. It is clear, however, that, no
matter what, the values of some parameters have to be fIxed subjectively a priori.
4.4 MATERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY VERIFICAnON SYSTEM NOT USING
OPERATOR'S DATA·
So far we have considered one possible material accountability verification scheme:
the plant operator generates all data necessary for the establishment of a material
balance and reports these data to the control authority. The control authority veri-
fIes these data with the help of independent measurements. If there are no signifI.
cant differences between the operator's reported data and the fIndings of the
control authority, then the material balance is closed with the operator's data.
In this section, we consider an alternative material accountability verification
scheme, which does not make use of the data reported by the operator but rather is
based exclusively on the data generated by the control authority. Such a system
could be of use in situations where there is no reason for a plant operator to main-
tain a complicated measurement system or where, for some reason, the records are
not available.
It is clear that if the inspection team cannot measure the data of all material
batches processed in the plant under consideration (e.g., if the inspection budget or
• This section was written in collaboration with W.S. Jewell, University of California, Berkeley.
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time is limited), then some prior information about the average material contents
of the different batches as well as the batch·to-batch variation has to be used. There·
fore, a Bayesian approach seems natural for the treatment of problems of this kind.
On the other hand, this prior information will not be very detailed, and so we will
use the principles of credibility theory,8,9 where it is necessary to know only the
first two moments of the prior distribution.
In the following, we first consider only one class of material, and then R different
classes (inputs, outputs, and so on) with the problem of material balance closure.
Finally, we discuss the problem of optimization of a given inspection effort. Since
the batch-to-batch variation of the true material contents within one class is nor-
mally much larger than the measurement variance, we will neglect the measure-
ment errors here; they could easily be taken into account, however, if necessary.
4.4.1 ONE CLASS OF MATERIAL
Let us consider one class of material consisting of N batches. An inspection team
measures the material content of n of these N batches precisely and wants to esti-
mate the total material content of the class with the help of the n data. The true
values of the material content of the batches vary from batch to batch; because of
long-term experience, however, the inspection team has prior information about
the average value and the batch-to-batch variation of the true material content.
This prior information may be specified in the following way: the true material
content Xj of the jth batch is a random variable with a likelihood density p(xjIO),
where 0 is the parameter (possibly a vector), representing the unknown variation
that has occurred in this production run. In Bayesian analysis, the parameter 0
itself is considered as a random variable with a prior density p(ff). We do not
assume that the complete expressions of p(xjIO) and p(ff) are known to the in-
spection team, but only the expected value m,
m: = E{Xj} = EE{xjI8} = f dO' O' p(O)· fdXj' Xj' p(xjIO),
j = 1, ... ,N
and the two components of the variance
var {x} = E {xf} - (E g})2 = :E + D,
(4.27)
(4.28)
which are given by
E = Evar {xjI8} = Eo {Ex {Xl 18}- (Ex gI8))2}
D = varE{xjI8}= Eo{(Ex {xjI8})2}_(EoEx {xjI8})2 j = 1, ... ,N.
For later purposes we note that
cov{xj,xj'¢d = E{x,.xj'¢d-E{xj}·E{xi*;} = D. (4.29)
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As we must differentiate carefully between random variables and their actual
values, we indicate random variables by a tilde. In addition, we will put the random
variables whose moments have to be determined into curled brackets. Notice that,
even though the random variables Xj are independent, given 8 they are, a priori, de-
pendent random variables; in other words, it is possible to make inferences about
future values of the random variables Xj from observed values because they have the
same (unknown) value of 8.
Assume that the inspection team has measured the material contents of n .;;;; N
batches (for simplicity we relabel the batches so that these are the first n batches);
let ~ = (xl, .. , ,xn ) be the result of these measurements. The problem is to es-
timate the total material content of the class using these data and their prior in-
formation (4.27 and 4.28). Since we know x, we must estimate (xn +l , ••• , XN)'
The idea of the credibility approach is to take an estimate In (x) for the material
content x n + 1 of the n + 1st batch, which is linear in the data and which minimizes
the preposterior variance of the forecast error defined by
(4.30)
(Hx is, in fact, a variance since In@) will be an unbiased estimate; Le., E{Xn+1 - In
@)}=O.)
As a linear form, we take
(4.31 )
since there is no reason to use a different weighting factor for each Xj' Then Hx is
given by
(4.32)
and we get, with Eqs. (4.27), (4.28), and (4.29)
E{x~+, } = var {xd + (E{X;})2 = D +E + m2
E {ttl Xj) 2} = n' (var {xd+ (E{Xj})2) +n' (n -1)' (cov {xl,xj}
+ (E{xd)2) = n'(D+E+m2)+n'(n-l)'(D+m2),
E{Xn+1 t Xj} = n'(cov{Xj,xj}+(E{Xj})2) = n'(D+m2)
J=I
the following expression for the preposterior variance Hx :
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(433)
+n" (n - 1)" (D +m2 )] - 2zom - 2z 1 " (D + m 2 ) + 2" Zo "Zl "m.
The optimal values of Zo and Z 1 are determined by
and
which finally gives
(4.34)m" (l-zd.ZoandnE
n+-
D
Notice that (4.31) and (4.34) can, in fact, be used to estimate the future real-
ization of any random variable Xj, j = n + 1, ... ,N. The minimum of the pre-
posterior variance of H" is given by
E
=E+--
E
n+-
D
(4.35)
These results have an intuitive interpretation: for nD ~ E we obtain Z 1 ~ 1, Zo ~ 0,
and therefore
That is, we use primarily the information contained in the data. Note that this
could happen either because the number of examples is very large or because D,
the variance for our prior information, is large. For nD ~E we obtain z ~ 1, and
therefore
Le., we use primarily the prior information m.
We now estimate the sum S of all material in the class
N
S = L Xj
j=l
(4.36)
"by the true values of the material contents in the first n batches, L Xj, plus the
j=l
sum of the estimates of the remaining N - n material contents:
nL xj+(N-n)"f"(x).
j=1
Using (4.27), we obtain the following estimate F"(x) of the sum S:
F"(x) = (N - n) "(l - zd "m + (N - n "Z I + 1) "±Xj.
n j=l
(4.37)
(4.38)
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The preposterior variance of the forecast error of this estimate, which is defined by
H, = E{[S - F"@)]2}, (4.39)
is not just the sum of (N - n) terms H" in (4.35), because the same value of 8
applies throughout, and thus the error terms are correlated. However, it can be
written in simplified form as
H, = var{a i Xj + f Xj},
j=1 l=n+ I
N-n
a = ---. ZI.
n
(4.40)
Therefore, we get
H, = (a2 'n+(N-n»'var{xi}+(a2 'n'(n-l)+(N-n)'(N-n-l)
+ 2 • a' n . (N - n»' cov {Xi' Xi ;6/'}
which gives, with (4.28) and (4.29), the final result:
E
H, = N· (N-n)'E+(N-n)2 '--.
E
n+-
D
(4.41)
It should be noted that we would have obtained the same result if we had estimated
S in the general form
nL Xj +Fi'(x);
1=1
n
Fi'(x) = Zo +:l. L Xj
n jel
where the constants Zo and z 1 had to be determined by minimizing the preposterior
variance
The reason for this is that we limited ourselves to choosing an unbiased linear
estimate for S.
Let us consider again two special cases. For n = N we get, from (4.38) and
(4.41),
N
FN(x) = L Xj;
j=1
H, = O.
That is, the true value of the total material content is known. For n = 0 we get
H, = N'E+~ ·D.
That is, the total material content is estimated only on the basis of the prior
information. One also sees that D behaves like the variance of a systematic error
that persists in all estimates because 8 remains the same.
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4.4.2 SEVERAL CLASSES OF MATERIALS: OPTIMIZATION OF VERIFICATION
EFFORT
(4.42)
R
C~ L lEi' ni
i=1
Let us consider now one inventory period and assume for simplicity that the phys-
ical inventories at the beginning and at the end of the inventory period are zero.
The material flowing through the plant dUring this inventory period may be classi-
fied into R classes of material: R I input classes and R - R 1 output classes. Let
Xi} be the true material content of the jth batch of the ith class, which will be
measured by the inspection team in case this batch is selected for measurement. If
the ith class is an input class, Xi} is positive; otherwise, it is negative.
We assume that the random sampling scheme of the inspection team is to select
ni out of the N j batches of each class at the end of the inventory period. For ex-
ample, one may imagine a chemical plant, where samples from all batches are drawn
and stored and where only a fraction of these samples are analyzed at the end of the
inventory period.
In the following we assume that for the inspection of the material flow dUring
the inventory period under consideration there is only the amount C of inspection
effort (given in man-hours or in monetary terms) available. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the observation of one batch datum of the ith class requires the
effort lEi. Therefore, the question of how to distribute the effort among the differ-
ent classes arises: in other words, how to choose the class sample sizes ni such that
the boundary condition
is met.
Before beginning the statistical analysis that provides us with the basis necessary
for solving this optimization problem, we have to formulate the two hypotheses of
the control authority:
• If no material has been lost or diverted (null hypothesis Ho) the material
balance principle postulates that at the end of the inventory period the algebraic
sum of all throughputs must be zero; in other words:
R Nj
L L Xjj = O. (4.43)
i=1 }=I
• If the plant operator wants to divert material during the inventory period
under consideration (alternative hypothesis HI)' Eq. (4.43) no longer holds.
Let us assume that the operator does not change the number of batches in each
class simply by taking away some of the batches; rather, he diverts from ri batches
of the ith class the amount Iii of material. Let us assume, furthermore, that the
operator decides at the beginning of the inventory period whether he will divert any
material. Finally, let us assume that the diversion takes place in the first R I classes
after the inspection team's measurements and in the remainingR -R I classes before
86
Input:
Output:
""'----,
I I
r;;---;'I I I mTIUln~111m· I II I I Ii I I II I I IL ___J L____J L ___....
XII = YII XI~ :::= Vn )(13 = Yu
r---' ,...---, [Jll]JllllJI I
I I I I r----'I I I I I I
I I I I I IL___J l ___J L_ _J
)(21 = Y21 )(22 := V22 )(23 = V23 -1-.1.].
(x,,<O, V,,<O, 11,>0)
~---,
I I
I I
I I
I I
I IL ~
r-- -,
I I
I I
I I
I I
L
-
J
0_---,I IL J
FIGURE 4.3 Material balance (zero opening and closing inventories). Null hy-
S 4
pothesis (no diversion): ~ Xli + ~ Xu = O. Alternative hypothesis (diversion:
S 4 i=1 i=1
.~ Y Ii + .~ Y2i = 1 'J.LI + 1 ' JJ.2' Solid box: material contents Xij measured by the
1= 1 11:::1
inspection team in case of no diversion. Dashed box: material contents Yij measured
by the inspection team in case of diversion. Shaded area: diverted material.
the inspection team's measurements (the reason being that input batches are mea-
sured immediately after their arrival, and output batches immediately before their
shipment). If Ai are the sets of batches from the ith class from which the operator
diverts the amount JJ.i of material, then we have, instead of Eq. (4.43), the following
relation for the true material contents Yij of the batches to be measured by the
inspection team:
where
R Ni
I L Yij
i=1 j=1
R
L J.Li'rj
i=1
:M (4.44)
{
Xii + J.Li
-
Xij
for all batches from Ai, i
otherwise
R I + 1, ... ,R
and where Xij is the material content of the jth batch of the ith class to be measured
by the inspection team in case of no diversion. An illustration of this relation is
given in Figure 4.3 for R = 2,NI = 5, N 2 = 4, and rl = 1.
As in the case of one class of material we now assume that the prior information
available to the inspection team is the knowledge of the values of the following
parameters:
mi : = E{Xii} 1, ... ,R (4.45)
_ _ {:E j
E jj ,: = cov {xij, xj'j'} =
o
for
.,
I
'* i'
(4.46)
{
:Dj
Djj ,: = cov {mj(e), mj,(e)} = 0 for
..
= I
i *" i'
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(4.47)
We have assumed here that the batch-to-batch variations of different classes do not
depend on each other. It should be noted that this assumption seems to contradict
Eq. (4.43), where such a dependence is given explicitly. However, this equation is a
material balance equation that may be interpreted in such a way that the last out-
put batch can contain only the amount of material that has been left (and that may
be excluded from the random sampling procedure). This means that only the last
batch depends on the foregoing batches; it does not imply a nonzero correlation
between all batches of the R classes under consideration.
The statistical analysis of the control scheme outlined so far has to solve two
problems. First, an estimate of the algebraic sum of all batches of all classes, which
we again call material unaccounted for (MUF), must be made. Second, the signifi·
cance test with respect to the two hypotheses formulated above must be con-
structed, and its efficiency determined. In the following discussion, we will limit
the analysis to the first problem because the solution of the second question would
require a mathematical effort far beyond the scope of this monograph. Instead, we
refer the interested reader to the originalliterature. 10
Under the assumption that no material is diverted or is missing, the MUF is
estimated according to the considerations of the foregoing section with the help of
the following formula
FMUF(Xl"",XR) = tl F['(xj) = ~l (Nj-n;)omjO(l-Zli)
+ [(Nj - nj) 0 Zlj+ I] 0 ~ Xji) , (4.48)
nj i=l
where Z 1j is, according to (4.34), given by
Zlj = E· .
n. + -1.
I Dj
(4.49)
It is clear that this estimate is simply the sum of the class estimates (4.38) because
we have neglected the correlation between batches of different classes, given 8.
One can, however, derive the corresponding formula for nonvanishing correlations
without major difficulties.
The preposterior variance of this estimate is given by
HMUF = E{[MUF- FMUFCXI,' .. ,XR)]2}
= t [(Nj - nj) 0 Ej + (Nj - nj)2 0 Ej ] .
j=1 nj + Epj
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This variance may be used as a criterion for the optimization of the distribution of
a given control effort C; thus, the optimization problem reads, together with (4.43):
R [ E. ]min . L (Nj - nj) • Ej + (Nj - nji • --'- •
n ......nR· j"l E j
C ;;;. I; f· • n' nj + -j , I Dj
This procedure may be considered an analogue of the one we used for the detenni:
nation of the "best" estimate for the opening inventories in a sequence of inventory
periods. This estimate was also fonned on the basis of the null hypothesis that no
material is missing or diverted. It was stated in Chapter 2 (p. 23) that in principle
the opening inventory must be estimated in such a way that the probability of de-
tection is optimized. In the same sense, one could argue here that the efficiency of
the test should first be calculated, and then the estimate of the material unaccounted
for detennined such that the efficiency of the test is maximized. We did not pro-
ceed this way for the same reasons we gave in the opening inventory case: first,
because of the complexity of the mathematical problem and, second, because it is
difficult to fonnulate an alternative hypothesis when only random losses, and not
diversion of material, have to be detected.
We will conclude the presentation of this credibility approach here without giv-
ing a numerical example, mainly because in the nuclear material case the control
procedure has been established in a different way, as already indicated. However,
in the last chapter we will come back to the scheme just described.
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5 International Nuclear MaterialSafeguards
As already indicated in the introduction, there is one example where material
accountability has become of paramount importance: the international nuclear
material safeguards system, set up in partial fulfI.1lment of the nonproliferation
treaty for nuclear weapons. This system went into operation some years ago, and
the experience gained since that time could be of use in establishing other inter-
national control systems.
In the following sections, the development of the nuclear material safeguards
system is reviewed in order to demonstrate why material accountability became the
system's primary tool. Next, the nuclear fuel cycle and the various material measure-
ment problems inherent in it will be described. Finally, a numerical example is pre-
sented.
5.1 NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND IAEA NUCLEAR MATERIAL
SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM
Measures for safeguarding the nuclear material in the nuclear fuel cycle industry are
of special importance for three reasons:
• The material is very valuable (plutonium and highly enriched uranium are
worth twice as much as an equivalent amount of gold).
• Furthermore, the material is extremely toxic (the lethal body burden ofpluto-
nium is about 10-6 g).
• Finally, and most important, the material can be used for the construction of
nuclear weapons.
It was for all of these reasons that, from the very outset, safeguards were more
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important for nuclear material than for other materials (e.g., gold), where only one
of the reasons given is valid. However, it was the last of the three reasons that caused
the international interest in this special safeguards problem; this interest finally led
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.1
On March 5, 1970, the nonproliferation treaty took effect after ratification by
43 member states of the United Nations. This treaty, which had been drafted by
the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and signed by these
three states on July 1, 1968, was meant to prevent the acquisition of nuclear wea-
pons by states other than those that already possessed them. The treaty thus
implies international safeguards that guarantee the timely detection of any diversion
of nuclear material from the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle. The authority responsible
for the implementation of these safeguards measures is the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.
Although at the time the treaty was ratified, the United States, for example, had
at least 25 years of experience with nuclear material safeguards, it soon turned out
that the international control of national fuel cycles would cause completely new
problems. For this reason, research and development work was initiated in several
nations with the purpose of developing a practicable and acceptable international
safeguards system. This work was started in the signatory states (even though their
own nuclear fuel cycles were not subject to these safeguards) as well as in non-
nuclear-weapons states with large peaceful nuclear fuel cycles (e.g., Japan and the
Federal Republic of Germany). The international effort was coordinated and
stimulated by the IAEA through consultants,2-4 workshops, panels, and sym-
posia.5-13 At the Geneva Conference in 1971 14 an evaluation and overview of the
work done so far was given, and it is illuminating to look at the structure of the
whole system as it was conceived at that time (Figure 5.1): even though the de-
tailed tools and procedures had just been fixed and therefore no rigorous analysis
of the system was possible, all relevant aspects of the problem had been recognized
and described very clearly.
An important step toward a safeguards system that could be accepted by all
states was made when the Safeguards Committee, which had been created by the
Board of Governors of the IAEA and which negotiated from July 1970 until
February 1971, succeeded in establishing a model agreement15 that was meant to
serve as an example for all the safeguards agreements between IAEA and the indi-
vidual states.
In the model agreement, it was laid down that material accountability is used as
the safeguards measure of primary importance, with containment and surveillance as
complementary measures. Here, material accountability has to be understood ex-
actly as it has been defined in Chapter 2. For this purpose it is necessary to have
well-defined areas for the physical inventory and channels for the flow of the
nuclear material; otherwise, a measurement of the material would be impossible.
This was the basis of the introduction of the concept of strategic points into the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (see IAEA,15 article 116): the safeguards measures must be
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concentrated at as few places as possible. Containment measures are understood to
be physical security measures such as concrete walls, special devices for the trans-
port of the material (birdcages), seals, and alann installations. Surveillance measures
are understood to be those measures that are taken when, because of the special
situation, direct inspection is the only possibility (e.g., dUring reactor core loading).
It should be emphasized that these measures as well as their relative importance
were agreed upon because of the special boundary conditions of the international
safeguards problem. The major boundary conditions that allowed the system to be
accepted on an international level may be summarized by the key words rational,
objective, and formalized. This means that not the subjective impression of an
individual inspector but only a fonnalized system that provides quantitative state-
ments is accepted as a basis for a judgment of whether a state behaved legally in the
sense of the nonproliferation treaty. It was for this special purpose that material
accountability became the most important measure, because unlike either contain-
ment or surveillance measures, it provides quantitative statements by its very
nature.
Furthermore, the procedures for the performance of nuclear material safeguards
were laid down in the model agreement: the operator of a nuclear plant generates
all source data for the establishment of a material balance and reports these data to
a national (or regional) authority, which reports them to the international safe-
guards authority; the international authority verifies these reported data with the
help of independent measurements made on a random sampling basis. If there are
no significant differences between the operator's reported data and the international
authority's own findings, then all the operator's data are accepted and the material
balance is closed on the basis of the operator's data alone.
Finally, it should be mentioned that there are model agreement statements
about the maximum routine inspection effort. In order to make meaningful state-
ments about this effort, the importance of the nuclear material (in the sense of the
nonproliferation treaty) processed in the different plants of the nuclear fuel cycle
had to be defined. Thus, the concept of effective kilogram was introduced (in fact,
this concept was in use before the nonproliferation treaty, in connection with bi-
lateral safeguards agreements made under the auspices of the IAEA). According to
this concept, I kg of plutonium corresponds to one effective kilogram, whereas
1 kg of uranium with an enrichment of 0.0 1 and above corresponds to a quantity in
effective kilograms that is obtained by taking the square of the enrichment. The
maximum routine inspection effort, given in inspection man·hours spent in a
nuclear plant, is determined on the basis of the annual throughput or inventory of
nuclear material expressed in effective kilograms.
Before concluding the description of the IAEA safeguards system, some words
should be said about the development of international safeguards since 1971. The
first problem to be solved was that of the relation between the national and regional
safeguards authorities on one hand and the international authority on the other.
Here, EURATOM, the safeguards authority of the European Community, posed a
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special problem: as it is itself an international authority, the question of the relation
of two international authorities had to be treated. 16 Second, more attention has
been paid to the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear plants; even
though this problem is the responsibility of the individual states, the IAEA de·
veloped some recommendations. We will come back to this point at the end of the
chapter. Finally, the question of stopping further proliferation of nuclear weapons
by means other than international safeguards has received attention. The ideas
developed in this connection center on "limitation of the export of sensitive
nuclear plants" and establishment of international "regional nuclear centers,"
where all nuclear activities related to power generation are concentrated. 17 How·
ever, as these ideas are still under discussion, and as they are not directly connected
with our subject, we will not go into detail here.
Let us come back to the IAEA international safeguards system as established in
1971. The efficiency of this system was estimated only very roughly when the
model agreement was negotiated. Clearly, such an estimate could be begun only
after the principles, the tools, and the procedures had been laid down precisely. The
first detailed analyses were finished several years later .111 Before we discuss them,
however, some ideas about the nuclear fuel cycle and the problem of the measure-
ment of nuclear material should be clarified.
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FIGURE 5.2 The nuclear fuel cycle, based on the light water reactor.
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5.2 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL MEASUREMENT
The nuclear fuel cycle industry is composed of all those industrial activities that are
connected with the production of energy through nuclear fission processes (other
activities based on nuclear fission, like radiomedicine, are not relevant here). The
main activities of a nuclear fuel cycle based on the light water reactor are rep-
resented in Figure 5.2.
In the uranium mine, natural uranium ore is extracted; 0.7% of the uranium in
this ore is found as 235 U and 99.3% as 238 U. Preliminary processing produces uranate
(yellow cake), which is transported to the conversion plant. Here, it is converted
into gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF6 ), which is sent to the enrichment plant,
where the uranium is enriched, raising the 235 U concentration to 2-3%. The
uranium hexafluoride containing the enriched uranium is sent to the fuel fabrication
plant, where the uranium fluoride is first converted into uranium oxide (UQ2 ). The
uranium oxide powder is pressed into pellets; these pellets are sintered and loaded
into fuel pins that are finally fitted to fuel elements. The fuel elements are brought
to the nuclear power station, where they constitute the reactor core. The fuel
elements remain at the station for approximately 3 years, during which the fuel
is consumed, Le., the 235 U isotope is split by neutron-induced nuclear fission, yield-
ing fission products and heat. In addition, transuranium elements are produced, the
most important among these being plutonium (mainly 239 Pu, but also other iso-
topes).
The spent fuel elements that are removed from the reactor core are stored for
some months at the reactor site to allow the short-lived fission products to decay,
and then they are transported in heavily shielded transport casks to the chemical
reprocessing plant. There, the remaining uranium is separated from the plutonium,
the other transuranium elements, and the fission products. The uranium is sent
back to the enrichment plant, and the plutonium is either stored (for later use in
fast breeder reactors) or sent to the fuel fabrication plant where it is added to the
uranium, thus serving as additional fuel (this procedure is called thermal recycling
of plutonium). The remaining transuranium elements and the fission products con-
stitute the highly radioactive waste, which after some treatment is stored in the
fmal waste disposal (i.e., deposited in such suitable geological formations as salt
caverns).
As indicated in Figure 5.2, the nuclear fuel cycle is divided into an open part,
where the nuclear material is handled in an accessible form, and a closed part,
where the nuclear material is handled in a form that is not directly accessible. This
division is important in view of the various methods for measurement of the nuclear
material: in the open part, so-called direct methods may be used, where the material
is measured in the usual way by determining gross and net volumes or weights,
sampling, and performing chemical analyses, but this is not possible in the closed
part. Here, indirect or nondestructive methods have to be used to measure the
nuclear material contained in the fuel elements, which means that the emitted
neutrons, rays, or the heat of decay are used for the measurement.
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It should be noted that both types of measurements, direct and indirect, pose
difficult technical problems. Therefore, it has become crucially important that the
safeguards material accountability evaluate the errors connected with these measure·
ments. In recent years there has been an ongoing effort devoted to estimating -
with the help of interlaboratory tests - the variances of all random and systematic
error components of the measurements; an indication of the size of this effort may
be obtained from Kraemer and Beyrich19 and Beyrich and Drosselmeyer.2o An
account of all measurement problems in the nuclear industry is given by Jones21
and, from the statistical point of view, by Jaech.22
Without going into all the details of the measurement of the flow of nuclear
material, one specific case should be considered: the entry of material into the
chemical reprocessing plant. Here, the uranium and plutonium contents of the
spent fuel elements have to be measured. This is done, after the separation of the
fuel from the cladding material of the fuel pins and the dissolution of the fuel, in
the "accountability tank." The measurement at this place plays a unique role in
the whole fuel cycle for two reasons: it is the first time that the plutonium
generated in the reactor is measured and, furthermore, the measurement itself is the
most difficult of all measurements in the whole fuel cycle because of the presence
of all the highly radioactive fission products. For these reasons, special attention
has been given to this measurement problem?3.24 Thus, the entry into the chemical
reprocessing plant deserves the name "strategic point" in the sense of the nonprolif·
eration treaty.
The measurement of the physical inventory poses a different problem in each
plant of the nuclear fuel cycle. In the conversion and fabrication plants, physical
inventories are taken simply by stopping the production process and measuring all
the material available. If the plants are large, then one will not stop production in
the whole plant, but only in parts. In any case, one will collect the material in some
parts of the plant in order to facilitate the taking of inventory. In the case of the
chemical reprocessing plant such a procedure is not possible since the material is
not accessible because of its radioactivity. Here, either a washout is performed
(Le., all of the material is taken out of the plant so that the physical inventory is
zero), or the material contained in the plant is collected in several tanks and estim·
ated very roughly. Another method that is still being developed25 and that does not
require any interruption of the reprocessing procedure is the in-process inventory
determination method, which is based on the differences of the isotopic composition
of the entering irradiated fuel. Finally, in the enrichment plants, none of the
methods listed can be applied directly because the enrichment process cannot be
stopped, nor can isotopic differences be used, if the entering material is natural
uranium. Thus, one can only estimilte the amount of material in the process itself;
however, this amount is only a very small fraction of the material circulating in the
whole plant.
It should be noted that all the production and processing procedures in the
nuclear fuel cycle, as well as the measurement techniques (especially the indirect
97
measurement methods), are still being developed. The data presented in the papers
cited, as well as in the following numerical example, are data as of today -
tomorrow they may have to be revised.
5.3 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Among the many case studies that have been done in recent years26 is an analysis
of the accountability problem in a chemical reprocessing plant; it has all the charac-
teristic features of the general material accountability problem as well as those of
the specific safeguards problem. The data used here are from Avenhaus et al. 27
and Avenhaus and Nakicenovic.211
5.3.1 BASIC DATA
The West Valley plant of Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) is located in the United
States about 30 miles south of Buffalo, New York. The plant reprocesses irradiated
nuclear fuel elements by means of the PUREX solvent extraction process. The
capacity of the plant is 300 tons of low-enriched uranium per year (in the form of
low-enriched U02 or uranium metal). This means 1,000 kg of low-enriched uranium
per day, assuming 300 working days per year. The base-line process is designed for
low-enriched U02 in stainless-steel-zirconium alloy tubes; with modification of
the front-end treatment only, however, natural uranium fuel clad in aluminum can
be processed.· The processing procedure (Figure 5.3) will not be described in detail
here, but some remarks will be made about input, product, losses, and inventory.
The element to be processed is first removed from the storage pool, placed in a
fixture on the inspection table, and marked for sawing. It is then transferred to the
saw table; the scrap metal cut off is taken in scrap buckets to the general purpose
cell (GPC) for eventual burial. The fuel bundle is pushed by a ram out of its casing
into a shear feed magazine, and the magazine is transferred to the shear. The
chopped fuel is discharged through a chute into baskets in the GPC, and these are
loaded into the dissolver in the GPC by a crane. The amounts of fuel and acid
charged to the dissolver are adjusted to yield a 235 U concentration that is approx-
imately 50% of the critical concentration. Finally, the dissolver solution and rinses
are collected in the accountability and feed-adjustment tank (3D-I), which is
equipped with heating and cooling coils, condenser, air sparger, and liqUid-level
and specific-gravity instruments.
The low-enriched uranium product is loaded into a tank trailer and shipped in
quantities of about 4.2 metric tons of uranium per shipment. The recovered
plutonium product is stored in geometrically safe tanks from which it is loaded into
10-liter bottles that are then packed in birdcages. Each lO-liter bottle contains 2-3
kg of plutonium. Shipments of plutonium are scheduled either when there are 20
bottles of packaged product in storage or at the end of each campaign.
* The plant is under reconstruction; these data will no longer be valid when operations resume.
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FIGURE 5.3 Reprocessing procedure at NFS, major streams. See text for explan-
ation. (Adapted from Avenhaus et al. 27)
Two kinds of loss are considered: liquid waste and hull losses. Losses of solid
waste from the laboratories are not considered to be important, and the amount of
material that is recycled in the course of acid recycling can also be neglected.
The plutonium inventory of the plant during a campaign can be estimated with
an accuracy of about 10% by means of rough estimates of the plutonium content
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TABLE 5.1 NFS Campaign and Batch Oata for the Refer-
ence Time T(6 months) for the Plutonium Throughput
Pu throughput (kg)
Liquid waste (% of input)
Hull losses (% of input)
Number of campaigns
Number of working days
Input
Input/campaign (kg)
Number of batches/campaign
Batch volume (liters)
Pu content/batch (kg)
Batch-to-batch variation (%)
Product
Number of batches/campaign
Weight of batch (kg)
Pu content/batch (kg)
Batch-to-batch variation (%)
Liquid waste
Number of batches/campaign
Batch volume (liters)
Pu content/batch (kg)
Batch-to-batch variation (%)
SOURCE: Avenhaus et al. 27
875
0.9
0.1
5
125
175
25
4,000
7
10
76
15
2.28
10
90
5,000
0.019
10
of the different tanks. The in-process inventory determination method does not
work very well in the NFS plant because the plutonium product tanks are too large.
The only accurate method of determining the inventory of the plant is to perform a
flushout after the end of a campaign. Representative data from actual NFS cam-
paigns are given in Table 5.1.
Plutonium is the only material in the process that is of strategic value; for this
reason, we restrict our considerations to this element. The measurement system
needed for complete plutonium accountability may be described as follows: input
is measured in the input accountability tank (30-1) by determining the volume
(by the dip-tube system) and the concentration (through isotopic dilution analysis)
of a sample. The samples for plutonium product specification and plutonium con-
centration analysis (amperometric titration and isotopic analysis) are drawn from
the product storage tank (50-SA or 50-5B). The product loadout quantities are
based on the net product solution weight and the reported assay values. Liquid
waste is collected in the central waste tank (70-10). Measurement is based on
volume determination (level indicator) and analysis of a sample (TTA-extraction
a counting) drawn from the central waste tank. The plutonium content in the hulls
is determined by weighing the baskets (gross and tare), taking samples of end and
middle pieces, and analYZing the samples.
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TABLE 5.2 Pu Measurement System for NFS Plant
Standard Deviation per
Single Measurement Effort per Single
(%) Measurement
Class Measurement Random Systematic Man-hours Cost ($ U.S.)
Input Volume determination 0.35 0.1 0.7
(dip-tube system)
Sampling I 1.5
Concentration deter- 0.6 0.3 400
mination (isotopic
dilution analysis)
Product Weighing 0.02 3
Sampling 0.5 2.25
Concentration deter- 0.4 0.3 200
mination (amper-
ometric titration and
isotopic analysis)
Liquid Volume determination 5 5 0.1
waste (level indicator)
Sampling 50 0.5
Concentration deter- 15 IO 2 40
mination (ITA-
extraction Q:
counting)
Physical Washout 0.577 [kg)
inventory
SOURCE: Avenhaus et al. 27
In Table 5.2, the plutonium measurement system is summarized, and the effort
required to perform the measurements, expressed in man-hours and money, is given.
Obviously much more effort is devoted to safeguards in the plant than is indicated
in Table 5.2. However, as this additional effort represents a kind of baseload effort
that cannot be reduced and that is not subject to any optimization procedure, we
will not report on it here; for further information, the reader should refer to the
original work.27
5.3.2 MATERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES
According to Chapter 2, the establishment of the material balance includes the
establishment of the
Initial physical inventory 10
Book inventory B(lo + input - product - waste)
Closing physical inventory I.
WI
In the following, we will discuss the measurement of these quantities as well as the
verification of the relevant data in detail. We will then determine the efficiency of
the combined system for one inventory period - we do not consider the problems
connected with a sequence of inventory periods, which have been analyzed in
Chapter 2.
Physical Inventories
We assume that the true values (in kilograms) of the physical inventories 10 and II
after a flushout are
E(/o) = E(Id = 1. (S.I a)
(S.I b)0~/o.I~2.
We assume further that the variation of these inventories is of the same order of
magnitude:
If we assume, in addition, that the physical inventories are equally distributed
random variables with a range given by (5.1 b), we obtain the following variances of
the physical inventories after a flushout:
var (/0 ) = var (/d = 0.333. (S.le)
Input
One measurement of the plutonium content glj (in grams) of the jth input batch
consists of
Volume determination Vii (in liters)
Drawing of a sample
Concentration measurement cli of the sample (in grams ofPu per liter)
Therefore, in the case of no data falsification the operator reports the total plu-
tonium input during one inventory period; this input has been calculated on the
basis of the following input batch data:
j=I, ... ,NI . (S.2a)
The results of the single measurements can be written in the following form:
vlj = E(vI) + eU + e~6
clj = E(cd + elf} + e~6 + d?iC
(S.2b)
(S.2e)
where E(vd and E(c d are the true values of the quantities to be measured; eu and
e~6 are the random and systematic errors of the volume determination; e~ and e~6
are the random and systematic errors of the concentration determination; and d'lj
is the sampling error in the operator's sample. Here, it has been assumed for sim-
plicity that the true values for all batches are the same. The generalized expressions
can be given easily.
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The variances of these errors are abbreviated as follows:
var (em = :a~rl
var(e¥j) :a~SI
var(eU) :a~rl
var(eU) :a~s
var(et:n :a;l.
(5.3)
If one assumes that one calibration per inventory period is performed both for
the volume and for the concentration measurement, and if one neglects error terms
of the second order, then the total input reported by the operator is given by
Nt
Input = N 1 0 E(vd 0 E(cd +I: [E(vd 0 (e~j + e~s +d~n
j=l
+ E(cd 0 (eU + e~j)] (5.4)
and the variance of the total reported input is given by the following formula, if
one takes into account that random and systematic errors are propagated differ-
ently:
(5.5)
Waste
For waste the situation is the same as in the case of input except that all the char-
acteristic quantities have different values. Thus, for the variance of the total re-
ported waste dUring the inventory period - characterized by the index 3 - we get
the following formula:
var(Waste) = E 2(V3)o(N3 oa~r3 +Nj °a;3 +N3 oa~s3)
+ E2(C3) 0 (N3 0 a~r3 +~ 0 a~3)' (5.6)
which needs no further explanation.
Product
The situation in the case of the product is different, since not the volume but the
total weight of the batch is determined by taking the gross and the tare weight of
the batch and its container; thus, the systematic errors of these measurements are
cancelled. Therefore, one has for the material content g2j (in grams of plutonium)
of the jth product batch
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(5.8)
(5.9)
(5.7c)
(5.7a)
(5.7b)
j = 1, ... ,N2
V2j = E(V2) + e'!J + e~} [kg solution]
C2j = E(c2)+e~j +e~B +~f [gPu]
kg sol
where E(V2) and E(C2) are the true values of the measurements, e~1 and e~t are the
random errors of the gross and tare weights of the weighing procedure, e~j and e~
are the random and systematic errors of the concentration measurement, and d~f is
the sampling error of the concentration measurement.
The variances of these errors are abbreviated in the same way as in the case of
the input:
var(e~j) = var(e~f)
var(e~j) = :a~r2
var (e~j) = :a~2
var (~j) = :a:2
Therefore, the variance of the total product reported during the inventory period is
given by the following formula:
var (Product) = var (% [E(V2) 0 (e~j + e~ +d~n + E(C2) 0 (e~1 + e~n])
= E 2(V2) 0 (N2 0 a~r2 +Ni 0 a:2 + N 2 0 a~B2)
+E2(C2)o2N2 oa~2'
Material Unaccounted For
According to Eq. (2.2), material unaccounted for is defined as
MUF: = 10 + Input - Product - Waste - II. (5.1 0)
If the operator does not divert any material (null hypothesis Ho), the expected
value of MUF is zero (see Eq. 2.8); in case of diversion of the amount M, the ex-
pected value ofMUFisM (see Eq. 2.12). The variance of MUF is, in both cases, given
by
var (MUF) = :a1-uF = 2 var (/0) + var(Input) + var (Product) + var (Waste),
(5.11)
where the single expressions are given by Eqs. (5.1c), (5.5), (5.6), and (5.9). Nu-
merical values for the square roots of all variances (relative standard deviations) are
listed in Table 5.3. The variance of the material unaccounted for is given in Table
5.3, according to which the standard deviation of MUF amounts to 4.1 kg of
plutonium in one inventory period (half a year). Using Eq. (2.15) we conclude that
for a false alarm rate of « = 0.05 about 13.5 kg ofplutonium must be lost or diverted
to ensure a probability of detection of I - (3 = 0.95.
104
TABLE 5.3 Variance of the Material Unaccounted for (MUF) for One Inventory
Period
Class
Input
Product
Waste
Inventory
MUF
SOURCE: Avenhaus et al. 27
Variance (kg2 )
8.564 (Eq. 5.5)
6.837 (Eq. 5.9)
0.958 (Eq. 5.6)
0.333 (Eq. 5.lc)
17.026 (Eq. (5.1l)
Standard Deviation (kg)
2.926
2.615
0.979
0.577
4.126
(5.12)
5.3.3 VERIFICATION PROCEDURES
It is assumed that the inspector watches all the measurements necessary for taking
the physical inventory and that he need not verify the volume and weight determi-
nations or the sampling procedures, as they are automated and therefore, tamper-
proof. It is further assumed that the inspector verifies the concentration determi-
nations on the basis of a random sampling scheme and that both the operator and
the inspector use the same measurement methods.
If the operator wants to divert material by means of data falsification, he pro-
ceeds as follows. He dilutes rl of his input samples in order to simulate a smaller
amount of input. In this way he gains material that he can divert. Therefore, instead
of (5.2c) we have
Clj = E(cd + eU + e~· + d?j - JI~ for j = I, ... , rl
Clj = E(cd + e~J + e~· + d?f for j = I, ... ,N. - rl.
The operator reports, however, Cjj + JI. , for j = 1, ... ,rl in order to maintain the
material balance.
He proceeds in the same way for the product and the waste, except that in these
two cases he concentrates the samples. (Clearly, the effects will be the same if the
operator does not dilute or concentrate samples but simply reports wrong data).
Therefore, if cg,l, i = I, 2, 3, j = I, ... ,ni, are the results of the concentration
measurements reported by the operator and those of the inspection team, then the
D-statistic according to Eq. (3.9) is given by
The reason for this special choice of signs has already been explained; it will be im-
portant for the correlation considerations below.
The expected values of the D-statistic under the null and alternative hypotheses
are given by
E(D/Ho) = 0 (5.14a)
E(D/Hd = L IJ.f •ri,
i
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(5.l4b)
(5.15)
where IJ.f is the amount by which the concentration of a falsified batch of class i is
falsified. The amount of material that can be diverted in this way is not given
simply by the amount ~lJ.f • ri, but rather by
I
3
M 2 = L E(vd· IJ.f •ri
i=t
where lJ.i is defined by
(5.16)
As one can see from Eqs. (5.14) and (5.15), M2 and E(D/Hd are not identical.
Therefore, the optimization procedure sketched in Chapter 3 must be modified, as
a different boundary condition, Eq. (5.15), has to be used; instead of Eqs. (3.42)
we now get the following optimal sample sizes n? of the inspection team and r? of
the operator [for the reasons given at the end of section 3.2 (p. 58) we limit our
consideration to these simple fonnulae] :
nf!1 (5.l7a)
1,2,3. (5.l7b)
Under these conditions we get for the expected value of the D-statistic under the
alternative hypothesis H t
IJ.'E(D/Ht ) = L _I • r? ,
j E(vd
or, if we use the expression for the optimum sample size r? ,Eq. (5.l7b),
TABLE 5.4 Input Data for the Concentration Measurement Verification
Amount lJi per
Total Number Pu Content Effort fj per Batch to be
Class of Batches Batch Size per Batch Verification Diverted
N i E(vi) (kg) ($ U.S.) (kg)
Input 1 125 4,000 liters 7 400 0.1470
Product 2 380 15 kg 2.28 200 0.0342
Waste 3 450 5,000 liters 0.019 40 0.0114
SOURCE: Avenhauseral. 17
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TABLE 5.5 Inspector's Optimal Sample Sizes
C (% of Max. Effort)
Sample 100 80 60 50 30 20 10 5 I
nO 125 96 26 I I I I I II
nO 380 380 380 358 214 142 70 34 52
nO 450 17 5 I I I I I I)
SOURCE: Avenhaus etal."
TABLE 5.6 Operator's Optimal Sample Sizes
Amount M. To Be Diverted (kg)
Sample 0.1 0.5 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
r"': 0 I I I I I I I I I I I
rO 3 10 25 54 83 1I2 142 171 200 229 258 288
•rO I I I I I I I I I I I I)
SOURCE: Avenhaus etal."
(5.18)£(D/H\)
N:~ __1_. e.' Il.
i J!1- (va J 1
N ·M2 •
f £3 ('Vi)' ei • Ili
The basic data for the verification scheme are collected in Table 5.4. Because of
the large difference of the amounts Ilr by which the data have to be falsified,
practically all of the effort must go to the product stream. This does not mean,
however, that the input and waste stream data need not be verified at all. The
following procedure is proposed. If only a small effort can be expended, only one
batch is verified in the input and one in the waste stream; the rest goes to the
product stream. If resources available are more than enough for verification of all
product batches, then the remaining effort must be distributed between input and
waste according to formula (5.17).
The optimal sample sizes n? are given in Table 5.5 as a function of the total
effort C. The optimal numbers of falsified batches r? are given in Table 5.6 as a
function of the total amount M2 assumed to be diverted.
5.3.4 DETERMINING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN DATA VERIFICATION AND
MATERIAL BALANCE ESTABLISHMENT
It was previously mentioned that the random variables MUF and D are stochastically
dependent because the data of the operator are used both for data verification and
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for material balance establishment. In case of the null hypothesis Ho , we get, be·
cause E(MUF) = E(D/Ho) = 0 and by using Eqs. (5.4), (5.5), (5.6), and (5.9),
the following expression for the covariance between MUF and D under the null
hypothesis Ho
cov(MUF. D/Ho) = E([MUF - E(MUF)] ° [D - E(D)] JHo)
= E(MUFo D/Ho )
N,
+ L [E(vI) ° [e~i + e~B + d'ff
j=l
N,
+ E(cI)o [e~i + e~j]] - L [E(V2) ° [e~i + e~B + ~j]
j=l
N)
+ E(C2)o [e~f + e~fll- L [E(V3) o [e~i + e~j + ~j]
j=l
+ E(C3) ° [e~j + e~j]]) °
N n,
+~ 0 ~ [eC~ + eCB + dOt; -fC! -fcB - d1t;]n L. 2} 2 2} 2} 2 2}
2 j=1
+Nn3 °~ [e~i + e~B + ~f - [fI - [fB -d~f]))
3 }=I
(5.19)
where [ and d I are the errors of the inspector corresponding to those of the oper·
ator. This formula looks rather horrible. It should be noted that its structure is
not particularly complicated, but the detail of the technical problem, i.e., the
measurement effort for establishing the material balance leads to such a lengthy
expression.
If we omit the vanishing terms in Eq. (5.19), we obtain a much simpler ex-
pression, namely
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cov(MUF, D/Ho) == - E[E(VI)' N I • (~ [(eU)2 + (~f)2] +nl . e~.)
nl /=1
N 2 ('" )+ E(V2)' -. L. [(em2 + (~f)2] + n~' e~·
n2 J=I
+ E(V3)' N3 • (~ [(e~ji + (1flf)2] + n~ • e~.)] ,
n3 J-I
which can finally be reduced to the following formula:
3
cov(MUF, D/Ho) == - L [E(vd' Ni ' (a;ri + a~i + ni • a;.i)]. (5.20)
i=1
TIlls means that MUF and D are negatively correlated.
From Eq. (5.20) we obtain the co"elation coefficient for the null hypothesis
H0, which is defined by
cov(MUF, D/Ho )
PH.: = Jvar(MUF)'yvar(D/Ho) (5.21)
For the alternative hypothesis HI (diversion of the amounts M I and M2 by means
of the two strategies) we have, instead of Eq. (5.17),
cov(MUF, D/Hil = E«MUF- M.)· [D - E(D)VHI), (5.22)
where the expected value of the D-statistic under the alternative hypothesis HI
according to (5.l4b) is given by
E(D) = L ~~ .rv.
v
The covariance between MUF and D under the alternative hypothesis HI is cal-
culated by using Eqs. (5.4), (5.5), (5.6), (5.9), and (5.12) and leads to the following
expression:
E (MUF - M.) • (D - E(D))) ==
E ((NI .E(v.)· E(c.) - N2 • E(V2)' E(C2) - N3 • E(V3) • E(C3)
N ,
+ L. [E(v.)· [e~j + e~ + d~n + E(c.)· [e~j + eu]]
}=I
N,
- L [E(V2)' [e~ + elft + dtC ] + E(C2)' [e~1 + e~m
}=I
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where hI}' v = I, 2, 3 are the numbers of batch data falsified by the operator and
contained in the inspection team's samples.
With the help of the material balance relation
N I oE(vdoE(cd-N2 °E(V2)oE(C2)-N3 °E(V3)oE(C3) = M I
and because of the independence of the e, d, and f on one hand and hI} on the other
hand, we obtain the same expression for the covariance between MUF and D under
the alternative hypothesis as under the null hypothesis:
cov(MUF, DIHd = cov(MUF. DIHo), (5.24)
(5.25)
vvar(MUF) ° ";var(DIHI ) .
which also means that in this case we have p <O. However, because of the differ-
ence of the variance of the D-statistic for Ho and HI we have, instead of (5.21),
cov(MUF. DIHa)
5.3.5 OVERALL PROBABILITY OF DETECTION
In Figure 5.4, the results of the numerical calculations for the overall probability
of detection I -13 according to Eqs. (4.18) and (4.11) are presented for one in-
ventory period (6 months) for the parametersM =M I +M2 = 10 kg Pu, Q = 0.05,
QI = Q2, and for varying M I (and M2 ) and effort C. The corresponding probabil-
ities of detection for p = 0, which have been calculated according to Eqs. (4.19)
and (4.12) are almost the same as those for p < 0, which is not surprising, in view
of the discussion in section 4.3. As can be checked numerically, the minimum of
the probability of detection is given approximately for those values of M I and M2
for which the following relation holds:
(5.26)
aMUF aD/HI
which is intuitive because of the symmetry of the formulae, at least for p = O.
At first sight it seems strange that for a certain range of the M I (and M2 ) values,
I -13 decreases with increasing effort C. The explanation is as follows: the variance
ahlH decreases monotonically with increasing C (this is intuitive). This means that
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FIGURE 5.5 Total probability of detection I -(3 as function of amount MI of
material diverted and single false alarm probability (XI, with M I + M2 = 10 (kg),(X = 0.05, and C = 50% of maximum effort.
I -(32 as given by Eq. (3.39) increases with increasing C if the argument of the
<I>-function is positive and decreases if the argument is negative.
In Figure 5.5, for a fixed effort C (50% of maximum effort), I -(3 is represented
as a function of MI (and M2 ) and (XI (and (X2) for M = MI +M2 = 10 kg Pu, and
(X = 0.05. The saddle surface is easily recognizable, which illustrates the mir.imax
problem posed in section 4.3, Eq. (4.26). The maximum of I --(3 is approximately
given for (XI =(X2 if Eq. (5.26) holds.
The numerical calculations may be summarized by stating that the overall
guaranteed probability of detection for a given effort C and a total amount M of
diverted material for one inventory period is calculated according to formulae
(4.25) and (4.18) for (XI = (X2;MI andM2 are chosen according to (5.26).
5.4 CONCLUSION
In light of the example presented in the last section, the relevance of material
accountability for the nuclear material safeguards problem should be examined
once again. In fact, one could argue that the figures shown in Figure 5.4 indicate
that too much material has to be diverted before a reasonable probability of detec-
tion is reached and, therefore, that the material accountability tool is not the most
appropriate one. There are two answers to this objection.
First, it is very unlikely that a state will divert very small amounts of material in
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order to accumulate them and construct a nuclear weapon, and prevention of the
diversion of very small amounts of material by a private group, so-called nuclear
theft (see, e.g., Willrich and Taylor29 and Krieger30 ), is the responsibility of the
national authorities. These national authorities might use a safeguards system com-
pletely different from the one described above in order to meet their objectives;
one could imagine, for example, that the containment principle might playa much
more important role.
Second, as was pointed out in section 5.1, international acceptance depended
heavily on the system's being rational, formalized, and objective. It is clear that the
accountability system that has become opperational is highly formalized by its very
nature. In addition, it has a high degree of objectivity: according to the analysis
presented, subjectivity is limited to the choice of the values of only a few para-
meters, like total inspection effort, total false alarm probability, and frequency of
inventory periods. It was for this reason that these complicated analyses have been
performed; even if, in practice, much less sophisticated formulae can be used, it is
necessary to understand the structure of the system and to be able to determine the
degree of subjectivity remaining in it.
In summary, it has been shown that, of the different possible tools for an inter-
national nuclear material safeguards system - material accountability, containment,
and surveillance - material accountability best meets the various requirements and
boundary conditions imposed on such a system.
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6 Material Accountability In Technologyand Economics
In Chapter 5, one specific and rather recent application of the principle of material
accountability was presented. It is, in fact, this new application that has stimulated
research in the field - research into both theory (Le., statistical and game theo-
retical) and practice (Le., measurement). In this chapter, we will present some ap-
plications in the areas of technology and economics that differ from the nuclear
safeguards application in several aspects. First, some of them have a very long
tradition: mint material accountability, for example, goes back to the ancient
Greeks. Second, the statistical treatment, along the lines of that described in
Chapter 2, is of minor importance in most cases; the reasons for this will be given
later. Finally, the purpose of the establishment of material balances varies from case
to case; it cannot always be formulated so clearly and so mathematically as in the
nuclear material safeguards case, and, indeed, this was the reason for discussing this
case first.
First, two applications in the chemical industry are described - distillation and
isotope separation - where material accountability is used extensively for process
control purposes. Applications from the metal industry are discussed next; in
particular, mint material accountability will be given as an example - an example
that has surprisingly strong similarities to the nuclear material case. The second half
of the chapter is concerned with more general applications. First, we will look at the
Materials-Process-Product Model (MPPM) developed by Ayres and his co-workers;
this is an attempt to treat economic problems with the help of material account-
ability considerations. The broad use of material balances as a management tool in
socialist economies is discussed next (the discussion, however, is a brief and general
one, because a detailed description is certainly beyond the scope of this mono-
graph).
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6.1 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Material balance methods have a long history in the chemical industry. They have
been used mainly for process control purposes, which means that the problem of
detecting loss or diversion of material to be processed does not playa major role
under normal conditions. The material presented in this section can give only a very
rough idea of the use of material balances. Much more complete are the descriptions
in textbooks on process control (see, for example, Buckley" Treyball,2 or
Skinskey3). Here, only a demonstration of applications in this very important field
will be given.
In the following sections, two examples are given that are considered to be rep-
resentative of many others: fractionated distillation and isotope separation.
6.1.1 DISTILLATION
According to Buckley, I the control of distillation columns is one of the most in-
triguing and challenging branches of process control. Hundreds of papers have been
written on this subject, and the number of proposed control schemes probably runs
into the thousands. Here, we will limit ourselves to only a very few aspects.
Process control of distillation columns has two primary facets, product quality
control and material balance control. Material balance control must
• Cause the average sum of the distillate and tails streams to be exactly equal to
the average feed rate
• Cause the resulting adjustment in process flows to be smooth and gradual to
avoid upsetting either the column or the downstream process equipment fed by the
column
• Maintain the column holdup and the overhead and bottom inventories
between upper and lower limits
These control objectives must be satisfied in the face of any possible disturbances
in feed flow rate, composition, thermal condition, and so on.
For simplicity, we limit our analysis to an ideal and binary distillation. In Figure
6.1, a sketch of such a column is given, consisting of an enriching and condenser
section and a stripping and reboiler section; each section consists of many "trays,"
or stages, or units. Let us assume that F{moles/min) of a binary system are fed into
the column, XF being the mole fraction of the more volatile component. Further-
more, let P and W(moles/min) be the distillate product and tails waste streams re-
moved from the column, and x p and x w be the corresponding mole fractions of
the more volatile component. Then the mass balances for the whole system as well
as for the more volatile component read as follows:
F = P+W (6.1)
(6.2)
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FIG URE 6.1 Material balance of a simple fractionating column. (After Buckley.1 )
Elimination of Wgives
p = XF-XW ·F,
xp-xw
(6.3)
which describes the removal rate of distillate P as a function of the feed rate F.
Normally, the values of Xp and Xw are specified, while XF may vary because of
changes in the feed composition.
According to Figure 6.1 we also define for the enriching and stripping sections
L; = total vapor flow from ith tray (moles/min)L::1 = total liquid overflow from (i + 1)th tray (moles/min)
x; = mole fraction of more volatile component in L;
Xi:1 = mole fraction of more volatile component in L;:I
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Then the mass balance equations for the enriching section are
LI = P + LI~1
LI - xI = p. xp + L;~1 -x;: 1 ,
(6.4)
(6.5)
and for the stripping section accordingly (i -+ i)
L;~1 W+ L;
Ll~1 -Xj+l = W-xw +L; -x;.
(6.6)
(6.7)
(6.9)
(6.8)
From these equations we get for the enriching section
, Lt+tlF " (L; - L;:1 )IF
Xi = L;/F - xi+l + L;/F -xp
and for the stripping section
, Ll~I/F " (Ll: 1 - Ll)/F
Xj = Ll/F 'Xj+l - Ll/F -Xw,
or, if distillate and tails streams are essentially pure - Le., if P~XF - F,
W~ (I - X F) • F - then we get for the enriching section
, L;:';F " +~
Xi ~ LI/F •Xi+l L;/F -xp
and for the stripping section
(6.10)
x! _Li+l/F 'x!' _1-xF. x
J - LlfF J+l Ll/F w· (6.11 )
(6.12)
,
" ,Xi -Xp
Xi+l -Xi = L;:I/P'
From equations (6.4) and (6.5) we get a relation for the difference of the mole
fractions x; of the total vapor flow of one tray and X;:1 of the total liquid overflow
of the next higher tray:
This means that X;:1 is smaller than x; by an amount that decreases if the backflow
ratio L;:1 /P increases. In case of total backflow (Lt+.;P -+ (0), XI:l is equal to xI.
Equation (6.8) or (6.10) defines the "operating line" of the enriching section
(E.line), and Eq. (6.9) or (6.1 1) the operating line of the stripping section
(S·line). These lines are represented graphically in McCabe-Thiele diagrams (Figure
6.2). The point to be made here is that these diagrams represent nothing but
material balance relations for material flows in distillation (or absorption or extrac-
tion) columns.
We will not go into the details of the analysis of more complicated systems, like
multicomponent systems (for infonnation on these see, e.g., Chien5 ) or recycling
systems (see, e.g., Buckley6 and De Armas7 ; the latter describes their use in sugar
1I8
Xw xF Xp
mole fraction ethanol in liquid
FIGURE 6.2 Distillation diagram for an ethanol purification column. Most of the
trays in the column (the "steps" in the diagram) are rectifying or enriching (E)
trays rather than stripping (S) trays. The Q-line is determined by the feed compo-
sition x F and temperature. The two operating lines are determined by overhead and
bottoms comf,0sition specifications and by the position of the Q-lines. (Adapted
from Ackley. )
factories); rather, we will close this section with some general conclusions that can
be drawn from the relations above.
First, let us specify that Xp and Xw are to be held constant. Then, if the feed
tray location is to be held constant, we must always hold the number of trays in the
enriching section constant in the McCabe-Thiele diagram, as well as the number of
trays in the stripping section.
If feed composition (and thermal condition) is constant, then we want the oper-
ating lines to remain the same as feed flow changes. As shown by equations (6.8)
and (6.9), the operating lines will not change as long as the ratios of distillate to
feed, reflux to feed, boilup to feed, and tails to feed are held constant. This may be
achieved by fIXing anyone of three pairs: (a) reflux-to-feed and boilup-to-feed ratio,
(b) reflux-to-feed and tails-to-feed ratio, or (c) boilup-to-feed and distillate-to-feed
ratio.
If the feed thermal condition is constant, if feed composition is not necessarily
constant, and if the distillate and tails streams are essentially pure, then the oper-
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ating lines are given by equations (6.10) and (6.11). One sees that as the feed
composition changes the slopes of the operating lines must be changed so that on
the McCabe-TIliele diagram the number of trays in the enriching and stripping
sections remain the same.
Finally, let us determine the minimum number of stages necessary to reach
prescribed distillate and tails specifications for a given feed specification. The
number of trays takes a minimum for total backflow, Le., for L;+1 /P -+ 00; this
means, according to (6.12), that
(6.13)
Now let the efficiency of one tray be described by the separation factor a, which is
defined by
(6.14)
where ~~ and ~; are called atomic fractions. From (6.13) and (6.14) we then get
the following relation for the total number n of trays:
Xp n Xw
--= a 0---
I-xp I-xw
If this equation is solved for n, we obtain the Fenske equation8 for the minimum
number of trays:
I Xp I-xw
n = -oln- o--. (6.15)
Ina Xw I-xp
6.1.2 ISOTOPE SEPARATION
In principle, isotope separation (the most important separations being the separation
of uranium-238 and uranium-235 and of hydrogen and deuterium) may be con-
sidered a special case of distillation. In fact, the basic material balance equations
(6.1) and (6.2) also apply here. However, at least in the case of uranium, special
problems arise, as the mass differences between the two isotopes are very small;
in other words, one must solve the problem of "close separation." Therefore, one
needs special techniques with respect to the basic principles (diffusion, centrifuges,
or separation nozzles) as well as with respect to the technology of separation col-
umns, which are here called "cascades." In the following, our considerations are
limited to the second aspect, which, at least theoretically, can be handled indepen-
dently of the separation principle.
An ideal cascade does not mix material flows of a high degree of separation with
those of a lower degree; in other words, one wants to retain the "separation work"
once it has been achieved. This idea is represented graphically in Figure 6.3. Let us
assume that the head separation factor (3 that is defined by the atomic fractions of
the lighter element of the head streams of two succeeding separation units is inde-
pendent of the position of the unit:
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FIGURE 6.3 Principle of the ideal cascade.
~; = {3' ~;-1 .
For an ideal cascade, it must be guaranteed that
~;'+1 = ~;-1 = ~i,
(6.16)
(6.17)
which, together with (6.16), leads to
~; = {3' ~;~1 ,
or, for i + I instead of i, again using (6.16), to
~;+1 = {32 • ~;~1 .
Now, from the definition of the separation factor a we get
~;+1 = a' ~r+l .
(6.18)
(6.19)
Therefore, comparing (6.18) and (6.19), we get
{3 = va. (6.20)
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For the close-separation cascade (Le., when (3 - I -< I, a -< I) we get
a-I{3-1 = - 2 . (6.21 )
or, with (6.20),
The total nwnber of stages in an ideal cascade can be determined in a way
similar to that used for the determination of (6.12):
I Xp I -Xw
n = -,10-'---1
1o{3 Xw I -Xp ,
(6.22)2 Xp I-xwn = -·In-·---1.
Ina Xw I-xp
This means that the number of stages in an ideal cascade for a given separation
(xp, xw) is twice the minimum number needed for total backflow minus one.
Similarly, the nwnber of stages in the stripping section is given by
I XF I-xw
nw = -·In-·---.
In{3 Xw I-XF (6.23)
(6.24)Xp-X;, ".
Xi-Xi+1p
The backflow ratio for an ideal cascade can be formed as follows: From (6.12) we
get
From (6.17), it can be seen that for the ideal cascade x; = Xi+I' If we express
X'+I by X':I , we get, with (6.20),
L "
-l.!!
P
I
= --.{3-1 (6.25)
In the stripping section, the backflow ratio is accordingly given by
L; I (I -Xw (3' xw)
- = --. ---, ---,-.
W {3 - I I - Xi Xi (6.26)
If we eliminate the mole fractions x,", x; by using the following relations for the
enriching section
I "Xi = Xi+1 = Xi+2
and for the stripping section (i ~ j)
" IXj = Xj_1 = Xj-2
we get for the enriching section
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FIGURE 6.4 Heads flow rate vs. stage number in ideal cascade; 13 = 1.00215.
(Adapted from Benedict and Pigford.9 )
and for the stripping section
L; 1· .W= 13 _ 1 • [xw • 13' (131 - 1) + (1 - xw)' (1 - 13- /)].
(6.27)
(6.28)
These equations can be used to illustrate the shape of an ideal cascade. In Figure
6.4 the variation of the interstage flow with the number of stages is given for an
ideal cascade, which separates natural uranium (XF = 0.0072) into enriched
uranium (xp = 0.8) and depleted uranium (xw = 0.004) by means of gas diffusion
(Q = 1.0043). For one mole product of the form of Eqs. (6.1) and (6.2), F = 249
mole, W= 248 mole; the total number of stages is n = 3,217 according to (6.22),
and the number of stages in the stripping section is nw = 274 according to (6.23).
The heads flow rate in the enriching section is given, using (6.17), by
L! = L!' = 1 [0.8(1 -1.00215i-3.217)1 1+1 0.00215
+0.2' 1.00215' (1.002153.217- i -1)], 274<i<3,217.
Lj =
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The heads flow rate in the stripping section is given, using (6.28), by
248 .
0.00215· [1.00215· (1.00215 J -1)·0.004
+ 0.996· (l-1.00215- j )], 0 <i < 274.
It is worth noting that the graph in Figure 6.4, which is nothing more than a special
consequence of material balance relations, has become the symbol for isotope
separation.
Before concluding this section, a remark should be made about the statistical
analysis of the problems discussed so far. It is obvious that diversion or loss of
material plays no role here. Therefore, the considerations in Chapters I and 2 are
inapplicable. Still, it is important to analyze the effect of errors or disturbances
on the stability of the system. Although some work has been done in this field,3
the impression remains that more needs to be done.
Only recently, a methodologically oriented paper lO was published that discusses
the problems just mentioned. In this paper, the establishment of multicomponent
material balances for complex chemical processes is sketched, and the following
discussion concentrates on the measurement aspects of the problem, emphasizing
Design of measuring places and accuracy of methods of measurement (including
random and systematic errors)
Determination of balance periods for quasistationary continuous processes
Description of computer program packages
Even though the paper does not treat any of these three points in any detail be-
cause of its survey character, it does indicate the direction to be followed in further
inquiry.
6.2 THE METAL INDUSTRY
In the preceding section we demonstrated that in the chemical industry material
accountability is used primarily for process control purposes. In this section we will
show that in the metal processing industry material accountability is used for a
wide variety of purposes: for process control, for internal plant economy, and also
for detection of losses and diversion of material. This wide spectrum of applications
reflects the great variations in the value of the metal to be processed. In steel plants
large amounts of relatively cheap metals are processed and, therefore, the only pur-
pose of material accountability is to help run the plant economically; in gold and
silver processing plants, however, the purpose of material accountability is to detect
any loss or diversion of even small amounts of the very expensive material.
In this section, we describe briefly the establishment of so-called metal balances
in plants processing lead, zinc, and similar metals. We will not go into greater
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detail because the accounting techniques used are well known and straightforward.
We then discuss silver in federal mints, which provides an illuminating example of
the use of material accountability.
6.2.1 METAL BALANCES
Let us consider the processing of metals like copper,lead, or zinc. The ore is taken
from a mine, and after some preliminary treatment (e.g., milling) it is brought to a
plant specializing in the metal under consideration. Here, the concentrated ore is
processed by means of various techniques (preroasting, sintering, reduction) until
the metal is in the various forms in which it is sold (in the case of zinc, for example,
these forms are sheet zinc and coating zinc for coating or galvanization).
A rough comparison of inputs and outputs of typical plants shows that about 17
percent of the ingoing material is lost in the form of various wastes and hidden in-
ventories. This high figure may be considered the reason for the establishment of
metal balances; among other things, these balances serve to keep track of the losses
at different production steps and thus to keep them to a minimum. It is for this
reason that metal balances are somewhat different from, for example, nuclear
material balances. Whereas in the nuclear case the entire plant represents a single
material balance area, here the plant is subdivided into many material balance areas
for which separate material balances are established daily. These material balance
areas correspond to the main processing units of the plant. Thus, at the end of a
day the plant management knows the size of the losses in each unit and can decide
whether they are compatible with normal operating experience.
There is another difference in the methodology of establishing material balances
in nuclear material and metals. As described in Chapter 5, the statistical evaluation
of measurement errors plays a central role in the whole nuclear materials safeguards
system. With metals, the measurement errors (in weight determination and chemical
analyses, for instance) are negligible, compared to the plant internal losses and the
losses to the environment. On the other hand, as indicated, there is long-term ex-
perience in the form of statistical data about the values of various loss categories;
this means that significance tests of the form described in Chapter 2 can be per-
formed.
There is little in the scientific literature about these metal balances - perhaps
because they seem too prosaic or straightforward to the practitioner. Indeed, they
are not sophisticated mathematically, unlike the chemical balances described in the
preceding section. One reference ll has been found that reports the performance of
detailed analyses of concrete cases. However, we will not go into the details of that
work, since the data given there may well be outdated. More recent publications
about metal balances treat special aspects such as optimization methods12 or the
use of computerized techniques. 13
Finally, it should be kept in mind that, like the material balances in the chemical
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FIGURE 6.5 Flow diagram of the silver processed in a federal mint in the Federal
Republic of Germany.
industry, traditional metal balances are used for process control; however, unlike
balances in the chemical industry, their emphasis is on the control of losses.
6.2.2 MINT MATERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
It is not surprising that there are great similarities between nuclear accountability
and mint material accountability. In both C;1Ses, the material is valuable and must
be safeguarded against losses or diversion; it seems reasonable, therefore, that the
same safeguards principle be applied in both cases.
Before looking into mint material accountability, we must differentiate between
two different kinds of coins produced in a federal mint in the Federal Republic of
Germany: ordinary coins to be used as currency, and silver or gold coins that are
issued only on special occasions and that are bought by collectors. In the frame-
work of our considerations, the difference between these two kinds of coins is the
following. While the intrinsic value of the material for regular coins is not so high,
safeguards against diversion are necessary at every stage of the production process
- not only the final product (money) but lJso the input in terms of blanks that
can be used, for example, in all coin-operated machines. With silver or gold coins,
on the other hand, it is the material that has to be safeguarded because of its value.
In the production of ordinary coins federal mints perform digital accountability:
input and output measurements by means of counting and of weight determinations
of batches with an accuracy of a single coin. Although complicated and refmed
measures are taken in order to prevent illegal recycling of material that results in
double counting - which represents the only possibility for undetected diversion
of material - this case is not so interesting from a methodological point of view;
our attention will, therefore, focus on the second case.
The How of silver in a federal mint is represented graphically in Figure 6.5 (for
126
TABLE 6.1 Silver Throughput Data in a Federal Minta
Silver input (tons/yr)
Amount of material recycled (mainly scrap from rolling and stamping) (tons/yr)
Number of inventory periods/yr
Input
Number of silver bars/yr
Weight of I silver bar (kg)
Batch-to-batch variation (%)
Product
Number of silver coins/yr
Weight of I coin (g)
Silver content of I coin (g)
Batch-to-batch variation of silver content of I coin (%)
Losses in the pickling solution (% of throughput)
Hidden inventory
a Data from Avenhaus and Hartmann. I S
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15
4
4,000
30
< 10
1.7 X 10"
11.2
7
I
I
(see text)
more details see the publication of the FRG federal mint 14); gross data from a major
federal mint in the Federal Republic of Germany are given in Table 6.1. The melt
consists of silver bars received from the state, together with copper and recycled
scrap. The molten material is poured into permanent moulds; producing billets
(ingots) of an average weight of 3 kg. After a heat and pickling procedure the billets
are rolled into strip from which the rounds or blanks are stamped. These blanks are
repickled once and finally stamped into coins. They are counted and put into jute
sacks that are stored in the safe deposits of the mint until they are shipped. Scrap
generated during rolling and stamping is recycled along with the crucible residue; the
pickling solution containing the silver is removed to a special plant where the silver
is recovered.
From this description of the silver flow it is clear that two kinds of material
balance are important. The first can be called the external balance; it is simply the
comparison of the book inventory and the physical inventory of the plant, and it
is important for knowing whether material has disappeared accidentally or been
diverted deliberately. The second kind of material balance, which we will call the
internal material balance, refers only to that part of the plant where the silver
undergoes chemical transformations; this balance is important because in this part
of the production process major uncertainties and even losses cannot be avoided.
Let us first consider the internal balance, assuming the following: Such a
balance is established for a production campaign that lasts 3 months; the physical
inventory in the internal material balance area (see Figure 6.5) is assumed to be
zero before the start and after the end of the campaign. The establishment of the
internal material balance is represented in Table 6.2. The input consists of silver
bars and recycled scrap. The output is the coins taken from the furnace. The
measurement methods, their error variances, and the variance of the material un-
accounted for are given in Table 6.3. As can be seen, the standard deviation of the
material unaccounted for amounts to 0.12% of the input.
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TABLE 6.2 Internal Silver Balance in a Federal Mint
Length of inventory period (mo)
Input (I)
Silver bar
Number of nII of batches/inventory period
Ag weight GIl of 1 batch (kg)
Batch-ta-batch variation (%)
Scrap
Number of n12 of batches/inventory period
Total weight gl. of 1 batch (kg)
Ag concentration c12 of 1 batch (kg metal/kg silver)
Batch-to-batch variation (%)
Output (O)
Number of nO of batches/inventory period
Total weight go of 1 batch (kg)
Silver concentration Co of 1 batch (kg metal/kg silver)
Batch-to-batch variation (%)
Expected Materill/ Unaccounted For [E(MUF})
E(MUF} = Initial inventoryG + "1• • GIl + nl• •gl• • cl.
- no • go • Co - Ending inventorya
= 1,000·30 + 360·21 ·0.625 - 360·154·625
=0 (kg)
GNot taken into account.
3
1,000
30
< 10
360
21
625
< 10
360
154
.625
< 10
So far we have not considered losses or hidden inventories. There are no statisti-
cal data that could be taken into account in the way described in Chapter 2. How-
ever, one case was reported of an old furnace that, on being decommissioned, was
found to contain more than 80 kg of silver as hidden inventory. Considering the
uncertainty of the material balance established for one campaign, it is not sur-
prising that these losses, accumulated over years, were not detected. Given the price
of silver, however - 1kg of silver is worth about $140 - some effort to increase
the overall accuracy seems to be justified.
The input of the external material balance is the same as that of the internal
balance. The product consists of silver coins that are weighed in lots of 300; the
silver concentration measurement is the same as for the internal balance. In
addition, there is an output from the silver contained in the pickling solution. The
external material balance establishment is not discussed here as it is analogous to
that of the internal balance. One interesting point is that in this connection a veri-
fication procedure is in effect: there are specifications for the coins with respect to
their total weight and silver content that are verified by destructive methods on a
random sampling basis.
In sum, one may say that although the silver coin verification procedure serves
a different purpose from the verification procedure in the nuclear material case, the
example of mint material accountability contains all the essential features analyzed
in the preceding chapters.
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TABLE 6.3 Accuracy of Internal Silver Balance in a Federal Mint
Input
Silver bar (11)
Standard deviation 01, Gr of random error of weight determination of 1 batch (kg) 0.001
Standard deviation 0/, G. of systematic error of weight determination of 1 batch (kg) 0.001
Scrap (12)
Standard deviation 0I,Gr of random error of weight determination of 1 batch (kg) 0.001
Standard deviation 01, G. of systematic error of weight determination of 1 batch (kg) 0.001
Standard deviation 0I1Gr of random error of concentration
measurement of 1 batch (%) 0.3
Standard deviation 0I'G. of systematic error of concentration
measurement of 1 batch (%) 0.3
Output (0)
Same as for scrap
Variance ofMaterial Unaccounted Fora
} n/,var(MUF) = n/, 0°'0.+1000(100001'0.)1
no
+ no 0 ~ovoE' (co) + -0(1000aag.)'oE'(co)
100
1000010-6 + 1000 0 (100 010-')'
, 10
+ 360010-6 00.625 + 360 0(100010-')' 00.625'
100
360
+ 21' 03600 (0.625 03 010-')' + 21' 0-0 (10000.62503010-')'
100
360
+ 360 010-6 00.625' + - 0(1000 10-')' 00.625'
100
360
+ 154' 0360 0(0.625 03 010-')' + 154 0100(100 00.625 03 010-')'
1,270 (kg')
.jvar(MUF) = 35.6 kg = 0.12% of input
a Weight determination and concentration measurement calibration every IOOth measurement.
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63 THE MATERIALS-PROCESS-PRODUCT MODEL
So far, we have discussed cases where material accountability considerations are
used in special industries for specific technological reasons: for process control and
for the detection of diversion or loss of material. This section and the next report
on more general applications in the area of economics. As a detailed description
would take too much space here, only a survey is given and the more important
literature cited.
In 1972, Ayres16 published his ideas on the applicability of material account·
ability to economic problems under the title "Materials-Process-Product Model."
Two years later, a major "Feasibility Demonstration Based on the Bottle Manu-
facturing Industry" was reported by Ayres and his co-workers.17 As this work com-
plements the ideas that have been developed and illustrated so far, it is briefly
described here.
The MPPM principle is represented graphically in Figure 6.6. Boxes on the far
left represent inputs required for the model components to the right of them.
OUTPUlS
INOUSTIlI' OUTPUT
FORECAST BV
PROI:lJCT IIND.JSTRY
toWERlAI,S
SUBSm\JOON
F~ASTS
CHAIN suBSTl1lJ1DN
A:>RB:AS15
EFFWENT CONTRCl.
COST INFORMATION
RESOURCE AND ~OUALS
IwtlCATIONS FOR CHAINS
MPP MODELINPUTS
TOTAL DEMAND AND
0EIWlOClM'OSI1ION I---...-jFORECAS15 '-- ......
FIGURE 6.6 Materials-Process-Product Model. See text for explanation. (From
Ayres et a1. 17)
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Boxes on the far right indicate outputs from the model components to the left of
them. The boxes at the upper right represent several computational options for aug-
menting the amount of detail used in process description. The component at the
bottom of the diagram is a future model extension. The model in its present and
more limited form is shown by the highlighted region in the center.
Mathematically, the model may be visualized as a collection of nodes, represent-
ing processes that are interconnected by directional lines, each of which corresponds
to a specific material input or output. The overall economic flow moves from left
(raw materials) to right (final products), but the flows between intermediate
processes may go in either direction, provided that materials are conserved so that
inputs and outputs always balance. The processes on the left tend to be concerned
with the separation of components (e.g., metals from ore) and chemical recombin-
ation in desired forms (e.g., alloys, basic chemicals). The processes in the center
tend to be more concerned with physical transformations (e.g., spinning, rolling,
stamping, casting, drawing) and fabrication (weaving, lamination, welding, fasten-
ing, plating, painting, etc.). The processes on the right tend to be concerned with
systems integration, packaging, distribution, sales, maintenance, and the like.
As the implementation of this theoretical framework would clearly represent
a major effort (there are at least 500 important industrial materials) the MPPM
authors proceed to demonstrate the practical value of the model in a much smaller
effort. They built the Process Chain Evaluation Model (PCEM), which is simply a
collection of computer programs for constructing "chains" or "networks" of
processes; these programs compute consolidated material and energy input/
output data and value-added data for each such chain or network. With the help
of PCEM and an appropriate data bank one can analyze several specific kinds of
problems at the level of aggregation of an industry, a finn, or: a material.
Ayres and co-workers!7 describe an application of these ideas to the bottle
industry. In this industry, several raw materials compete, the more important ones
being glass, polyethylene, and polyvinyl chloride. Ayres and his associates showed
that the PCEM makes possible the assessment of the outcome of competition be-
tween alternative processes and raw material choices, as a function of alternative
assumptions regarding available technology, raw or intermediate material prices,
market prices for the final product, market size for the final product, tax rates, or
regulatory constraints (on waste emission, for example).
The starting point of the analysis is the specification of all inputs and outputs
(Table 6.4); according to the principle of conservation of mass, the sum of the
material inputs lUld outputs must be zero. The second step is the establishment of
an economic balance for the process, profit being the difference between the sales
revenue and the costs of raw materials, utilities, process operation, annualized in-
vestment, and taxes. The third step is a detailed analysis of the process chains, lead-
ing from the basic raw materials to the end product from both a material flow and
production cost point of view. These details are not important here, but what can
be achieved with this analysis again demonstrates the broad applicability of material
accountability considerations.
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TABLE 6.4 Soda-time Glass Bottle Manufacturing Materials - Input/Outputa
Utilitiell
Electrical energy
Fuel energy
Cooling water or equivalent
Primary Inputs
Sodium carbonate
Calcium carbonate
Silicon dioxide
Calcium silicate
Potassium aluminum silicate
Recycled glass
Secondary Inputs
Water
Sodium sulfate
Potassium nitrate
Arsenious oxide
Manganese dioxide
Product
Glass bottles
Galleoull Walltell
Steam
Carbon monoxide
Carbon dioxide
Silicon dioxide
SOURCE: Ayres et al. 17
a Normalized per unit pound product.
0.13000 kWh
5.62600 M Btu
0.71000gal
0.275801b
0.248201b
0.540801b
0.017901b
0.032201b
0.102001b
0.630001b
0.000401b
0.002801b
0.000501b
0.000401b
1.00000lb
0.630001b
O.OlOOOlb
0.210001b
O.OOlOOlb
Ayres et al. 17 emphasize the impact of alternative forms of taxation - for
instance,
"Effluent charges" on specific pollutants, such as ethylene dicWoride
Taxes levied on materials purchased but not accounted for in final products
Taxes levied on value added by processing
Taxes levied on undesirable components of final products, e.g., toxic materials
Furthermore, different forms of effluent charges are discussed, among them:
Charges that are linear or nonlinear to the amount emitted
Threshold values, or emission levels below which no charge is levied
PCEM can also be used in addressing the question of technological substitution,
which means here the substitution of one basic material for another. Which material
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is the most promlStng one under which conditions - for example, under raw
material scarcity or changing tax policies?
Unfortunately, space limitations prevent thorough treatment of this issue, but
one final remark should be made about the statistical analysis of the problem.
Ayres and his co-workers did not perform calculations of this kind; they do note,
however, that process accounting has not attempted to trace the origins of small
material losses from the process but that increasing environmental concem willl.ead
to much closer process monitoring although some losses will always be hard to
identify. Here a statistical analysis of the type discussed in Chapter 2 is in order.
6.4 USE OF MATERIAL BALANCES IN SOCIALIST ECONOMIES
In the foregoing section we presented new ideas on how and why to use material
balances in industrial plants. This section is devoted to the use of material balances
in socialist economies. Of course, only an idea of this extremely important field of
applications can be given; in fact, this sketch is meant to put the main ideas de-
scribed in this monograph into perspective by describing those developed and
applied by socialist economists.
An indication of the role of the material balance concept in the overall socialist
economic system is found, for example, in the official Soviet description of the
economy of the USSR. III The outline to be given here is based on an article by
Kossov and Baranov.19 A detailed description is given by Aganbegyan and
Granberg.20 •21 As far as known to the author, the best description in English
literature is given by Montias.22
Intersectoral balances, as they are called in the Soviet literature, are used as an
instrument for analyzing and planning the production and distribution process in a
national economy. The principles of intersectoral balancing were used for the first
time in the USSR in the national economic plan for 1923-1924. The intensive
development of these methods was carried through in the second half of the
fifties in several institutions, including the Economic-Mathematical Institute of the
Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
These intersectoral balances include different kinds of balances: balances ex-
pressed in monetary terms, balances expressed in physical terms, and also balances
expressed in mixed terms. All these balances may refer to the whole national
economy, to regional and inter-regional economies, and to intersectoral and inter-
industrial links, as well as to the production and distribution of given commodities.
They can differ with respect to time horizon (dynamic balances), or they can be
static. They are used for a variety of purposes - for reporting activities for different
time schedules, for planning, for investigation, and others.
Monetary balances usually consist of four divisions. The first division gives the
intersectoral flow of materials for current production; the main outcome of this
division is intermediate products. The second division deals with the structure of
final products. The third division shows the amortization and newly created values.
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The fourth division reflects the structure of partial distribution of newly created
values.
Balances in physical tenns usually consist of two divisions. The first division reo
flects resources and intersectoral capacities for the production. The second division
characterizes the distribution of the current production and the final consumption.
Because of the general scope of this monograph we are interested here only in the
second division of the balances in physical tenns.
Let Xi, i = 1, ... , n, be the gross output of the ith commodity in a given interval
of time, let aiJ be the technological coefficient showing the amount of the jth
commodity required to produce the unit amount of the ith commodity, and,
furthennore, let Yi be the fmal demand for the ith commodity in the interval of
time under consideration. Then the material balances for all n commodities read as
follows:
n
Xi = L aiJ' Xl +Yi,
jKl
If we define vectors X and Yand matrix A by
i = 1, ... ,no (6.29)
(6.30)
then we can write the n equations (6.29) in the following concise fonn:
X = A ... X+ Y,
or, introducing the unity matrix E,
(E-A) ... X = Y
(6.31)
(6.32)
These relations are mainly established to detennine the gross output X as a function
of the final demand Y. In other words, the problem is to solve the system of
equations (632) for X:
X=(E-Ar1 ... y (6.33)
which means the inversion of matrix E - A.
It is clear that the detennination of the gross output X for a given interval of
time cannot be detennined simply by inverting matrix E - A. Among other sub·
stantial reasons, this is not possible because of the large number of commodities,
which run into thousands. Several approximation procedures have been used in-
stead, the most intuitively appealing being an iterative approach.
One starts out with a (somewhat unrealistic) assumption that the first set of out·
put commodities Yi. i = I, ... ,n, circulated to all industries only consists of final
demands. With the help of input-output coefficients au (established by the indi-
vidual industrial sectors as well as by higher planning agencies) first estimates of
gross outputs xfO, i = I, ... ,n, according to
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(6.34)i = 1, ... , n,
n
xP) = L au' Yj +Yi.
j=l
are calculated. These estimates make up a second set of output commodities. The
previous summation procedure is repeated to yield second estimates Xf1).
i = 1, ... ,n, according to
(6.35)i = 1, ... , n.
n
X{.2) = " a.. ' X{l)~ I} J'j=l
It can be shown that every new set of gross output commodities obtained in this
manner would come close to the perfectly consistent set of commodities that could
be calculated by direct inversion of the matrix E - A.
There are further possibilities for solving the problem of inverting matrix E - A ;
however, we will not discuss these now but go back to the underlying assumption
that gross output commodities can be systematically derived from a bundle of final
demands. It is clear that certain intermediate products have a higher value to the
economy than the end-uses they can generate. Take, for example, sectors of the
economy that are given top priority in order to widen bottlenecks. These kinds of
problems are hard to solve with the help of physical balances alone; therefore, the
interaction between the physical and the monetary balances is of great importance.
Let us try to compare the balances treated here with those previously considered
in this monograph: As one may deduce from the definitions of the commodities
Xi and Yi and from the set of equations (6.29), in the second division of the
balances in physical terms flows of material are balanced. This means that in any
given time interval the intermediate and fmal demands must be equal to their gross
production. This is true if no changes in the inventory of commodities are con·
sidered. Theoretically, this can be understood if it is remembered that one purpose
of these balances is the planning and the control of the entire production and dis-
tribution process. In practice, of course, inventory changes and depreciation are
taken into account.
In earlier sections of this monograph we introduced the notion of material un·
accounted for. If one uses the iterative procedure for inversion of the matrix
E - A, after a finite number of steps a difference remains between two consecu·
tive sets of gross output commodities. If we want to use this difference as a measure
of compliance with final demands and gross output commodities, then we might
similarly call it material unaccounted for.
6.5 COMPUTER-AIDED MATERIAL ACCOUNTABIliTY PROCEDURES
The examples of applications of the principle of material accountability recounted
above are heterogeneous - they vary from very specialized (mints) to very general
(socialist economic planning). In concluding this chapter, it seems reasonable to
remark on the use of computers and computer programs in this connection. It is
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clear that the use of computers of any size is common wherever numerical calcula-
tions have to be handled (e.g., when complicated measurements that generate large
amounts of data are necessary) or if complicated mathematical formulae have to be
used that cannot be solved numerically by hand calculations [as is the case for
Eqs. (2.38) and (2.39), for example]. We will not discuss, however, these two
types of use but will concentrate on some recently published work that aims di-
rectly at developing material balance programs for specific purposes. In fact the
highest percentage of publications on material accountability matters in the last 2
years deals with computer software problems. Here, we will report on three classes
of papers, treating
Techniques and programs facilitating routine material accountability procedures
On-line techniques for process control purposes
Planning and design techniques in a general sense
The first class of papers deals with all the situations in which material enters
and leaves a facility, or a storage area of a facility, and in which the material can be
accounted for without any measurement errors. This is the case, for example, if
items or batches are counted but not measured for material content. Here, the
emphasis is on the development of appropriate forms, on maximizing simplicity,
and on minimizing the time to be spent by the personnel responsible for these
matters. Powley,23 Jacoby and Kabel,24 and Blankenburg25 have written papers of
this kind; clearly, however, a whole literature exists for these problems.
In the second class of papers, industrial processes are considered; here, material
accountability (or mass balance) measures are used for process control purposes,
much as described in the first section of this chapter. The main reason for the
development of computer programs here is to have the results immediately avail-
able in order to allow timely adjustment of the process. Examples of this type of
work are given by Cutten et al. 13 and McCracken.26 Naturally, there are other
reasons for developing computer programs - for example, optimization of process
input l2 or real-time methods for the control of the material flows in nuclear facilities
in order to detect losses or diversion of particular nuclear materials;27,28 however,
as they may be categorized under the heading of "on-line" or "real-time" techniques,
and here again an enormous literature exists, we will not go into detail.
In the last class of papers there are three subclasses. First, there are papers that
deal with the design and planning of production processes in which the establish-
ment of material balances plays an important role in the determination of yield
accounting, in allocating costs, in calculating production levels and raw material
requirements, and so on. A survey of programs for questions of this sort is given by
Harris et al. 28 Second, there are papers that describe programs for the design of
industrial plants and even for the design of a complex of interlinked plants; for
example, Sparrow et al. 30 describe a computer package for the design of multi-
product batch plants, and Walsham 31 offers a simulation model for the design of a
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petrochemical complex. Finally, there are papers that handle software problems in
connection with planned economies; it is clear that because of the magnitude of the
problems the question of developing appropriate computer models is crucial to the
success of the whole approach. About recent developments in that field not much is
known to the author; one example, however, is the paper of Rudner.31
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7 Envi ron mentaI Accountabi Iity
In earlier times man had an impact on his natural environment that was, at most, of
regional importance. Usually, either all materials taken from the environment and
used were given back again without further consequences - this was the case, for
example, in a purely agricultural society - or the amounts taken were so small that
they could be disregarded. For example, up to 1860 practically the only primary
energy source was the combustion of wood. With the large-scale use of coal after
1870, the amounts of primary energy needed increased in such a way that there was
no longer complete recycling of material; however, the amounts in question still
were small. Of course, in earlier times there were examples of human activities that
caused irreversible changes (e.g., the erosion of complete landscapes as a conse-
quence of uncontrolled deforestation, or the exhaustion of mines). However, in
these cases the consequences were, at most, of regional extent. Only in recent times
have human activities developed in such a way that their influence on the environ-
ment may cause irreversible changes of global extent.
The general problem of possible irreversible global changes in the environment,
as well as the question of what could be achieved in preventing such changes, is
detailed here for examples of material balances existing in nature that man can
disturb, namely the oxygen and carbon dioxide balance and the radiation balance
of the earth-atmosphere system. These problems are well known. The point to be
made here is that they have grown in such a way that their interrelations with other
problems have become most important, as have effects that were earlier considered
minor. As a result, they can no longer be treated in an isolated, discipline-oriented
way - the application of systems analysis becomes necessary.
One of the tools that could prove useful is material accountability in a very
general form, and several groups have already proposed its use. Kneese and co-
workers· promoted the idea mainly in connection with the problem of waste dis-
posal in industrialized societies. Drawing on his experience with a global control
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system based mainly on material accountability (the IAEA nuclear materials
safeguards system), Hiifele2 proposes the analysis and establishment of environ-
mental balances.
In the following sections, we will discuss some natural material balances and the
influence of man on these balances. The carbon dioxide cycle of the earth will be
treated quantitatively, and some policy decision problems connected with the com·
bustion of fossil fuels will be sketched. Finally, examples of local and regional
environmental accountability problems will be given.
7.1 MAN'S IMPACT ON NATURAL MATERIAL BALANCES
The oxygen and carbon dioxide cycle in nature uninfluenced by man has the
following form. During the day a high rate of photosynthesis leads to the net pro-
duction of O2 and net consumption of CO2 . At night, with no photosynthesis, a
net consumption of O2 and production of CO2 takes place. However, there is an
overall net input of CO2 and net output of°2 • The O2 and CO2 balances are closed
if one takes into account the decomposition of dead plants. In case of complete
mineralization of the plant mass, the total O2 produced is consumed again and the
total CO2 consumed is put back into the atmosphere. Some people assume that the
O2 inventory of the atmosphere as a whole results from the formation of fossil
fuels, Le., from plant masses not completely rotted.
In a modem agricultural society there still is a net production of oxygen. On
agricultural land in the Federal Republic of Germany, an average of 10 tons of
O2 per hectare per year is produced and 3.5 tons of O2 is consumed (by animals,
man, and fuels). Thus, there is a net output of 6.5 tons of O2 per hectare per year.3
However, if one considers the F.R.G. as a whole, one arrives at an O2 production of
200 million tons per year and a consumption of 700 million tons (of which 600
million tons is used for the combustion of fossil fuels). Therefore, a deficit of 500
million tons of O2 per year remains. Even if this holds only for a highly industrial-
ized country, one may ask whether we are consuming the atmosphere's oxygen. We
will come back to this point later.
The combustion of fossil fuel results in a carbon dioxide production of enormous
magnitude. In 1960, 10.8 billion tons of CO2 was released into the atmosphere all
over the world. This has already resulted in a measurable increase in the
atmosphere's CO2 content. Measurements in Hawaii (Le., at a place that is far from
local CO2 sources) indicate that the CO2 has been increasing throughout the world
by about 0.2 percent per year: to the 320-ppm current world average, 0.7 ppm
is added each year.4 To ask what consequences this may have, one must consider
the CO2 cycle in nature.s
Consider Figure 7.1. On land CO2 is taken up by vegetation and stored in plants
and humus. The magnitude of this reservoir is similar to that of the atmosphere,
and the exchange time is probably of the order of 30 to 40 years. The ocean pro-
vides a much larger reservoir and has the potential of storing some 60 times as much
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FIG URE 7.1 Natural reservoirs of carbon dioxide. rIC is the content of reservoir
x: k"Y describes the transition from reservoir x to reservoir y. (Adapted from
Sawyer.6 )
CO2 as the atmosphere. The upper layers of the sea (above the thennocline) must,
however, be distinguished from the deeper layers of the ocean. The upper layers are
well mixed and are in contact with the atmosphere, but they can hold only about as
much CO2 as exists in the atmosphere. Studies of the concentration of 14C, which
is produced by cosmic rays in the atmosphere and subsequently decays to 12 C,
suggest that the rate of transfer of CO2 from the atmosphere to the upper layers of
the ocean requires some 5 to 10 years for the transfer of a quantity equivalent to
that in the atmosphere. Transfer to the deep ocean from the upper layers is a slower
process, and as a result it would probably be a matter of centuries before the deep
ocean reached equilibrium with any new level of concentration in the atmosphere.
It is estimated that at present about half the CO2 released to the atmosphere by
burning fossil fuels is kept in the atmosphere. Thus the question arises of where the
rest is and what the consequences of this storage may be, and, additionally, what
the consequences of the increase of the CO2 content of the atmosphere may be.
For this purpose models must be developed (and have been developed) and tested
by global monitoring systems. Models for the CO2 balance of the earth are being
developed - by Fairhall7 and by Zimen and Altenhein,8 for example. They state
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that the CO2 will be stored in the sea, where it could have a serious effect on all
calcareous organisms and on the food chains of which they are a part. Other models
state that the increased CO2 content of the atmosphere changes the radiation
balance of the earth, resulting in an increase in the global average temperature (the
so-called greenhouse effect6 ).
To explain this greenhouse effect, in Figure 7.2 the radiation balance of the
earth is shown.9 The solar input to the atmosphere, averaged over day and night
and all zones of the globe, is 340W/m2 • Roughly 47% of this energy (160W/m2 )
reaches the surface of the earth; the rest is absorbed within the atmosphere or is
reflected immediately. Solar radiation is absorbed within the atmosphere by the
various trace gases, principally water vapor, CO2 , 0 3 , and molecular oxygen, and
by dust and haze. Additional radiation is absorbed by liquid water droplets and ice
crystals within clouds. The right-hand side of Figure 7.2 shows the radiation
balance between atmosphere and earth: infrared radiation from the earth to the at-
mosphere and vice versa and heat losses of the earth through evaporation and con-
vection. As early as 1863 Tyndall suggested that the blanketing effect of increased
CO2 would cause climatic changes by changing the surface temperature. Increased
CO2 , because of its strong absorption (and later emission) of infrared radiation at
12 to 18~, would reradiate energy downward to the earth's surface and further
inhibit radiative cooling at the ground surface. Radiative equilibrium models, in-
cluding a convective adjustment, suggest4 that the projected 18 percent increase in
CO2 concentration in the atmosphere by the year 2000 would result in an increase
of the surface temperature of about one-half degree and a stratospheric cooling of
0.50 to I°C at 20 to 25 kIn. However, these models neglect the important interacting
dynamics and thermodynamics of the atmosphere, as well as the ocean-atmosphere
interaction. This neglect makes the computed temperature changes very uncertain.
The possibility of verifying (or proving false) the conclusions and models de·
scribed above with the help of appropriate measurements is worth consideration. In
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the case of oxygen, measurements have been performed since 1910. Intensive
measurement from 1967 to 1970 did not show10 that the oxygen content of the
atmosphere had changed, within the accuracy of the measurements. These measure·
ments had been proposed because it was feared that, in addition to the oxygen con-
sumption caused by the combustion of fossil fuels, the herbicides and pesticides
concentrated by the basic photosynthetic organisms could affect their population,
thereby modifying the equilibrium concentration of oxygen in the earth's atmos-
phere. As stated before, this could not be verified by the measurements. There are
some investigators who hold that the oxygen balance is regulated in completely
different ways, for instance, by large forest fires. ll In any case, in view of the risk
involved, the Study Group for Critical Environmental Problems (SCEP)4 has pro-
posed performing measurements, with increasing accuracy, at least every 10 years.
In the case of the CO2 system of the earth, proposals have been made to
measure the three interacting systems of source, route, and reservoir. As already
mentioned, sources are the combustion of fossil fuel and the release and take-up
of CO2 by the oceans. In the latter case, observations and aerial measurements
have already been made in the three areas where there is a strong exchange be-
tween deep and surface water: the northern North Atlantic, the far northwest
Pacific, and the Weddell Sea. Global averages are measured, e.g., in Hawaii. It has
already been proposed to have at least four observation stations on the earth, far
from local sources. Cost estimates have been made for a "sufficiently" dense (in
time and space) global monitoring system.4 •10
In the study of the radiation balance of the earth, satellite observations make a
unique contribution to the understanding of atmospheric energetics (this is not
the case for oxygen or carbon dioxide). Apart from their use as important atmos-
pheric probes, satellites provide us with direct observations, on a real-time scale, of
the distribution of various radiation parameters at the upper boundary of the at-
mosphere. Accurate satellite measurements can provide global distributions of the
albedo as well as the absorption, emission, and net radiation balance of the over-
all earth - atmosphere system.12
7.2 A GLOBAL EXAMPLE: THE CARBON DIOXIDE CYCLE OF THE EARTH
The CO2 cycle of the earth has already been described in connection with other
natural balances. One may summarize the problems outlined there by quoting
Sawyer6 : "There is little doubt that in assessing the future level of CO2 in the
atmosphere it is important to understand fully the balance between the CO2 in the
atmosphere and the ocean."
Quantitative models for the global CO2 cycle have been developed by several
groups, with varying degrees of refmement.7•8 •13 The following analysis, which
stresses the material accountability point of view along the lines of Chapter 2,
follows the argumentation developed by Avenhaus and Hartmann.14
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7.2.1 THE FOUR BOXES MODEL
(7.1)
The four boxes model for the CO2 cycle of the earth may be described as follows
(see Figure 7.1). There are four boxes: atmosphere (a), biosphere (b), upper mixed
layer of the sea (m), and deep sea (d). At time ti these boxes contain the CO2
inventories Jr, lib, 1m and rt (measured in moles). In the time interval (ti' ti+I)
parts of the inventories are exchanged; the transition from box x to box y is de-
termined by the exchange coefficient k;"Y. In the following we will consider I year
time intervals, so the exchange coefficients are measured in reciprocal years (the
problems associated with the choice of the appropriate time steps are treated else-
where l4 and will not be discussed here). In addition, we have dUring (ti' ti+d the
CO2 input n"i+ 1 into the atmosphere that results from the burning of fossil fuels.
Therefore, according to Figure 7.1, we have the following relations for the CO2
inventories in the different boxes at time ti+ 1 :
10 = 1!J - kob .10 - ktJm ·I!J + koo •I~ + k mo ·lm + n.i+1 1 ill i , l.i+1
lib+) = It + ~b • If - k bo • lib
17:.1 = 1m + ~m • I't + ~m ·I,m - kmo • lim - k md ·Im
If+1 = r; + kmd • lim - k dm • If
These relations describe a transition from the state Ii = (If, lib, 1m, It) to the state
If+) , which can be written'"
If+1 =A.I/+N!.i+1
where Nl,i+ 1 = (ni,i+ 1,0,0,0), and where the matrix. A is given by
(7.2)
k bo k mo 0
l-kbo 0 0
A
kdm
(7.3)
0 I_~o_~d
0 ~d
(7.1')
Before going on we give for completeness the time<ontinuous version of the set
(7.1 ) of equations, which represents a set of linear differential equations:
dIt(t) = A' .r(t) + Nt(t)
dt
where N(t) = [net), 0, 0, 0], and where A': =A -E, E being the unity matrix.
and A being the matrix. (7.3).
• The vector X is dermed as a row vector; therefore, the transposed vector X t is a column
vector. Matrix multiplication is denoted by an •.
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(7.5)
N,,'+1 = 0 for all i = 0,1,2,... . (7.4)
During this period the CO2 cycle was in equilibrium, which is described in the
framework of our model by
Let us now consider first the "preindustrial" situation (until 1860), which is
characterized by
I t - A*It - It
'+1 - I - "
where If is the equilibrium state and A is the matrix (7.3). This means that the
equilibrium state is an eigenstate of the matrix A with the eigenvalue 1.
It can be shown, in fact, that the matrix A has the eigenvalue 1; even more, it
can be shown15 that any nonnegative square matrix in which the sums of the
column vectors are 1 has the eigenvalue 1 with an associated positive eigenvector
that is detennined up to a positive factor. Furthermore, one sees immediately that
any matrix of this form describes a material-eonserving transition, which means that
if I; (I) is the sum of all inventories in the boxes under consideration, then this sum
remains the same after the transition A *1: Le., we have I;(I) = I;(A *1). These
general properties are important because we will consider models with more than 4
boxes.
A special eigenstate of the matrix A with the eigenvalue 1 is given by
(7.6)
This means we consider a state where the atmospheric CO2 inventory is normalized
to one and where the other inventories are expressed as multiples ofthe atmospheric
CO2 inventory. This formula will be especially useful for the applications.
From Eq. (7.5) we fmd immediately that the equilibrium state I'+n is obtained
from the state I, by an n-fold multiplication of this state with the matrix A, Le.,
I'+n=An*If, n=I,2, .... (7.5')
It can be understood intuitively that A n fulfills the material conservation con-
dition I;(I'+n) = I;(I,), but formal proof is easy. In addition, one can show that for
n -+ 00 the matrix A n approaches the limiting matrix A-,
A-: = lim An = (l, Xt , Xt , Xt ), (7.7)
n-+-
where X is an eigenvector of the matrix A with eigenvalue 1 and I; (x) = 1. This
limiting matrix A- again has the material conservation property.
Finally, it can be shown that without any outside disturbances any state of the
system is transformed into an eigen or equilibrium state and that the speed with
which this transformation takes place is of the order of the reciprocal of the small-
est exchange coefficient of the system.14 This means that if we disturb the CO2
cycle of the earth by introducing CO2 into the atmosphere (as a result of the burn-
ing of fossil fuels) and then stop doing it, after some time an equilibrium will again
be reached - naturally with an increased overall CO2 inventory.
So far we have considered only equilibrium states. Let us assume now that at
I = 1,2, ....
= A ·If +Nf'+1
I
= A(/& +L AI-I·N!_I./) +Nf'+1
I-I
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time fo the system is in an equilibrium state 10 , and that from fo in the interval
(fl' f,+ I) the amount "1,1+ I of CO2 is released into the atmosphere for i = 1, 2, ....
Then one can describe the state of the system at time f" I > 0, by the following
formula: I[,t = [,t +~ A'-I.NtI 0 £.., 1-1.1>
I-I
where NU+I =("U+1' 0, 0, 0). This can be verified immediately by complete
induction: For I = 1 we get,
If = 1& + N& I = A ·1& + N& 1 ,
. .
which is consistent with Eq. (7.2), as we assumed 1& to be an equilibrium state.
Furthermore,
1+1
= [,t +1.; A'+I-I*Nto 1-1,1'
-I
At this point it should be noted that this way of analyzing mass balances in box
models has a wide range of applications in various fields at small and large scales -
in fact, we have already discussed such applications in Chapter 6 (see Figure 6.3).
As an illustration of this wide variety of applications, we describe another com·
pletely different application for the analysis of mass flows in closed systems with
the help of a box model, namely the oxygen exchange in a closed life-support
system.16 This system is modeled by 6 boxes (02 collector, man, O2 regenerator,
end product transformer, plant mass, and separation unit); the system of equations
describing the time dependence of the O2 content x,(f) of the ith box is analogous
to the system (7.1) given by
dxt(f)
-- = F*x t + Ct(f)
df '
where X(f) = (xl(t), ... ,X6(f», where F is a 6 x 6 matrix with time-independent
elements, and where the vector C(f) = (k l (f), . .. ,k6(f» represents various con·
trol functions (e.g., for the oxygen demand of the man).
In reference 16, additional mass flows (for CO2 , N, and other elements) are con-
sidered. The main purpose of the analysis is to determine conditions for stability;
because of the existence of control functions, this is much more complicated than
in our case; therefore, we will not go into detail but refer the reader to the original
paper.
7.2.2 UNCERTAINITY CONSIDERATIONS
We have not yet discussed the validity of the assumptions underlying our model
(only the question of the appropriate time steps has been mentioned). There are
(7.8)
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many sources of error that might influence the results; these errors fall into two
categories:
Errors in the model (adequacy of linear relationships and of homogeneous
boxes; with respect to this question see, for example, Oeschger et al.,13 where eddy
diffusion has been taken into account explicitly)
Errors in measurements and estimates of transition coefficients, inventories, and
fossil-fuel-caused CO, inputs into the atmosphere
In line with our reasoning in Chapter 2, we will only discuss the second category.
First, we draw some general conclusions from the results of the preceding
section. If we know that the system is in the equilibrium state, then, according to
Eq. (7.6), we know the relative inventories if the exchange coefficients are known
sufficiently well. The same holds if the equilibrium state is disturbed by an input
of fmite size from outside - again, we know some time after the end of the dis-
turbance the relative inventories (which in fact are the same as before the dis-
turbance).
Second, in order to make some statements about the absolute inventories, we
proceed along the lines laid out in Chapter 2. We assume that the exchange coef-
ficients are known precisely relative to the inventories and that inputs from outside,
if any, are also known precisely; thus, equilibrium as well as disturbed states are
described. We assume that at time to the real inventories 10 = (Ig, It IlI', Ig) are
estimated independently. With the help of these estimates, we form estimates for
the book inventories B1 = (Bf, Bf, B{", Bt) at time tl in the following way,
according to (7.7):
or, explicitly,
B~ = Ig - /(!Jb • Ig - kGm • Ig +kbo • Ig + kmo • IlI' + nO,1
Bt = Ig + /(!Jb • Ig - kbo • Ig (7.9)
Brr = IlI' +~ . Ig +,tdm •~ - kmo • IlI' - kmd • I[f
u: = 18 + kmd • I[f - kdm •~ •
These book inventories are compared with the real inventories n, If, If' and If
that are measured at tl : according to Chapter 2 the differences MUF1 = (MUFf,
MUFf, MUFf', MUFf) are defmed by
MUF1 = B1 - II, (7.10)
and tests of significance are performed for the null hypothesis E(MUF1 ) = O. If
there are no significant differences between II and B 1 (if there are, the whole
scheme has to be reviewed), then the starting inventory SI for the second inventory
period (tl, t,) is estimated in the form of a "minimum variance unbiased estimate,"
in the sense of section 2.3:
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Sf = tr. .If + (1 -af)· Bf, o~ af ~ 1, x = a, b, m, d, (7.11)
(7.12)
such that the variance of Sf is minimized. Generally, the book inventory vector
Bf+l at tl+ l is given by
(7.13)
where
where the "throughput vector" Df.j+l is given by
Df.j+l = (A - E) *If,
where E is the unity matrix and where the matrix A is given by (7.3). The xth com-
ponent Sf is determined by the recursive relation
Sf =: af • If + (1 - af) • (Sf-l + Df-l,j), x = a, b, m, d.
The variance ofSf is given by
var(S/) =: ai2 • var(I/) + (1 - af? • (var(Sf_l) + var(Dj~j_t>
+ 2 • af-l • eX • var(If-l»
x = a
x = b
for
x=m
x = d
(7.14)
Therefore, the minimization of YareSt) leads to the following recursive relations of
Sf and af (we omit the indices x = a, b, m, d):
var(Sj_l) + var(Di_l j) + 2ai - l • e • var(Ii_l )
ai = I ,
var(/j) + var(Sj_l) + var (Di-l ,i) + 2ai- l • e • var(Ii_l )
yareSt> = af • var(Ij) + (1 - aj)2 • var(Sj_l) + var(Di,j-l) + aj-l • e • var(Ii-l)'
For var(Ii ) = yare!), var(Di,i-l) = var (D), Le., independent of i, the asymptotic
values of var(S) and a are given by the following relations:
var(S) + var(D) + 20 •e • var(!)
a = ,
var(I) + var(S) + var(D) + 20 • e • var(I)
var(S) =: a2 •var(!) + (l - a)2 • var(S) + var(D) + a • e • yare!).
The solution of these equations is given by
var(S) =: a· yare!),
a2 • var(!) + (a - 1) • [var(D) + 20 • e •yare!)] = O.
(7.15)
As 0 ~ a~ 1, we get in fact a reduction of the uncertainty of the inventories.
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TABLE 7.1 Relative Inventories and Transition Coefficients for the Four-Box
Model, According to Sawyer,6 and Consistent with Eg. (7.6)
Source t' [b [m [d kab k oo kam k'"" k md kcbn
Sawyer6 1.2 1.2 58 1 1 , 1 I 1IT ..- .. .- .. 30il
Consistent with Eq. (7.6) 1.21 1.2 58.06 I I I 1 -,- IIT 40 .. .- 6.1 "j'ij"Q
It should be mentioned that alternative statistical models can be developed.
Instead of the book inventory nl dermed by Eg. (7.8) we may write
nf+l = A*sf,
where the matrix A is given by (7.3) and where sf is dermed by Eq. (7.9). Which of
the two procedures leads to a smaller variance of Sf depends on the numerical
values of the parameters.
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FIGURE 7.3 Natural reservoirs of carbon dioxide. IX is the content of reservoir;
x. kX:J/ describes the transition from reservoir x to reservoir y. (Adapted from
Machta. 17 )
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7.2.3 NUMERICAL CALCULATIONS AND APPLICATIONS
As a first application of the theoretical results offered above, we will consider some
carbon dioxide data reported in the literature and check their consistency by seeing
whether they fulfill the condition (7.6).
In Table 7.1 the exchange coefficients and the inventories as given by Sawyer6
are listed. It can be seen easily that these data are only partly consistent in the sense
of formula (7.6). Therefore, a consistent set of exchange coefficients is also given
in Table 7.1. However, it should be noted that this set cannot be determined
uniquely. We have changed the coefficients such that as few data as possible had to
be changed and, in addition, such that the inventory of the deep sea, the value of
which is consistent with data reported by Zimen and Altenhein8 and Machta,17 re-
main unchanged.
Figure 7.3 illustrates the seven-box model developed by Machta17 ; this model
takes into account the following reservoirs:
Stratosphere (1)
Troposphere (2)
Long-term terrestrial biosphere (3)
Short-term terrestrial biosphere (4)
Without writing down the system of equations that corresponds to the system
(7.1) and that can be derived immediately from Figure 7.3, we give here only the
equivalent of formula (7.6), Le., the relative size of the inventories in the equi-
librium state:
I = (1, k 12 /k21 , k 12 /e l • k23 /k32 , k 12 /k21 • k24 /k42 ,k12 /k21 • k25 /k52 ,
k 12 /k21 • k 25 /k52 • k 56 /k65 , k 12 /k21 • k25 /k 52 • k 57 /k75). (7.6')
Table 7.2 shows the data given by Machtal7 together with those data that would
be consistent with formula (7.6'). The large differences with respect to the exchange
coefficient kdm (Machta's k'5) between Sawyer's and Machta's data will be impor-
tant later.
As a second application, we ask how fast the system will return to the equi-
librium state after a disturbance from outside. As already mentioned, the speed of
approaching the equilibrium is determined by the reciprocal of the smallest ex-
change coefficient. A numerical illustration is given in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, where the
convergence of the matrix An toward the matrix A~, defined by Eq. (7.7), is
demonstrated both for Sawyer's and for Machta's data. According to Sawyer's
data, nearly 300 years is needed for reaching a new equilibrium, whereas according
to Machta's data nearly 1,600 years is needed. As the consistency relations (7.6) or
(7.6') are not sufficient to determine kdm uniquely unless all other inventories and
exchange coefficients are known precisely, it would be extremely interesting in
view of the problems connected with the CO2 cycle to have more and better data.
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TABLE 7.2 Relative Inventories and Exchange Coefficients for the Seven-Box
Model, According to Machta,17 and Consistent with Eq. (7.6')
Source [' [2 J' r [' ["
Machta 17 5.7 11.1 0.7 30 0.2
Consistent with Eq. (7.6') 5.75 11.2 0.6 30.4 0.22
Source r k12 k21 k 23 k 32 k 24
Machta17 366.7 I 1 I , I,- rr:s 2"""4:4 40 IT
Consistent with Eq. (7.6') 366.7 1 1 1 1 I,- 'f"i":S 24 4'i IT
Source k42 k 2S k S2 k'" k 6S kS7 k7S
Machta '7 I I ...L J 1 I 1,- D ,.. ,- ,- so 1600
Consistent with Eq. (7.6') 1 , I 1 I 1 1,- 1--:2"5
"."
2"13":8 ,- I"3""2:8 1600
TABLE 7.3 Convergence of the Matrix An toward A~ (Defined by Eq. 7.7) for
the Four-Box Model, Based on Sawyer's Data6
A A'oO
.7697 .0250 .1667 .0000 .0241 .0466 .0200 .0153
.0303 .0975 .0000 .0000 .0564 .1598 .0374 .0156
.2000 .0000 .6720 .0033 .0240 .0370 .0216 .0188
.0000 .0000 .1613 .9967 .8954 .7567 .9210 .9502
A200 A~
.0174 .0209 .0167 .0160 .0163 .0163 .0163 .0163
.0253 .0414 .0223 .0189 .0197 .0197 .0197 .0197
.0201 .0221 .0197 .0193 .0196 .0196 .0196 .0196
.9373 .9157 .9413 .9458 .9444 .9444 .9444 .9444
TABLE 7.4 Convergence of the Matrix An toward A~ (Defined by Eq. 7.7) for
the Four-Box Model, Based on Machta's Datal7
A A IOO
.7697 .0169 .0455 .0000 .0881 .0991 .0844 .0065
.0303 .9831 .0000 .0000 .1777 .3226 .1540 .0065
.2000 .0000 .9469 .0006 .3709 .3776 .3606 .0317
.0000 .0000 .0076 .9994 .3634 .2007 .4010 .9554
A '000 A~
.0169 .0173 .0168 .0158 .0159 .0159 .0159 .0159
.0310 .0320 .0308 .0282 .0285 .0285 .0285 .0285
.0740 .0755 .0736 .0694 .0699 .0699 .0699 .0699
.8781 .8752 .8787 .8867 .8857 .8857 .8857 .8857
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FIGURE 7.4 Comparison of measured and theoretical data for the CO2 content
of the atmosphere. (l) Experimental data after Keeling. 19 (2) Theoretical data us-
ing formula (7.1). (3) Theoretical data using the Runge-Kutta procedure for solv-
ing the system of differential equations (7.1'). (4) CO2 from burned fossil fuels
kept in the atmosphere.
As a third application, we compare the data on the CO2 content of the atmosphere
from 1958 to 1970 as measured by Keelingl9 at Mauna Loa with the theoretical
values obtained from formula (7.8) on the basis of Sawyer's and Machta's data. To
be able to do this, we take, after Fairhall,7 for the CO2 content of the atmosphere
n958 = 312 ppm.t
We also take, after Keeling/9 for the annual input nO of CO2 into the atmosphere as
a result of the burning of fossil fuels
nf958 = 0.248· lOIS moles/yr
nf970 = 0.425· lOIS moles/yr.
t An increase of 1 ppm/year corresponds to an increase of 5.64 X 10" molesfyear.
the result
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It is clear that if we start at to with the equilibrium inventories and add in (to, tl)
the amount no 1 of CO2 to the atmosphere, then according to Eq. (7.1) we have at
tl an atmospheric inventory n= Ig + nO,I' Only after t 1 is transport of the
additional CO2 into the other boxes started, because now the relative biospheric
and mixed sea inventories are smaller than before and therefore, according to Eq.
(7.1), the backflow into the atmosphere is smaller.
The results of these calculations are represented in Figure 7.4, along with the
CO2 content of the atmosphere that would result if all CO2 from burned fossil
fuels remained in the atmosphere (curve 4). One sees that the material balance
model (curve 2) describes the measured data (curve 1) much better. It should be
noted that curve 2 is obtained (within drawing accuracy) for both Sawyer's and
Machta's data. One also sees that curve 3, based on the continuous version [Eq.
(7.1')] of Eq. (7.1), has more or less the same form as that based on the discrete
version.
With the help of these calculations, we may discuss the question of uncertainty,
According to Eq. (7.10), we have
MUFf = 11-1 - Ii - (/{'Ib + /('1m). If-I + k ba ·IP-l + k ma ·/r-l + ni,i+1 .
Now, using the data given above, we get for the years 1958 to 1970
1/'-1 - Ii = - 0.002 • If-I and ni,i+1 = 0.007· If-l
Therefore, in the ideal case we should get, with MUFi = 0;
- (/{'Ib +~) .1,-1 + k ba ·It-I +~a ·/i"!.1 = - 0.005 • Ii-I'
Inversely, if we have annual inventory estimates, we can check whether the null
hypotheses E(MUF,) = 0 have to be rejected (i.e., whether the model and the data
are correct).
So far, little information has been given in the literature about the uncertainty
of transition coefficients and inventories.20 ,21 One might argue that because of this
very lack of data statistical analyses are mandatory; in fact, if we assume
var(r) = var(lb ) = var(lm ),
then we get for the asymptotic state, according to Eq. (7.1 5) and with Sawyer's
data6
lC'b = 3~' /{'1m = ~,
var (sa) = 0.383· var (r).
That is, the standard deviation of the atmospheric CO2 inventory is reduced by a
factor of three.
As a last application, we ask what - according to our model - the asymptotic
value of the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere would be if all of the fossil
fuel now known were to be burned. According to Zimen,8 this would correspond
to a final cumulated input of N = 600 • 1015 moles. If we start withlg = 51.4 • lOIS
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moles in preindustrial time, Le., until 1860,18 then we obtain with Sawyer's data
Ig = 62.2' IOIS,It:' = 61.7' IOIS,Ig = 2,985.4' 1015 moles.
This gives a total inventory 10 of
10 = 316.07' 1015 moles.
To answer our question, we have to add to this inventory the CO2 from the burned
fossil fuels and distribute this total inventory according to Eq. (7.6). The result is
I:' = 61.2' 1015, I~ = 74' 1015, I:! = 73.4' 1015, I~ = 3,552' 1015 moles.
This means that in the asymptotic state 567' 1015 moles from the 600' 1015 moles
go into the deep sea and furthermore that the atmospheric content rises from the
1958 value of 312 ppm to 345 ppm in the asymptotic state.
These results, together with those for the speed of convergence, are especially
interesting in view of proposals that have been made recently, namely the direct
introduction of the CO2 from the burned fossil fuels into the deep sea.22 If such
a scheme were feasible, then the figures given above indicate what fraction of the
buried CO2 will re-enter the atmosphere and at what speed. Inversely, if all the CO 2
from the burned fossil fuels were released to the atmosphere, one gets an idea ofhow
long the CO2 would stay in the atmosphere until it went into the deep sea; in other
words, one gets an idea of how long mankind has to live with an atmospheric CO2
content higher than the equilibrium value.
In this connection, one final remark should be made. Up to now practically all
atmospheric CO2 research has concentrated on the dynamics of the undisturbed
state as well as on the future development of the disturbed state. Therefore, the
question of whether a fmal equilibrium concentration of 345 ppm of the atmos-
phere would be tolerable has not yet been treated comprehensively from a decision
theoretical point of view, even though some work along this line has been initiated
recently.13 ,24 It is clearly necessary that in these analyses that are ultimately meant
to help in preparing policy decisions concerning such sensitive issues as fossil fuel
consumption one must explicitly take into account uncertainties of the knowledge,
as well as random variations in flows and inventories.
7.3 REGIONAL AND WCAL EXAMPLES
We have considered global natural material balances that are more and more in-
fluenced by human activities. We started from an equilibrium state and treated
human influence as a disturbance of this (preindustrial) equilibrium state. In this
section we will consider the accountability of pollutants on regional and locallevels.
This means that we do not have a natural equilibrium that gives us a measure for
the orders of magnitude in question; rather, the analyses as well as the measures to
be taken have to be based completely on what is observed and on the consequences
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of relevant throughputs and inventories. Again we will illustrate the ideas by means
of a specific example with a rich data base.
7.3.1 REGIONAL SULFUR DIOXIDE ACCOUNTABILITY
As a consequence of the burning of fossil fuels, sulfur is released into the air in the
fonn of sulfur dioxide, which represents - unlike CO2 - an immediate hazard to
human beings.2s It has, therefore, been the subject of major research.
In order to perfonn a SOz accountability for a region, we consider the air vol-
ume over that region as a material balance area in the sense of Chapter 2. Estab-
lishing a material balance for the atmospheric SOz in this material balance area
means detennining
The inputs over a given period of time (Le., all the inputs into that volume)
The outputs over a given period of time (Le., the removal by washing out by
rainfall, decay, and so on)
The physical inventory at the beginning and at the end of an inventory period
The inputs can be measured at least in cases where there are point sources, and,
they can be estimated fairly accurately if they come from spread sources (e.g., from
households or from transportation). The inventory can be measured by monitoring
TABLE 7.s SOz DataO
General
Natural S03 concentration (pg/m')
Limit for long-term S02 concentration
VDI (pg/m')
U.S. EPA (p.g/m')
S02 residence time in the atmosphere (days)
Ruhraretl
EMISSION (10 6 tons/yr)
Power plants
Residential
Industry
Transportation
TOTAL
INVENTORY (jJg/m')
Power plants 80·1.79
Residential 80·0.53
Industry 80·2.60b
Transportation 80'0.64
TOTAL 804.96
° Data from BUker et 01. '6 bAt a wind speed of 4.5 m/sec.
cOn the seventh day of a temperature inversion.
10
230
80
1-6
80·0.44
80·0.13
80-0.64
80-o.Dl
80·1.22
80·13.7
804.0
80·20.0c
80-0.3
80·38
155
systems like those established in certain regions (Los Angeles and the Ruhr area, for
example). The outputs cannot be measured directly. One may argue that the out-
puts can be evaluated over a fIxed period by determining the difference between
beginning inventory plus inputs and ending inventory; however, such a determi-
nation does not meet the requirements of the material balance, as full knowledge of
the processes involved is impossible.
To solve this output problem in the case of environmental accountability, one
needs models that describe the processes of pollutant formation and decay in the
atmosphere, as well as the washing out of pollutants from the atmosphere. Once such
models have been fully established, they can take the place of the missing "output"
measurements. However, such models must be tested, and in principle they can be
tested only if a complete measurement system is available. This problem can be
solved only by an iterative process.
Work on models of the type postulated has already begun. In Table 7.5, which
summarizes calculations performed by Buker et al.,26 results from a crude model
for the Ruhr area are shown. They correspond satisfactorily with the results of
measurements. A similar but more detailed study of the S02 contained in the air
volume above Great Britain has been published only recently.27 More complex
models are being established, for the Tennessee Valley region,28,29 for example,
where the emphasis is on radioactive discharge. An interesting attempt to balance
the lead contained in the air over a given region (Southern California Bight) was
published in 1974.30
Once the S02 balance for a region is established, questions similar to those
mentioned in the foregoing section again arise. What are tolerable levels of the
atmospheric S02 concentration, and how can these levels be achieved in an optimal
way?
It is clear that the best solution of the atmospheric S02 problem would be to
stop the emission, Le., to desulfurize oil and coal directly. However, in the case of
coal this is not possible, and in the case of oil it is very expensive: it has been esti-
mated that the reduction of sulfur emissions by 1 ton of S02 would cost about
$1000 (U.S.).31 Additionally, there is the question of what could be done with the
enormous amounts of sulfur that would become available in case of complete de-
sulfurization of raw oil in the refineries: 50 million tons of sulfur would be ob·
tained annually this way, and the world market amounts to only about 30 million
tons.32
Thus, on the basis of the physical properties of atmospheric S02 throughputs
and inventories (analyzed with the help of material accountability considerations)
the trade-off between technological possibilities, economic necessities, and human
health hazards has to be faced once again.
7.3.2 SULFUR ACCOUNTABILITY IN POWER PLANTS AND REFINERIES
The control of the S02 input into the atmosphere of a region means primarily the
control of the S02 emissions from refineries and fossil-fueled power stations. This
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means, however, that we now go back to the plant level: one plant is considered as
a material balance area in the sense of Chapter 2, and sulfur is the material to be
safeguarded.
Consider the case of an oil-fired power plant. Sulfur comes in with the oil and
leaves the plant through the stack in the form of S02 together with the offgases if
there are no filters to trap it. If there are filters, then a certain percentage of the
sulfur is removed from the offgas; however, it is kept in the filters, and one has to
ask where the sulfur goes from here. If oil is desulfurized - which transforms a
power plant into a chemical facility32 - then the sulfur is kept in the form of
chemical compounds before the oil goes into the process, and one has to ask what
happens to these chemical compounds. In any case, it is important to observe the
flow of the sulfur, including the final deposition of the sulfur compounds removed
from the offgas or from the oil. Otherwise, one would have kept the sulfur out of
the air but sent it eventually in the form of chemical discards into the ground-
water; in other words, one would not change the fmal effect.
It is obvious that the establishment of the material balance for sulfur in an oil-
fired power plant is very similar to the case, for example, of the plutonium material
balance in a reprocessing plant. Thus, in this context, too, integral experiments have
already been proposed; according to Kneese et al. 33: "Our knowledge of the flow
of materials through the economic system and their loss or purposeful discharge
to the environment is extremely limited, especially with respect to the industry."
The fmal element in verification of the material balance through inspections - so
important in safeguards - may at present not be relevant to the discussion of
pollutant accountability. Only if strict standards for the emission of pollutants are
set, standards that impose an economic burden on the plant operators, the question
of deliberate illegal release of pollutants and, therefore, of the verification of data
may become important.
7.3.3 NOTE ON SPECIAL METAL BALANCES
In recent years one particular area of environmental accountability has become of
major interest - the establishment of balances for special metals used in all advanced
economic systems. Weise34 has pointed out the need for such a balance for mercury,
and several countries have begun to implement such balances for various metals that
have an impact on the environment and therefore on man or that pose a direct
hazard to human health if not controlled properly. A recent publication35 reports
a material balance scheme for cadmium, but other elements - particularly mercury
- have also been the subject of study.
The idea of this special approach is to analyze carefully the flow of the specific
element under consideration in a national economy: physical inventory at a given
point in time (clearly, only the material in the human environment and not the
minerals in the ground), imports, exports, releases to air and water, and finally
physical inventory at the end of the inventory period. With the help of these
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balances one can investigate whether one really knows where the material flows,
where it comes to rest, whether these flows, especially the releases to the environ-
ment, are in accordance with the relevant regulations, and fmally, whether the
burden on man and environment imposed by these materials is tolerable.
It is clear that here the long-term aspects of the use of specific materials are con-
sidered, and not the timely detection of any illegal use of processing. Therefore, it
seems natural to take 1 year as an inventory period. It is also clear that a national
economy represents the appropriate material balance area because imports and ex-
ports can be measured easily. A major problem is the measurement of the many
small mass flows related to small processing units, like laboratories, and especially
the releases to the environment.
In the papers mentioned earlier there are illustrations of the difficulties of de-
termining the uncertainty of the mass balances to be established. Therefore, only
very large amounts missing could be detected with a reasonable probability under
present conditions. On the other hand, at the moment there exists no quantitative
theory about the significance of missing amounts of material; in other words, one
still has to develop ideas about what amounts of mercury or cadmium, if missing,
GOALS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCOUNTING
DATA ABOUT EMISSIONS
AND LOCAL CONCENTRATIONS
ASSESS-
MENT
SETTING UP MODELS TO
DETERMINE INVENTORY
STOCK (LOCAL CONCENTRATION-
EMISSION RELATION )
VERIFiCATION OF THE MODELS
BY MEASUREMENTS AT
REPRESENTATIVE POINTS
SETTING UP ACCOUNTING
SYSTEMS IN PRODUCER-
CONSUMER - SYSTEMS
(OUTPUT)
INTEGRAL EXPERIMENTS FOR
DETERMINATION OF STRATEGIC
POINTS IN PRODUCER -
CONSUMER SYSTEMS
FIGURE 7.5 Environmental accountability. (From Gupta et ai. 36)
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cannot be tolerated by a national economy. It is clear that in this important area
work has only just begun, and one must hope that the success of mass balance con-
siderations elsewhere will stimulate progress here as well.
7.4 CONCLUSION
We have surveyed natural material balances, and we have seen how human activities
increasingly disturb these balances on a global scale. Furthermore, we have looked
into environmental problems of regional and local scale, and we have demonstrated
that the idea of material accountability, which has been propounded by several
groups and which has proven successful in the case of nuclear material safeguards,
could be valuable in diverse situations in the natural environment and in the
economy.
Figure 7.5 represents in the form of a flowchart the complex interrelations
among the main aspects of the problem of environmental balances:
• Material balance models
• Verification of the models by measurements
• Technology and economics
In the preceding chapters examples of these individual aspects have been given. The
diagram illustrates the importance of achieving an appropriate balance of theoretical
models, of monitoring systems, and of environmental standards of any kind.
It seems too early for an international accountability system, for example, for
pollutants, although this has already been envisioned by some groupS.2,33 Even if the
data base exists, there may be difficulties of access to it and problems in organizing
a worldwide reporting system. In this connection it is important to realize that in a
specific case such an international accountability system does exist, that it has
proven workable for the plant operators and for the safeguards authority, and that
it can be implemented with a reasonable budget (in 1974 the staff numbered 100
and the budget amounted to $3 million, including R&D).
It must be stressed that international political considerations urgently called for
setting up the IAEA safeguards system. At present the issue of environmental pol-
lution control may not be seen as so urgent, so it is not surprising that the inter-
national demand that is a prerequisite for the establishment of an international
safeguards system is lacking. Even with radioactive waste discharges, whose danger
is universally acknowledged, the problems of establishing a register were great.
Despite political unwillingness to recognize the patent realities of the situation, it
is vital that steps be taken immediately to ameliorate this problem, whose mag-
nitude increases daily.
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8 Arms Control
Arms control measures as a means of reducing political tensions entered the inter-
national political scene in the years after the First World War. At that time, most
of the effort was devoted to finding formulae capable of expressing equivalencies
that were negotiable. Thus, at the Washington Conference on the limitation of
Naval Ships (1921-1922), for instance, a formula for capital ships was agreed upon,
but little attention was given to the need for information about compliance or the
preparation of responses in the event of noncompliance.
After the Second World War, when arms control discussions started again, the
question of possible verification measures was raised immediately - partly perhaps
because disarmament had failed to prevent the Second World War and because
clandestine preparations for a war had been carried out so effectively by some
nations. There are many more political and technical reasons, but they will not be
discussed here; it is sufficient for our purposes to note that today security in dis-
armament is identified with adequate inspection. At this point those aspects dis-
cussed in Chapter 5 become relevant - for instance, what is the minimum level of
inspection consistent with security requirements on one hand and with acceptability
on the other?
Even though no large-scale implementation of the control of conventional arms
has been achieved so far, it is widely held that some kind of accountability measures
will be used if arms control or disarmament verification agreements become effec-
tive. Therefore, and simply because of the vital importance of these problems, we
will describe some ideas developed so far.
In this chapter, we will offer some remarks about the problem as a whole, and
then discuss some earlier ideas about accountability and inspection measures.
Finally, we will report on a model in which all the aspects of the verification of
arms reduction measures in Central Europe, at least, have been tackled.
It should be noted here that in this chapter we use the term "verification" in a
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much more general sense than in the foregoing chapters, where we limited its use
to the control of data generated by the inspected party. Here, we will use this word
for all measures taken in order to get any information about compliance with the
provisions of arms control and disarmament treaties and agreements. This is the
usage employed by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1 who have
given an excellent outline of the political problems connected with the ideas to be
discussed in this chapter.
For those interested in the current state of arms control and disarmament the
journal Arms Control Today2 is recommended as a source for general references.
Detailed analyses of the various aspects of the whole problem are given in a special
issue of Daedalus, 3 and information about technical means may be found in Green-
wood.4 SaatyS and especially Mathematica6 offer a unique collection of mathemat-
ical models for a series of specific problems of this field.
8.1 SURVEY ON ARMS CONTROL ANALYSES
We have already demonstrated in Chapter 4 that one cannot analyze verification
measures effectively if one does not analyze - at least in a cursory way - the whole
problem, Le., those arms control and disarmament measures that are to be agreed
upon and that have to be verified. Therefore, we first discuss some of the current
ideas in that field and then some verification models.
8.1.1 MODELS DESCRIBING ARMS CONTROL AS A CONFLICT SITUATION
In order to determine the frame or, in the language of Chapter 4, the "global
parameters" of a verification system, it is necessary to have an idea of the possible
gains and losses of the parties who are considering entering into an arms control
agreement, even if these gains and losses can be described only very vaguely.
In 1963, Maschler developed a very detailed model to analyze some aspects of a
treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning a ban on test-
ing nuclear weapons.? The model treated the subjective beliefs and predictions of
the decision-making authorities of the United States on the basis of a two-person
non-zero-sum game. For this purpose an attempt was made to order the subjective
utility payoffs for the various policies that could be adopted by the two parties to
the game, and some conclusions were reached about whether and under what con-
ditions it would be advisable for the United States to sign such a treaty.
Whereas Maschler based his analyses on a mathematical model, Saaty8 discussed
in general terms the possible advantages and disadvantages of an arms control agree-
ment for a state. He began with an evaluation of the expense of weapons systems
compared to their destructive power, continued with considerations on the value of
human life, and ended with such qualitative criteria as reduction of international
tensions and improvement of the capacity to develop in peaceful directions by
establishing machinery for handling conflicts by means other than war.
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It seems to be a hopeless enterprise to translate the idealistic goals of anns con-
trol and disannament as expressed above into a concrete bilateral or multilateral
agreement that includes quantitative details about verification measures. In fact, no
quantitative models are known that have made an attempt of this kind and thus can
offer algorithms that are derived from first principles and that are able, among other
things, to determine necessary effort. In this connection, it seems worthwhile to
mention the ideas on mathematical style and political style expressed in ACDA/ST
-37: 9
The mathematical style modelizes the questions of inspection effort, cheating
strategies, effectiveness within a given, closed, fully delineated set of conditions.
These questions are studied, then, as a quantifiable relationship between the number
of opportunities to violate and the number of inspections allowed. The political
style examines the psychological and political milieu within which the decisions to
cheat or comply are made. Therefore, such complicating variables as incentive to
cheat, incentive to detect, longer-term objectives, deterioration of existing weapons
systems, political repercussions, and the domestic political system must be taken in-
to account when assessing how much inspection is needed.
We realize that it was exactly in the sense of the mathematical style as defmed
here that we assumed in our analysis of the nuclear material safeguards system that
the values of some global parameters are fixed by political decisions and that there·
after the systems analyst optimizes the available resources according to some derived
criterion. We will come back to this point once more later on.
8.1.2 MATERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AS AN ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION TOOL
The major part of the published literature dealing with arms control verification
measures considers nuclear weapons test ban verification measures. This may result
from the fact that such agreements indeed were reached and therefore called for
detailed analyses. Furthennore, the verification measures in question here (for in-
stance, installation of seismic equipment) lent themselves in a comparatively natural
way to mathematical treatment: the detennination of the necessary number of
stations and their optimal distribution such that any clandestine weapons test is de-
tected with a given probability is a well-defmed mathematical problem.
In addition to these test ban analyses, there are several approaches to other,
more general arms control and reduction schemes, and here material accountability
considerations enter the scene at a very early stage. There is one examplelO in
which a factory is considered that produces some materials that are of strategic un-
portance; the factory is subject to control in the fonn of a monitoring system that
guarantees an account of all the material entering and leaving the factory by apply-
ing the accountability principles already well known to us.
There is another example where a pure record-report system fonns the basis of a
verification systemll and where the consistency of the records that are generated
by the inspected party and that are reported to the control authority is taken as a
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criterion of compliance with an anns control agreement. Oearly, this means that
some material or troop unit that has been recorded as having left one place must be
recorded as having arrived at another place - again the old principle in a somewhat
different fonn. The same reasoning as used in the case of the test ban agreements
may explain why there has not been more effort devoted to these important
questions. Up to now there are not agreements on the control or reduction of con-
ventional military forces that are subject to verification procedures.
8.1.3 DIRECT INSPECTIONS
Next to test ban verification measures, direct inspections have been a major object
of mathematical studies.6 Here, some very detailed game theoretical models on
specific aspects have been developed that have gained the attention of a wide scien-
tific audience. In this connection it should be noted that formulae of the type of
the formulae (3.40) have been developed independently in the course of such
studies,12
8.1.4 CONCLUSIONS
Let us summarize this section by saying that there exists a large literature on arms
control and disannament verification measures both in the mathematical and in
the political style. Probably much more work has been done that has not yet been
published in the open literature. There is still some lack of realistic applications;this
is a result of the fact that international verification systems have not yet been
installed. However, this would change immediately as soon as agreements of this
kind were negotiated.
8.2 VERIFICATION OF MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION IN
CENTRAL EUROPE
In June 1968, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact
began discussions about Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) in Central
Europe. Since that time there have been ongoing discussions about this issue, and
fonnal talks opened in Vienna in 1973. Even though there is still no final agreement
in sight in Vienna, and the question of verification has not yet been discussed
fonnally, some unilateral efforts have been made to analyze the effect of specific
verification measures that one might imagine to be negotiable. As these analyses
contain all the elements of material accountability and its verification that have
been described in the earlier chapters of this monograph, we will merely sketch
them here. In so doing, we strictly adopt the mathematical style, Le., we do not dis-
cuss the whole problem with all its political implications, but concentrate on one
aspect, namely, the technical problems of verification.
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In the following we will report briefly on some MBFR models that have been
developed so far. We will then discuss the problem of verification of MBFR agree-
ments in some detail. It will be shown that ''material'' accountability procedures
could indeed play an important role in this area.
8.2.1 MBFR MODELS
Analyses on the subject of MBFR in the political style may be found in Daedalus3
and especially in Volume 6 of Arms Control Today;'% the latter contains an updated
list of references from which one may get an excellent impression of the current
state of MBFR. We will not discuss these analyses here but instead try to give an idea
about models in the mathematical style that have been reported by Bellany;13.14
these models seem to give a kind of quantitative framework or reference for what
will be said about verification procedures.
A first approach is to assume that there exists a balance that can be represented
by an equation of the form
g(Me• Te• Pe,· ..) = f(Mw• Tw• Pw'" .),
where g and f are the warmaking capabilities of the Eastern (e) and Western (w)
forces, respectively, and are functions of troops (M), tanks (T), aircraft (P), and the
like, deployed by each side. (We will not discuss here what is meant by warmaking
capability, but we will come back to this point in the next section.) It follows from
this equation that after force reductions t:.M, t..T, and so on, there will be a new
balance if
t:.Me/t:.Mw = 3Me/3Mw
and so on, where AMe and t:.Mw represent small reductions in the number of troops
of East and West, respectively.
The value of 3Me/3Mw can be determined only if the functional relationship be-
tween troop numbers on each side is known, but because of insufficient published
data this problem cannot be tackled directly. However, if one made the additional
assumption that the existing level of forces came about via an arms race process
obeying either the Richardson model15 or the less crude and more recent variant of
Caspary5 and if one also assumed that the levels of forces had reached a stage of
zero growth rate, then one would get
Me = k •Mw (approximately),
and one would get the following relation for small balanced reductions in troops:
t..Me/Me = t..Mw/Mw
which means that balanced reductions should take place in the form of equal per-
centage reductions.
A second approach is to assume that there exists a stable balance between the
two opposing forces in the particular sense that an actual outbreak of hostilities
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would lead to no advantage, initially at least, to either side. In other words, one
tries to estimate the initial losses in a battle and applies the results to peacetime re-
ductions. Because of unavailability of published data, one has to attempt to describe
mathematically the course of a very simple battle.
One way of doing this is to regard the battle as a tank battle and to begin by
writing the rate of tank losses as
~Te ~Tw Tw
-=--"r"-
Te Tw Te
where Te " Tw is a measure of the encounter probability of one tank with an enemy
tank; and p and q are measures of the respective rates at which West's tanks destroy
East's tanks and vice versa. Then losses ~Te and ~Tw in the first moments of the
battle emerge as
~Te ~Tw p Tw
-- = --.-.-Te Tw q Te '
At this stage, following Bellany,13 we need to make a further assumption about
our tank battle, namely that the numerically larger tank force, East's, is the attacker.
It then becomes possible to assign a value to the ratio p/q, provided we accept the
fairly widely held belief that tanks can more effectively destroy other tanks from a
defensive position than they can themselves be destroyed by attacking tanks. If
current NATO tank strength in the Central Region of Central Europe is assumed to
accurately reflect this superiority of the defense in the sense that p/q = Te/Tw'
then the losses (and therefore the appropriate peacetime reductions) become
~Te/Te = ~Tw/Tw'
If on the other hand, p/q is taken to be a fixed number on average, derivable from
the study and observation of historical conflicts and weapons trials, and it seems
that students of such matters put its value somewhere between 3 and 4 in this con-
text, then we get
where 3 <r <4. Inserting now the actual ratio of the NATO to Warsaw Pact
strengths in the Northern and Central regions of Central Europe together, one
obtains
where 1.1 <s < 1.4.
There are more models of this kind, but we will stop the description here be-
cause the intention was only to give an idea of the ways of thinking that could lead
to reduction figures - a problem similar in magnitude to that of fixing absolute
figures for the inspection effort. We also will not discuss here the validity of as-
sumptions and the many caveats that have to be observed at any stage of such an
analysis; instead we will concentrate on the verification aspects of any arms re-
duction agreement.
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8.2.2 FORMULATION OF THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM
Let us now assume that an arms reduction is agreed upon in the following form. A
fraction of the stationed military forces (troops and heavy equipment) is withdrawn
from a certain area in Central Europe, which we call the reduction area. Further-
more, an upper level for the military forces is agreed upon that cannot be passed in
the future; any attempt at increasing the forces beyond this level would be consid-
ered an act of noncompliance with the agreement.
It is clear that the reduction itself, Le., the withdrawal of forces, need not be sub-
ject to sophisticated verification measures, as such an action can always be demon-
strated to representatives of neutral states, or to the press, or to any observers. The
problem for the adversary states consists in continuously maintaining the conviction
that the agreed force level is not passed. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake veri-
fication measures whose goal is early detection of any significant increase of the
military forces beyond the agreed level.
Before we can talk about technical details of verification measures and their
compliance with the goal spelled out above we have to defme what we mean by
"military forces." Obviously, the number of troops alone or of tanks and guns does
not fully describe the strength of military forces. On the other hand, it makes no
sense to define the strength of military forces in a comprehensive and therefore
sophisticated way if there exists no possibility of verifying the so-defmed military
forces with the means available. The solution analyzed so far is indeed to count
only troops and tanks, keeping in mind that this can be only a first-order solution
to the problem.
It should be noted that quite similar difficulties exist if one wants to verify some
environmental standards such as air or water standards. Air or water pollution can
be defined only in accordance with appropriate measurement methods (e.g., for
S02 or dust particle content in the case of air), which means that one has to limit
the defmition in such a way that the most important features of the problem are
caught.
What are the possible verification measures? In Daedalus3 a long list of possible
technical means is given, including satellites and ground sensors. However, in the
MBFR case there are many reasons that make these means unacceptable either to
one or to all parties; therefore, a system whose basic elements are a record system
and physical inspections seems to be the best chance of acceptance, at least at the
moment. Still, a rich portfolio of possible combinations of these elements exists, as
we shall see, and the question is which combination best meets the verification goal
under the given boundary conditions.
8.2.3 BASIC MEANS AND PROCEDURES
In the years 1973 to 1976 there were major studies that analyzed the basic means
and procedures, the boundary conditions, and the effectiveness of an MBFR-
verification system for Central Europe. We will report here about some elements of
168
these unpublished studies because they represent a remarkable effort toward pos-
sible solution of these problems of vital interest and because they are an illuminating
example oflarge-scale use of the material accountability principle.
The studies start with the assumption that for a given reduction area a force level
has been agreed upon and, furthermore, that after withdrawal of the surplus of
troops and tanks, at time to a certain force level L is guaranteed in this area. In the
following we restrict our discussion, for the sake of simplicity, to troops. In the time
interval (to, tl) an exchange of stationed troops takes place across the boundaries
of the reduction area, and the problem arises of how to guarantee that the net input
of foreign troops into the reduction area in this interval of time is not significantly
greater than zero.
The solution proposed at the moment is to limit the exchange of troops to so-
called declared exit-entry points where there are inspectors to observe the flow of
troops. In addition, some measures are proposed that will guarantee that the possi-
bility of crossing the boundary at undeclared points is excluded. We will call these
two basic measures transfer measurement and transfer safeguards.
It should be noted that the exchange of troops can take place via road, railroad,
sea, and air. Whereas the situation is relatively clear in the first three cases, it is
more complicated in the fourth. We can maintain the scheme only if we define the
boundaries of the airports as boundaries of the reduction area. It is clear that in this
case the transfer safeguards pose a difficult problem.
Another point worth mentioning is that the major problem here is to guarantee
that troops cannot enter the reduction area through undeclared entry points with-
out being detected or, in other words, that no undeclared troops can enter the re-
duction area. Contrary to this situation, in the nuclear material safeguards system
only the declared material, Le., the material that has been recorded and reported
before entering the fuel cycle, is subject to safeguards. The fact that in the arms
control case such a limitation cannot be accepted may be seen as reflecting the
difference in importance between these two control problems.
In principle, the two basic means, transfer measurement and safeguards, would
be sufficient if there were no counting or measurement errors. However, as these
errors cannot be avoided, after some time they accumulate in such a way that the
uncertainty about whether the actual force level is enhanced significantly is no
longer tolerable. Therefore, from time to time one has to perform a physical in-
ventory of the stationed troops in order to "recalibrate" the information. Obvi-
ously, the same problem as before arises: it is not sufficient to perform a physical
inventory with respect to the declared troops; one also has to be sure that there are
no undeclared inventories. Thus, some inventory safeguards measures have to be
taken. To find the appropriate tools seems to be the most difficult problem posed
by this concept of arms control verification. In all material accountability problems
considered so far the physical inventory was a constitutive element of the material
balance establishment. Here, however, we have a case in which it plays only an aux-
iliary role, as all material flows are measured against a fixed nominal inventory,
namely the agreed force level.
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TABLE 8.1 Means and Procedures for Verification of an Arms Control Agreement
II
III
IV
Transfer Measurement
Official exit-entry points
Accompanying documents to facilitate verification
Permanent stationary inspections
Transfer Safeguards
Mobile ground teams
Aerial (or satellite) reconnaissance
Observation of the air space
In pentory Measurement
Declaration of official installations
Overall inspection or notifications combined with spot checks
Ad hoc inspections
Ad hoc aerial (or satellite) inspections
Inpentory Safeguards
Ad hoc aerial (or satellite) reconnaissance
Mobile ground teams (ad hoc)
Before going into some mathematical details, we will say a few words about
procedures. There are several possibilities, and since there is no solid information
about what can and what will be negotiated, we will give two extremes. One
possibility is that the inspection authority generates all the information necessary
by its own means: inspectors count the troops crossing the exit-4lntry points; they
take the physical inventories; and, in addition, some measures are taken in order
to detect any undeclared inventories. Naturally, such a procedure would be ex-
tremely intrusive if it were completely effective; we will come back to this point.
Another possibility is that the party subject to the control generates all the neces-
sary information and that the inspection authority mainly performs consistency
checks using the reported information, and performs only marginal measurements
on its own. The question arises of whether the inspected party is willing to give
detailed enough information that these consistency checks result in satisfactory
effectiveness. Here, we are led to fundamental problems of the system, which we
will discuss in the last section.
Table 8.1 summarizes the four basic components of a complete system for the
verification of an arms control agreement in a well-defined reduction area; some
procedural aspects are also included in the table. It should be noted here that in
establishing this system the emphasis was on completeness; the aspect of accept·
ability has not been considered so far.
8.2.4 MATHEMATICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Because no MBFR verification system has been been established, we cannot yet per·
form a mathematical analysis as we did for the nuclear material safeguards system.
(8.1)
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Therefore, we will limit our considerations to some aspects of the whole problem
that we can handle with the tools developed in the first chapters.
Transfer Measurements
Let us assume that we have R exit-entry points and that in a given reference time,
at the ith point, i = 1, ... ,R. N j transfers take place. We consider for illustrative
purposes troop transfers, but we also could imagine others. The reference time (e.g.,
1 year) is defined here as a period during which a cycle of transfers is completed
and after which a similar cycle begins. Furthermore, let us assume that at the ith
exit-entry point the transfers are always of the same order of magnitude; that the
number of troops in a transfer counted by the inspector is Tij. j = 1, ... ,N,•
i = 1, ... ,R, where TiJ has a sign according to the direction of the transfer; and
that the variance of the random counting error for one transfer is a~ • i = 1, ... , R.
It should be noted that the estimation of these variances requires experiments. In
fact, a series of so~alled field tests has given some indication of the possibilities
and limitations of physical inspections. One must admit, however, that we are still
far from being able to give satisfying quantitative estimates of the accuracy of in-
spection measures. It is for this reason that we do not take into account systematic
counting errors here, even though they could easily be included with the help of the
formalism given in Chapter 2.
According to the discussion in the foregoing section one can imagine the follow-
ing verification schemes:
1. As a first possible procedure we assume that no data are reported by the in-
spected party to the inspection authority, which means that the inspection authority
must generate all necessary data itself. However, the inspection authority has the
capability of acquiring all data needed. As measurement accuracy is limited, a sig-
nificance test has to be performed to determine whether the transfers during the
reference time lead to a strength of forces beyond the agreed level.
Let /0 be the initial inventory, and a:O the variance of the error of the deter-
mination of the initial inventory. We will not discuss here the way in which the
initial inventory is determined, whether by counting or by other means, and we
will therefore not discuss the reasons for these errors, which are characterized by
the variance alo .
The book inventory B at the end of the reference time is given by
R Nj
B = /0 +L L Til'
1=1 j=1
and the variance a1 of the book inventory is given by
R
var(B) = ale + L N j • a1
1=1
:a1. (8.2)
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(8.3)HI :E(B-L) = M>O.Ho:E(B-L) = 0;
The problem consists in testing whether this book inventory is significantly
greater than the agreed force level L. This means that a test has to be performed
with respect to the null hypothesis Ho (that the expected value of the difference
between the book inventory and the agreed level is zero) and the alternative
hypothesis HI (that the expected value of this difference is a value greater than
zero):
In other words, M is the difference between the agreed and the actual force level. If
the counting errors are normally distributed, we get, by analogy to formula (2.15),
the following expression for the probability of detection
1 - (3 = cI> (~ - UI-a.). (8.4)
where a is the false alarm probability. It should be kept in mind that this probability
of detection refers only to the strategy of passing the agreed force level by intro-
dUcing troops into the reduction area via agreed exit-entry points. We will come
back to this point.
So far, we have tacitly assumed that the inspection authority wants to know
whether the agreed force level is surpassed only at the end of the reference time.
However, if the reference time is one year, the "critical time" might be one week,
perhaps even one day. Thus, we have the same problem that we treated in Chapter
2: if we fix the overall false alarm probability for the reference time, we have to
choose the false alarm probabilities for the single ''inventory periods" appropriately.
Without repeating the formulae here, we mention only that for a flXed value of
M and increasing reference time the probability of detection 1 - (3 decreases such
that it will eventually no longer be satisfying. When this happens, it is time to per-
form a physical inventory in order to recalibrate the information, or, in other words,
to raise the value of the probability of detection to a satisfying level.
2. As a second possible procedure we assume that sometime before each transfer
the corresponding transfer data of the inspected party (expected nominal value EI/
and variance al of the jth transfer at the ith exit-entry point) are reported to the
inspection authority. The inspection authority then decides on the basis of a ran-
dom sampling plan whether it will verify the data of this transfer by checking the
reported data with the help of independent measures.
It should be noted that the variance al need not necessarily be understood as
the variance of a counting error; it may also be the variance of an error caused by
imperfect knowledge about the transfer at the time the data have to be reported.
Let us assume for the moment that there exists only one exit-entry point;
therefore, let us omit for the moment the index i. Furthermore, let us assume at
the moment that one inspection takes € hours and that C hours are permitted for
the inspection of the transfers at this exit-entry point. This means that n transfer
data can be verified where
C = €. n. (8.5)
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Let the variance of the inspector's estimate of one transfer datum be a~ and that
of the reported datum a~. Then the variance of the difference D between one re-
ported and one estimated datum is
(8.6)
If this variance is known, the inspection authority (the inspector at the exit-
entry point) can perfonn a difference test with respect to the null hypothesis H o
(that the expectation value of the difference between inspector's estimate and re-
ported datum is zero) and with respect to the alternative hypothesis HI (that this
expectation value is either larger or smaller than zero), depending on whether the
transfer entered or left the reduction area:
Ho :E(D) = 0; HI :E(D) = p.. (8.7)
The analysis of this test leads, under appropriate nonnality assumptions, to the
already well-known fonnula for the probability of error of the second kind:
~' = cI> (U1 _Q' -~) , (8.8)
where a' is the probability of error of the first kind.
According to our assumptions, the whole verification procedure consists of n
single difference tests. If we assume that one transfer datum can be falsified by the
amount p., then r falsifications are necessary in order to reach the amount M, where
M = p.' r. (8.9)
Here, the falsifications of data of transfers going into or leaving the reduction
area have to be taken with the appropriate sign.
If the inspected party has decided at the beginning of the reference time to pass
the agreed level by the amount M, the probability of detection 1 - ~ is given by
fonnula (3.18):
where
~ =
a = l-(l-a't
(8.10)
(8.11)
is the resulting false alarm probability.
For R different exit-entry points the analysis becomes very difficult, as already
detailed in Chapter 3; the boundary conditions that correspond to Eqs. (8.5) and
(8.9) are given here by
(8.12)
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Therefore, it seems that in a real situation the only way to determine the optimum
distribution of a given inspection effort on R exit-entry points and the probability
of detecting noncompliance with the agreed force level of size M is to perform a
simulation study.
3. A third possibility is that no detailed data are reported to the inspection
authority and, in addition, the available inspection effort is too small for full cover·
age of all transfers. We assume furthermore that either the inspected party reports
some general data on transfers (expected values and variances) or the inspection
authority has built up some experience about such general data. This means that,
as in case 1, the inspection authority has to form an estimate of the net transfer
during the reference time with the help ofits own fmdings and the general data; at
the end of the reference time, the inspection authority must perform a significance
test similar to that in case 1. With the appropriate assumptions this problem can be
treated in exactly the same way as the one treated in section 4.4, so we will not
present the mathematical apparatus again.
Inventory Measurements
What has been said about transfer measurements applies to inventory measurements,
except that here we do not have the analytical problems caused by the sequential
nature of transfer measurements. There is, however, a difference between these two
types of measurements that might require completely different technical solutions:
while one can in the transfer measurement case imagine that an inspection or data
verification of the type discussed above could be accepted by the inspected party,
there seem to be major difficulties in the inventory measurement case. Probably at
least some parts of barracks, installations, or ground training areas would not be
accessible to inspectors, and it is not clear at the moment if such a restriction could
simply be treated as a kind of systematic error or whether it would necessitate a
completely new approach.
Transfer and Inventory Safeguards
According to the foregoing section safeguards measures are necessary in order to
guarantee that no military forces enter the reduction area through undeclared entry
points and to ensure that there are no undeclared forces in the reduction area during
the time of inventory taking. We have mentioned the difficulties of fmding appro-
priate (acceptable) measures; therefore, we will not go into mathematical discussion
before there is clarification about the subject. Still, two points are worth mentioning.
First, unlike the transfer and inventory measures, no quantitative statements are
necessary here; it is sufficient that either the statement "nothing happened" or the
statement "something happened" can be made with some accuracy, which means a
simplification of the problem. Second, again in contrast to the transfer and in-
ventory measurements, here the problem of circumvention of safeguards becomes
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relevant: whereas in the case of measurements the situation seems to be quite clear,
one never knows in the case of safeguards if there is any chance to detect something
or if, on the contrary, an illegal action is performed in such a way that the safeguards
are meaningless. In other words, it is not clear to what degree there is a statistical
independence between illegal actions and verification measures; if such indepen-
dence exists, the probability of detection is no longer an appropriate criterion of
optimization.
8.2.5 SYSTEM PROBLEMS
On the foregoing pages we have touched several times upon aspects of the system
as a whole that were treated in Chapter 4. We will discuss some of them once more
in this connection even though we will not be able to offer satisfying solutions.
We have defined the goal of the MBFR verification measures as the timely de-
tection of any significant increase of forces beyond the agreed level. This goal must
be put into the context of the goals of MBFR itself, which cannot be specified so
clearly and so easily; they range from such concrete goals as saving of national
financial resources through the reduction of arms to such qualitative ones as
reduction of tensions and building up of mutual confidence.7 At this point the first
"system problem" arises: How can we achieve accord between MBFR goals and
MBFR verification goals? We can fulfill the verification goal by investing heavily
in the inspection effort, but will such an intrusive verification system have any
chance of acceptance by the inspected parties? Apparently, in addition to the
verification goal some boundary conditions must be formulated to guarantee a
reasonable balance between high verification efficiency on one hand and high
chance of acceptability on the other.
Let us assume that there is agreement about the basic measures and procedures of
an MBFR verification system - for example, that some kinds of physical inspection
and counting measures are accepted but that there is to be no satellite surveillance
because the evaluation of the data generated by these means is not accessible to all
parties to the game. The problem then arises of how to establish the system as a
whole such that the above-mentioned balance is guaranteed. One approach to this
problem (discussed in Chapter 4) is to look at the global parameters of the veri-
fication system. In the case of an MBFR verification system we have the following
global parameters:
• Length of the inventory period (which has here a somewhat different mean-
ing from its meaning in Chapter 2)
• Probability of detection for the whole system
• False alarm probability for the whole system
• Increase of forces beyond the agreed level
• Inspection effort (expressed in inspection man-hours and/or monetary terms)
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FIGURE 8.1 Suggested MBFR verification system.
As we have only one relation between these global parameters, once we have put
together all the subsystems we have to choose the value of four of the five para-
meters independently, and it is at this point that we have to achieve the balance be-
tween the different goals and boundary conditions. Naturally, a high value of the
overall false alarm probability leads to a high probability of detection; however,
mutual confidence will not benefit very much from a large number of false alarms
even if the alarms are later recognized as false. Similar arguments hold for the
choice of the values of length of inventory period and inspection effort. Thus, one
could imagine that in designing a verification system one proceeds as follows. One
first asks what increase beyond the agreed force level in which period of time would
be considered critical. Next, the values of overall false alarm probability and inspec-
tion effort are fixed, and the overall probability of detection is calculated with the
help of an optimization procedure of the kind described earlier. If one thinks that
the value of the probability of detection is high enough, then the system could be
implemented; otherwise, the parameter values have to be reviewed and the pro-
cedure has to be continued until a satisfying and consistent set of parameter values
is reached.
In conclusion, some remarks about action levels are in order, as this aspect is of
176
central importance to the whole system. How many levels, and of what organiza-
tional form, are necessary to convince a government that the alarm raised by the
system is a real alarm, or only a false alarm? So far, there is only vague understand-
ing of this area; one suggested system, based on studies already mentioned, is rep-
resented in Figure 8.1. It seems too early to go into more detail here, especially
if one remembers that even the well-defined and widely accepted nuclear materials
safeguards system is still rather vague in light of the degree ofclarification necessary,
according to the discussion in Chapter 4, to full understanding of the structure of
the system.
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